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HQDA Ltr 525-74-19

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (24 Apr 74) DAMO-ODU

6 May 1974

Expires 6 May 1975

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Colonel John R. Hermann, Jr.,
 Senior Advisor, 3rd Royal Thai Army (RTA), 27 May 1972 -
 27 May 1973 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Reference: AR 525-14, Senior Officer Debriefing Report (U),
 2 Julv 1971.
2. Transmitted herewith is the report of Colonel John R. Hermann, Jr.,
 subject as above.
3. This report is provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized
 from the experiences of the author. The report should be reviewed in
 accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5, AR 525-14; however, it should not
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
HEADQUARTERS, DETACHMENT III
Joint United States Military Advisory Group, Thailand
Phitsanuloke, Thailand
APO San Francisco 96303

TARAGC-3

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report
(Colonel John R. Hermann, Jr.)

THRU: Chief, Army Advisory Group
USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI
ATTN: Deputy for Programs and Operations
APO San Francisco 96346

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development
ATTN: FOR OT UT
Department of the Army
Washington, D. C. 20310



1. (U) **GENERAL:** This report covers my tour as Senior Advisor to the 3rd Royal Thai Army (RTA) during the period 27 May 1972 to 27 May 1973. It is designed to provide an overview of 3rd RTA activities and a perspective on the Communist Insurgency in North Thailand, as well as my views on the U.S. Army Advisory effort in Detachment III. Included in this report is my assessment of the 3rd RTA capability to train, mount counterinsurgency operations and its ability to maintain security in its assigned area. Many of the short titles/abbreviations contained in this report are unique to JUSMAGTHAI and are included in Annex A for clarification. Additional annexes provide detailed back-up information.

2. (C-NF) ORGANIZATION IN THE NORTH:


a. **3rd Royal Thai Army:** The senior military headquarters in the North is the 3rd RTA commanded by LTG Samran Patayakul. The major units under his command are the 4th Infantry Division, the 3rd Army Support Command (3rd ASCOM) and the 4th and 7th Military Circles. The Cavalry Division Forward, 31st Regimental Combat Team (RCT) and 11th RCT are presently OPCON to 3rd RTA from the 1st Division headquarters in Bangkok. (See Figure A-1). 3rd RTA Headquarters is organized into a rear and forward headquarters. Both headquarters are located in Phitsanuloke, though

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Enclosure

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separated by approximately 5 kilometers. 3rd RTA Forward coordinates counterinsurgency efforts in North Thailand and displaces to areas where major operations are being conducted in order to provide a control headquarters. It has had OPCON of organic 3rd RTA units as well as units assigned to other commands. 3rd RTA Main, on the other hand, is responsible for administration, logistics and training of organic units in 3rd RTA.

(1) 4th Infantry Division: This unit is composed of two organic Regimental Combat Teams (RCT) as well as normal combat support and combat service support units. Each RCT has three organic infantry battalions, an organic tank company an OPCON artillery battalion and normal service support elements (See Figure A-2 and A-3).

(2) 3rd ASCOM and the Military Circles provide logistical support and are discussed in Annex E.

b. Communist Suppression Operations Region III (CSOR III): The national level command for the conduct of integrated counterinsurgency operations is Communist Suppression Operations Center (CSOC) located in Bangkok. The implementing arm of this organization in the North (Region III) is CSOR III, which in reality is 3rd RTA Forward because this headquarters provides the command and staff for its operation. The Commanding General, 3rd RTA, also serves as the Director of CSOR III and is responsible for integrating counterinsurgency efforts in North Thailand. The CSOC organization extends down to province level in the form of Communist Suppression Operation Provinces (CSCP) and Communist Suppression Operation Districts (CSOD). These organizations are commanded by the senior regional military commander or the provincial governor and staffed by police, civil, and military personnel (See Figure A-4). Forces available to CSOR III for CI operations include designated RTA units, para-military units, Border Patrol Police (BPP) and Provincial Police (PP). These are commonly referred to as Civil-Police-Military (CPM) units.

(1) RTA Units: RTA units are assigned the mission of destroying armed CT forces located in jungle areas.

(2) Civil (Para-military) Units: These units are assigned the mission of local protection and are normally under the control of the local civil government.

(a) The Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) is currently receiving more emphasis in the North. VDC personnel normally receive six weeks of training and are formed into Village Protection Units (VPU) which are usually headed by a provincial policeman.

(b) Hilltribe Volunteer Companies (HTV) are approximately 140 strong, recruited from hilltribe people, and are trained and led by

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Thai Special Forces Teams. In addition to providing local protection these units also assist in intelligence collection and participate with RTA units on operations.

(c). Nara Suan (Hunter-Killer) Teams are composed of screened CT defectors and local volunteers and are led by RTA personnel. Teams are organized to operate with 10-12 men each. Training has been provided by RTA Special Forces personnel and covers intelligence gathering, ambush techniques and reaction type firing.

(3) Border Patrol Police (BPP): There are two BPP regions in North Thailand. They are Region 5 with its headquarters at Chiang Mai and Region 6 with its headquarters in Tak. The BPP has the primary mission of conducting CI operations and border surveillance missions.

(4) Provincial Police (PP): There are also two PP region headquarters in North Thailand. They are Region 5 in Lampang and Region 6 in Phitsanuloke. The district and village police throughout the North are a part of the Provincial Police organization and are available for CI operations. Their primary mission within the CI context is to eliminate the CT in villages and thus sever their link with the jungle CT. Provincial Police provide leadership for various para-military organizations. They also organize PP Special Action Force Platoons of about 50 men each. (See Figure A-5).

c. When brought together civil and police forces are assigned the role of population and resources control, while RTA units are assigned missions of containing, and in some cases, destroying CT jungle units. Successful accomplishment of these functions requires coordination. With CPM operations under RTA command these operations have only been marginally effective due to poor coordination between all three agencies. RTA leadership has not proven equal to the task of bringing the CPM functions together into any really effective working relationship. A problem also exists in police area of responsibility. In some instances local police do not retain credibility with the people because, to supplement their meager pay, they often engage in graft and corrupt activities.

3. (C-MF) INTELLIGENCE:

a. The Communist Terrorist (CT):

(1) The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) has been present in ever growing numbers in the North over the past six to eight years. Their major inroads have been made among the Hilltribe people by promising them freedom to grow opium and by playing on the incipient ill feeling that has long existed between them and the lowland or ethnic Thai. The CT are located within four general areas in the North: The Tri-Province area, consisting of mountainous sections of Phitsanuloke, Petchabun and Loei Provinces,

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Nan, Chiang Rai and Tak Provinces (See Figure A-6). It is estimated that there are approximately 4,000 full time jungle fighters in the North.

(2) Support for the CT outside their operational areas has not appeared in any significant proportion. The CT depend on porters to move supplies across the Thai-Laos border, locally grown foodstuffs obtained from the hilltribe people and paying better than market prices for items in villages close to the mountains. Within the past year a great number of hilltribe people have defected to the RTG in protest of CT policies that have eaten into their food supplies. As a result the CT have had to reorganize into smaller groups in an attempt to control this urge to defect. Evidence of introspective study on where they have erred seems to be going on among the CT. The principle locations of defection have been in the Nan, Chiang Rai and Tak areas. The CSOR organization has not been aggressive in following up these CT weaknesses. By employing a well planned psy war campaign they could effectively exploit this weak link in the CPT organization in the North. For discussion on Psyops see Annex G.

(3) In North Thailand the insurgency has been characterized by a sophisticated military operation. The CT are well armed to include 60 and 82mm mortars, RPG's and 12.7mm anti-aircraft machineguns. They have not, however, made any substantial progress in building a political infrastructure in the North as they have in the Northeast. To date they have not hit upon a theme that appeals to the ethnic Thai and would bring him rallying to their side. Efforts to overcome this deficiency, as recognized by the CPT, have been in the form of an exchange program with some 35 CT cadre in the North and Northeast switching positions. This was undoubtedly done to achieve a cross fertilization for building up the political structure in the North and to improve the CT military posture in the Northeast.

(4) The Chinese Irregular Forces (CIF) operate in the northern part of Chiang Rai Province. Not a great deal is known of the operation of these forces because the Army Advisory Group has been ordered to keep away, lest we give the appearance of supporting the CIF. Apparently they have been funded to some degree by the RTG and have entered into certain land holding arrangements with them. In return the CIF has participated in counterinsurgency operations against the CPT and these operations have enjoyed some success. Reports indicate a reluctance on the part of the CT to engage the CIF. The CIF has conducted a number of search and destroy operations in their area with the result that their area is one of the quietest to date.

(5) Of all the areas in North Thailand the most sensitive area by far is the Tri-Province area. This mountainous region thrusts South into the Chao Phya plain and toward Bangkok, the population center of Thailand. It is in the Tri-Province area that the RTA has mounted its largest operations to date (Operation Phu Kwang, 1972 and Operation Sam-Chai, 1972-73). At best, both of these operations achieved marginal results. There have been very few defectors in this area as compared to

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Nan, Chiang Rai and Tak Provinces. This indicates a strong hold, both physically and ideologically, by the CT on the hilltribe people in the area. There have also been reports that the main Communist Headquarters in the area (HQs 23) has or soon will be moving south, 50 kilometers deeper into Thailand. Consolidation of this area by the CPT would give the party better access to money and resources in Bangkok and serve to cut the country in half, separating the Northeast from the rest of Thailand.

(6) Reports received during this past year indicate that the CT are in a consolidation phase and have been ordered not to actively engage the RTA in combat except under extraordinary circumstances. The winding down of the war in Vietnam and Laos could give added impetus to a consolidation phase while CPT leadership determines a new party line to follow under a new game plan. Speculation by the RTA is that the CT will probably be reinforced and resources that have been going to Vietnam and Laos will now be given to the CT. The American Mission leans to a more optimistic view - China will want to preserve the status quo for a few more years in order not to give the Russians an opportunity to come in with aid and therefore, there will not be a big step up in resources being given to the CPT by the Chinese.

(7) The predominantly Sino-Thai, Hilltribe insurgency in the North appears to be in a state of confusion. There were reports of 200 Chinese being infiltrated into North Thailand during the fall of 1972 to bolster the effort there. For the time being the CPT organization in the North is not growing and that in itself is a hopeful sign, because the Communists themselves believe that an organization that doesn't constantly grow must eventually wither on the vine. Steps have been taken to counter this trend by the CPT as outlined above.

(8) My overall assessment of the Communist Insurgency in the North is that if the CPT can appeal to the lowland Thai then the insurgency is on the threshold of reaching significant proportions. The insurgency has its weaknesses, but at the present time very little is being done to exploit these weaknesses. Unless the RTA can become more effective in coordinating their efforts to counter this threat I believe that the CPT thrust could possibly reach unmanageable proportions within four to six years. For further information on CPT activities see Annex B.

b. Intelligence Organization and Operations of 3rd RTA Forward/CSCR III:

(1) The 3rd RTA Forward/CSCR III intelligence organization is conceptually sound and workable. It receives input from various police and civil agencies at provincial and district level and special intelligence gathering organizations such as the Joint Operations Centers (JOC) and Special Operations Centers (SOC). 3rd RTA Forward has the mission of analyzing this information and providing timely combat intelligence to deployed units. In reality, the intelligence cycle is seldom completed.

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(2) Although the 3rd RTA Forward has the necessary structure, combat intelligence operations in the North are not responsive to the intelligence needs of the RTA. Underlying problems are: Lack of coordinated effort, poorly trained personnel at all levels, and a failure to utilize available intelligence gathering assets.

(3) Some improvement in the 3rd RTA intelligence operations has been evident since the assignment of a new G-2 at 3rd RTA Forward/CSOR III in December 1972, but the need persists for a real integrated intelligence effort. Until the many petty jealousies that exist between the police and civil agencies and the JOC's AND SOC's can be overcome by strong leadership, improvement in intelligence operations will be only marginal.

4. (C-NF) PLANNING, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING:

a. Command and staff supervision of CI engaged units in the North is poor to non-existent. This may be due in part to the cultural heritage of the Thai which would cause loss of face to a commander that appears to be closely supervised. There are, however, some indications that this trend may be reversing itself. Until this cultural block can be completely overcome, performance in CI and all other operations will remain poor. The Commanding General of 3rd RTA frequently visits his subordinate units but fails to take subordinate commanders to task for a poor showing. Operational planning at 3rd RTA Forward is of a high caliber, and due to an aggressive Chief of Staff, the planning generally reflects an integrated staff effort. Execution is a different and depressing story and the need for aggressive and dynamic leadership manifests itself daily.

b. Operations in the past against CT forces have been confined to large sweep, search and destroy type operations (Operation Phu Kwang, January - March 1972). The most recent campaign (Operation Sam-Chai, December 1972 - January 1973) and the ensuing operation (Operation Rama Suun, February - May 1973) have taken on a different orientation; that of containment of the CT force in lieu of elimination of the insurgents. This is in cognizance with RTG stated strategy of first containing the CT while training their own forces. When the RTA feels prepared, they launch an offensive against the CT as the second step. It appeared in Phu Kwang, that the RTA believed they were in better shape than what they actually were. They suffered greater casualties than anticipated and presumably have opted to return to step one of their strategic operations to avoid further heavy casualties. More recently a new twist has come to light for solving the hard problem of eliminating the CT. The RTA appears to have decided to form "Sua Praun" or hunter-killer teams that will move against the insurgent base areas. These teams will be under RTA control but outside the structure of the RTA. They will be composed of volunteers drawn from the reserves with leadership provided by the RTA. The purpose of these 12-man teams will be to locate CT forces and call in air and artillery fire against them. This is designed to keep pressure on the CT throughout the year rather than concentrating their effort on a few large operations. The RTA units would participate in containment type operations.

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See Annex D for a detailed discussion of operations.

c. The performance of the Thai soldier indicates that he is a willing, but poorly trained soldier. With some exceptions there is a general failure of commanders and staffs at all levels to implement RTA training directives and properly supervise training. Basic combat training is conducted under a decentralized system and does not adequately train the Thai soldier in the basic combat skills. The basic training period has just recently been extended from eight to ten weeks, with a sixteen week training cycle as the goal. A highly gratifying change of pace occurred recently in the 4th Infantry Division's recent Division FTX which took place in January 1973. This change was due to the influence of the Assistant Division Commander who organized, conducted and supervised the FTX. (This Asst Div CO is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth). It appears that the RTA is aware of the inadequacy of the training and is taking action to correct it. Until these new policies take effect the average Thai soldier and junior leader are insufficiently trained to give them the confidence and motivation to perform effectively in combat. A detailed analysis of training is contained in Annex C.

5. (C-NF) LOGISTICS:

a. The 3rd RTA has the responsibility to provide logistics support to all units in North Thailand. The principal staff officer charged with the overall coordination and direction of the logistics effort is the 3rd RTA G-4. He has a technically oriented staff that assists him in coordination. Support provided by 3rd RTA comes from the 3rd Army Support Command (3rd ASCOM), the 4th Infantry Division and the 4th and 7th Military Circles. 3rd ASCOM has maintenance, supply and service capabilities within its ordnance, signal, quartermaster, engineer and medical units. 3rd ASCOM has the mission of performing direct support functions for all non-divisional units, back-up direct support for divisional units and general support functions for all units within 3rd RTA. Subsistence, PCI and ammunition support is controlled by 3rd ASCOM for all units in North Thailand. Two military circles have the capability to provide supply, less repair parts, and service support to their areas of responsibility. See Annex E for a detailed discussion of 3rd ASCOM.

b. Logistic support of 3rd RTA is influenced by the technical service departments located in Bangkok and the command and staff elements located in 3rd RTA. The technical service departments control the mission, personnel and assets of combat service support units in Thailand. Key logistics personnel in 3rd RTA perform the planning function in a manner comparable to U.S. Army standards; however execution ranges from indifferent to excellent. The causes for the system being less than totally effective are lack of knowledge concerning the logistic system on the part of involved personnel, and the reluctance to depart from the less functional tech service support system. Given the current mission of 3rd RTA and its present level of operations, the logistic system, with selected augmentation, is capable of providing adequate support to all elements in North Thailand, and has proven its ability to do so during two of the largest CI Operations conducted by the RTA.

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6. (C-NF) Base Defense: USMACTHAI regulations designate JUSMAG field detachments as liaison elements to effect coordination between RTA and U.S. tenant units located on various base sites within North Thailand. Detachment III, ARAG, is responsible for the coordination of external defense at Takhli RTAFB and at 8 communication base sites. Current U.S. mission policy allows U.S. forces to conduct defensive measures only within base perimeters. Royal Thai Government forces provide the external security necessary for the defense of these bases. For a detailed analyses of base defense in North Thailand see Annex F.

7. (C-NF) ADVISORY EFFORT:

a. General: The mission of the U.S. Army Advisors assigned to JUSMAGTHAI Detachment III is to provide advice and assistance to 3rd RTA. The majority of this effort has gone towards upgrading the Thai planning and conduct of CI operations with attendant effort directed towards improving staff functions, training and logistics of all 3rd RTA units. Additional functions of Detachment III advisors include: Coordination with other U.S. and RTG agencies in the North; monitoring the distribution, maintenance, security and use of MAP equipment; coordinating between US forces and RTG agencies for external security of US occupied base sites; conducting classes for RTA officers and noncommissioned officers on technical subjects and equipment; and management of JUSMAG equipment and facilities at five widely separated locations.

b. Personnel: The personnel strength of Detachment III, with advisors CPCON to Det III, is 14 officers and 3 non-commissioned officers; however, it is rare that all these personnel are available at one time. The strength of the Detachment is now at 11 officers and 2 non-commissioned officers and this latter strength figure represents a more normal working level. Such a draw down on advisory personnel of course, degrades the effort and effectiveness of the U.S. Mission. Chief, Army Advisory Group recently drafted a request to increase the overall strength of the ARAG. Such a proposed increase would enable this Detachment to better advise the RTA on training matters. The Thais will listen to and accept advice more readily if they have an advisor assigned on the scene. The 3rd RTA needs professional U.S. Army Advisors in almost every area. The rapport established by all members of this team has been truly exemplary to the point where the 3rd RTA accepts much of the advice offered and frequently seeks out the advisor for assistance. The case in point is that the advisory effort is spread too thin to be really as effective as it should be.

(1) The overall quality of officers and non-commissioned officers assigned to this team has been superior. In some instances officers are assigned whose background is not compatible with the unit he is advising, i.e. a logistics advisor whose background has been with special weapons and missile systems has a difficult time advising a basic troop level logistics system.

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(2) All personnel assigned to up-country advisory duties should have training in the Thai language. The influence of an advisor is frequently proportional to his ability to speak Thai. Though the language barrier can be, and is usually overcome, by a determined and professional advisor it does take longer to get a point across and creates an obstacle to understanding.

(3) The tour length of up-country advisors should be a minimum of 18 months to two years. Only after 8 to 10 months does an advisor really begin to understand the problems at hand and develop the lines of communication to solve them. The recent DA approval for up-country advisors to bring their families to Thailand may be of some help; however, families should remain in Bangkok and not attempt to live up-country because living conditions are rough and the advisor tends to spend an inordinate amount of time with his family worrying about their support, instead of concentrating his full effort on his advisory duties.

(4) In North Thailand there are several remote sub-detachments with only one advisor authorized. There should be at least two advisors at each site even if one is an EM or NCO. The chore of administering a remote site and living at such a location takes up a great deal of time and thus distracts from the advisor's primary function. Two men at a site could also alleviate a bad situation in the event of an emergency or illness.

(5) In the most recent MAP allocation and additional add-on of equipment the RTA received a sizeable number of helicopters. Consideration should be given at this point to assign a rated US Army Advisor to each up-country detachment. The RTA, with some professional help, could make much greater use of their aviation assets than they presently are doing.

c. Advisory Operations: For an advisor to cover the many functions assigned him and, more importantly, to cover counterinsurgency operations, it is important that he knows what is happening at all levels of the civil-police-military effort. He can better advise only if he has a picture of the integrated effort that constitutes a proper CI. One method of obtaining this information is through close liaison and coordination with all American agencies in the North. I have directed that this be done, not only as a means of making ourselves more knowledgeable, but as a means of demonstrating to our counterparts that we must coordinate with all facets of the governmental structure to obtain an integrated CI effort. As a result there appears to be a freer flow of information and a more closely knit US Mission team effort in the North. The following points could help improve the Army Advisory Group's effectiveness in Thailand.

(1) In accordance with latest U.S. Mission guidance U.S. Advisors cannot accompany tactical units on active CI Operations. This particular constraint makes it extremely difficult to properly evaluate the effectiveness of RTA units and to properly know where to place more training emphasis.

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We suspect that small unit leaders need more training, that units are weak in small unit tactics, and that more aggressive measures should be taken in securing LZ's. An advisor available on an operation could make many on the spot corrections that could vastly improve current CJ operations. It is recommended therefore, that U.S. Army Combat Arms Advisors be allowed to accompany RTA tactical units on CJ operations.

(2) Rapport is an overworked word when used in connection with advisory duties, but the proper kind of rapport is essential if an advisor is to have any influence at all on his counterpart. I believe it essential that an advisor first establish his qualifications as a professional army officer. This is accomplished by the officer making his own estimate of the situation, and keeping his business discussions in the environment of the office or training field or wherever professional activity is taking place. An advisor need not be a "buddy" to his counterpart to be effective. Once he has established his professional qualifications he has usually won the respect of his counterpart and any relationship proceeding from that basis has a sound foundation for the type influence that an advisor is attempting to exert. Socializing with one's counterpart is fine, but the advisor must always remain circumspect with relation to his behavior, and never rely on the social approach or doing favors for his counterpart as a method of trying to influence him, just the opposite will be gained.

(3) More definitive guidance should be put out to all American advisors as to what information an advisor has access to, and just what the advisors areas of responsibility are concerning operations, intelligence and planning. ARAG duties are clear cut as far as training and logistics are concerned, but the apparent need for more information by higher head quarters continually confuses both the advisor and his counterparts, as well as frustrates the advisor when the information isn't forthcoming, and leaves him in doubt as to the true nature of his role. Recommend an agreement be reached with the RTA as to what our responsibilities are and then specific guidelines be sent to the field. If part of the advisors job is to obtain information that the RTA doesn't want us to have, then he should know that so he can get on with it. He must know where he stands.

(4) The intelligence information flow between the Detachments in the field and JUSMAG/USMACTHAI Headquarters in Bangkok is all one way, from the field to the headquarters. Not once within the past year has this Detachment been visited by a representative from MACTHAI J-2, either to obtain our views or give us a country overview. Right now we depend on the local SRF, RTA and American Consul personnel for practically all our intelligence information.

(5) A valuable aid in pulling the detachment together and effecting team work is the monthly Commander's Conference. Instituting this type of meeting not only was beneficial to me, but was valuable to the rest of the sub-detachment personnel. They exchanged ideas with each other, convinced themselves that they weren't the only ones with problems, and picked up techniques from each other that worked to the mutual benefit of all. It

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It also gave them a chance to relax with contemporaries and convinced them that Detachment Headquarters cared about them and was supporting them.

d. Logistics and Administration: In general, logistic support for the advisory effort is adequate but there are areas that do need attention and they are as follows:

(1) When an advisor goes to Bangkok to see a Doctor or a Dentist he usually has a problem that needs immediate attention. Furthermore advisors usually have limited time to stay in Bangkok. Recommend that up-country advisors receive priority for receiving medical and dental attention when reporting to the hospital in Bangkok.

(2) A source of continual irritation is the lack of mail service to up-country personnel especially around holidays. At most, Detachment III receives two mail deliveries a week, on Tuesdays and Fridays. A great preponderance of holidays occur on Fridays and Mondays. When this happens usually the mail is not picked up or ~~broken~~ down by APO personnel since they are taking advantage of the holiday. No one is trying to deny them a holiday, but perhaps work schedules could be adjusted so that compensatory time is given to those working on a holiday. Many letters have been written regarding this subject and complaints have been made to the I.C. but no one has yet taken the initiative to improve this deplorable situation.

(3) A need for a translator/interpreter exists at detachment and sub-detachment locations. Again many letters have been written on this subject attempting to have RTA supply such personnel, so far to no avail. One solution might be the hiring of a Thai National secretary who is capable of taking dictation, typing correspondence, answering the telephone, and acting as a translator/interpreter. One can be hired for about \$125.00 per month (Grade 1S-6).

(4) Each sub-detachment should be issued a back up generator. The Thai electrical power system throughout North Thailand is erratic and unreliable. Team houses need a source of power they can rely on to maintain radio contact and to prevent food from spoiling. One 10 KW generator at each sub-detachment should be sufficient for these purposes.

8. (C-IF) CONCLUSIONS: Although the body of this report specifies a number of conclusions, the following major points are believed to warrant reiteration:

a. Until the Civil-Military-Police efforts in counterinsurgency operations is better coordinated and cooperation between these elements of the RTG improved, the CJ effort in North Thailand will be disjointed and a hit-and-miss proposition at best.

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b. At the present time the CPT in the north has not found an effective theme that appeals to the Ethnic Thai. This has somewhat stagnated the growth of their movement. If, however, such a theme is discovered and implemented, the insurgency could become unmanageable.

c. The RTA is instituting a policy of containment to combat the insurgency in Thailand. It is also adapting the technique of using Hunter-Killer Teams to engage the CT in lieu of regular military units. Because of its recent adaption, this policy cannot be adequately evaluated at this time.

d. The success of any national policy will vary from one part of the country to the next because each area of Thailand (the North, North-east, and the South) has its own unique set of insurgency problems. In the North, the RTG is confronted with a full fledged, active insurgency.

e. Support for up-country detachments must be improved.

9. (U) Recommendations: The recommendations as specified in this report should be implemented.

ANNEXES:

- A - Glossary of Abbreviations
- B - Intelligence
- C - Training
- D - Planning and Operations
- E - Logistics
- F - Base Defense
- G - Psychological Operations


JOHN R. HERMANN, JR.
Colonel, Infantry
CO, DET III, ARAG

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ANNEX A

GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS

AO	Area of Operations
ARAG	Army Advisory Group
ASCCM	Area Support Command
ASL	Authorized Stockage List
ATT	Army Training Test
BCT	Basic Combat Training
BDSC	Base Defense Security Center
BPP	Border Patrol Police
CDF	Cavalry Division Forward
CQ	Coast Guard
CHARAG	Chief Army Advisory Group
CI	Counterinsurgency
CIF	Chinese Irregular Forces
CPM	Civil-Police-Military
CPT	Communist Party of Thailand
CSOC	Communist Suppression Operations Center
CSOD	Communist Suppression Operations Directorate
CSOP	Communist Suppression Operations - Province
CSOR	Communist Suppression Operations - Region
CT	Communist Terrorist
DASC	Direct Air Support Center
DOLA	Department of Local Administration

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ETO	Express Transportation Organisation
FEC	Federal Electric Corporation
HTV	Hilltribe Volunteer
JOC	Joint Operations Center
JUSMAG	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group
JUSMAGTHAI	Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group Thailand
MAP	Military Assistance Program
MIST	Mobile Information Service Team
NIPSO	National Information and Psychological Operations
OICC	Officer in Charge of Construction
ONPO	Office of National Psychological Operations
PP	Provincial Police
RCT	Regimental Combat Team
RRFS	Radio Research Field Station
RTA	Royal Thai Army
RTAF	Royal Thai Air Force
RTG	Royal Thai Government
RTMC	Royal Thai Marine Corps
RTAW	Royal Thai Air Wing
SOC	Special Operations Center
SRF	Special Reporting Force
TFY	Thai Fiscal Year
TNPD	Thai National Police Department
USSF	United States Special Forces


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VDC	Village Defense Corps
VPU	Village Protection Unit

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3RD ROYAL THAI ARMY



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



Figure 1-2


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REGIMENTAL COMBAT TEAM



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


Figure A-5



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ANNEX B

INTELLIGENCE

1. (U) PURPOSE: The purpose of this section is to provide a current assessment of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) activities in North Thailand.

2. (C) DEVELOPMENT OF THE CPT IN NORTH THAILAND:

a. Communism in Thailand was initially introduced in the central region by a Marxist-Leninist group which immigrated from mainland China in 1927 to escape suppression operations. This Marxist-Leninist nucleus spread communist revolutionary ideas in the Chinese community of Thailand and among Thai intellectuals and students. Communist activities were eventually expanded from the central region to North Thailand in 1947 when Bunthan Tho Thong, a Sino-Thai CPT organizer, was sent to Chiang Mai from the central region (Bangkok) to establish clandestine organizations through the medium of Mao Hilltribesmen and Thai exiles who were driven into the northern mountains through RTG suppression of Communist and non-Communist dissidents.

b. In 1928, Ho Chi Minh set up a communist base in Northeast Thailand designed to train men to fight against the French in Indochina. In 1932 Thailand adopted a democratic system of government and at this time the Chinese Communist took the opportunity to establish the Chinese Communist Party of Thailand (CCPT) and to make propaganda openly. In 1933 the RTG passed an Anti-Communist Act which drove the CCPT underground. After the outbreak of World War II the party was renamed the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) in order to provide a more realistic name for rallying popular support for a patriotic war. The CPT was able to extend its influence and augment its strength toward the end of World War II, when the Thai Government repealed the anti-communist act, so that Thailand might be given membership in the United Nations. This enabled the CPT to again make open propaganda.

c. Prior to the victory of the Communists in China in 1949, the CPT revolutionary line was ill-defined. The CPT was influenced by doctrinal philosophy from both China and the Soviet Union. After the Communist victory in China, however, the CPT was encouraged to spread its activities through armed struggle, and sent a great number of young Sino-Thai to be trained in Communist China.

d. As early as 1947 the CPT sent party cadre into North Thailand to establish a clandestine infrastructure among Mao Hilltribesmen, students and exiled Thai dissidents. In 1950 the effect of the Communist cadre was first felt in the North when the students initiated a strike at Mao Jak Agricultural Institute. This strike or uprising was led by Bunthaw,

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a Sino-Thai CPT organizer, and was settled only after intervention of the Ministry of Education, Cabinet and Prime Minister. After the strike was settled the CPT continued in clandestine operations among the Mao Hill-tribesmen seeking to mobilize and organize the Mao and Thai dissident masses.

e. In the early 1960's, dissident Thai exiles, former Prime Minister Pridi Phanomyong, Mit Satanon, Amphorn Suwannabun and former RTA Colonel Phrayon Chulaon, attempted to organize the Mao Hilltribesmen into a political infrastructure and requested support from the Communist Chinese in their efforts. The Communists responded by providing a safe haven, technical advice and training to the organization. In addition to advice and training the communists strongly suggested the adoption of a policy of armed revolution. The Chinese Communist in effect, took charge of hilltribe assets developed by exiles in Northwest Laos by dominance of economic and political control of exiles, and further developed hilltribe assets for use against the RTG. The Communist used Thai and Sino-Thais who had worked for exiles as cadre, and selected hilltribesmen with proper intellectual qualifications for training and began developing bases in Laos for eventual support of insurgents in Thailand. In addition a school for training Thai Communists was established at Hoa Binh, in North Vietnam. Song Noppukhun, a Sino-Thai graduate of the Marxist-Lenin Institute, Peking, CPT political member, and former CPT Secretary-General and once Principal CPT liaison officer with CCP, Peking, established a headquarters in Muong Sai, Luang Prabang Province, Laos and began work toward developing insurgency in North Thailand.

f. Since 1965, the Communists have been actively engaged in infiltrating, subverting, and indoctrinating the hilltribe people living in the border areas of North Thailand. Taking advantage of the differences in culture, customs and social and economic conditions between the tribes and the lowland people, together with the frictions that developed between them and some RTG administrative officials, the communists formulated an effective propaganda theme. The CPT propaganda mainly stressed the Mao identity. In February 1967, the CPT recruited tribesmen, began to take up arms against the RTG and to stage violent incidents. From the pattern of incidents, captured documents and interrogation of captured and surrendered guerillas, it was learned that the Northern CT had established operational bases in Chiang Rai, Nan, and down to the Tri-Province border area between Phitsanuloke, Phetchabun, and Loei. In addition, the CT were able to occupy and control the whole area of Khwaeng Chaiyabury in the adjoining area of Laos, from which strong support was available to the CT in the North. At present there are about 4,000 armed CTs in the Northern area, in Chiang Rai, Nan, Tak, and the Tri-Province area (Phitsanuloke, Phetchabun and Loei).

3. (C) AREA OF OPERATION:

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a. Geography: The sixteen Provinces of North Thailand make up approximately one third (42,000 square miles) of the countries total area. The North consist primarily of mountainous terrain and is drained by numerous streams. Those of the extreme North join the Mekong; those of the extreme West join the Salween. The majority, however, flow Southward and eventually join the Chao Phraya. The terrain is marked by a series of parallel North-South mountain ranges and deep, narrow alluvial valleys. Except where scarred by the clearings of the mountaineers (hilltribe people) or interrupted by masses of bare rock, the ridges are covered with thick forests which yield valuable timber. Villages and towns are clustered in the valleys. The average height of the peaks in the area is 5,200 feet; the country's highest mountain, Doi Intharon, rises to an elevation of 8,500 feet above sea level. The western most part of the ridges continue southward to form the backland of the Malay Peninsula. To the east, the Northern sector of the Thai-Laotian border follows the line of the Luang Phra Bang mountains.

b. Climate: The climate is tropical-monsoon, with the rainy season occurring from late May to the end of October. The average rainfall varies in the North depending on location. To the east, the northern sector of the Thai-Laotian border the average rainfall averages between 60 to 80 inches, in the central area 60-80 inches, and in the extreme west along the Thai-Burma border 80 to 120 inches. Temperatures range from an average high of 100° F during the hot months March, April and May to an average of 65° F in the cool months of December, January and part of February.

c. Vegetation and Soils: In the Northern region dark clays and alluvial deposits along the river valleys support intensive wet rice cultivation. In the mountains, where most of the hilltribe people are found, slash and burn techniques are used for preparing land for cultivation and dry rice is grown. In general, tropical evergreen forests are located at elevations of 3200 feet and deciduous forests are located at lower levels. Evergreen forests cover approximately $\frac{2}{3}$ of the total land area in the North. The remainder of the North is covered by alluvial rice crops. (See figure 1).

4. (C) STRENGTH AND DISPOSITION:

a. The insurgents in the North are located in several general areas. (See figure 2): Chiang Kham area in Chiang Rai province; Mouang, Pua, Thongchong, Sa and Nonsi, in Nan Province; Maesod, Umphong in Tak province; and the Tri-Province area (Phitsanuloke, Phetchabun and Loei) which is divided into two CT operational sections, North and South, using the Phitsanuloke-Ionsek highway as the dividing line. The insurgents have taken advantage of provincial and national boundaries to make RTG coordination efforts more difficult. In the Chiang Rai, Nan and Tri-Province areas the majority of the insurgents are located along the Thai-Laotian

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border in the Luang Phra Bang mountains, which extends from Chieng Kham southward down the Thai-Laotian border to Changwat Loei. In Maeo and Umphong in Tak Province, the insurgents are situated in the Doi Intharon mountain range which starts west of Chiang Mai and extends southward along the Thai-Burma border. Insurgents in the eastern Changwats, except Changwat Uttaradit, along the Thai-Laotian border, make use of the Laotian boundary and lofty mountain areas to establish their base of operations. Insurgents operating in Pahtha and Kumpang areas in Uttaradit Province are based across the border in Laos. In the Tri-Province area, insurgent base areas are situated in the Hiu Long Ma mountains and are supported from a logistics base located on Phu Miang in Chaiyaburi province in Laos.

b. It is estimated that there are approximately 3000-4000 full-time, armed jungle insurgents in North Thailand. These insurgents are for the most part hilltribes people living in the border areas of North Thailand. These jungle insurgents have shouldered the blunt of the CPT's armed struggle in the North. Insurgent strength within the major CPT operational areas is as follows:

<u>CPT OPERATIONAL AREA</u>	<u>JUNGLE FIGHTER STRENGTH</u>
Chiang Rai Area	700 - 1000
Nan Area	1000 - 1600
Uttaradit Area	60 - 100
Tri-Province Area	800 - 1000
Tak Area	800 - 1000

For breakdown by Amphoe and Ban's see Figure 3.

c. Potentially the CPT is capable of augmenting its jungle fighter strength from external personnel and equipment to support CT operations in the country by infiltration and exfiltration across the Thai borders. These augmentations are from insurgent organizations from Laos. They consist of Red Chinese, Pathet Lao, Meo and Khamu. The CT also have the ability to reinforce their jungle fighters from local villagers who have been recruited by the CPT, but who remain within their villages to carry-out assignments and gather information. They are also the base for CPT politico-military expansion. Consisting of as many as twenty to thirty people, village militia units have been established in many villages, especially where the CPT enjoys strong support. Although the total number of Village Militia Units (VMUs) in the North is not presently known, it is known that approximately 1/3 of the CTs strength in several districts of Chiang Rai, Nan, Tak and Tri-Province (Phitsanuloke, Phetchabun, Loei) Provinces consist of VMUs. The CPT has also organized VMUs on a smaller

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scale in other areas. The number varies depending on the CPT operational areas, being proportionally higher where jungle fighter strength is greater.

5. POPULAR SUPPORT:

a. Almost all of the support is drawn from the rural villages, consistent with the CPT policy of working from the jungle to recruit, organize and mobilize the villagers for armed struggle. Support for the insurgent movement stems from a well organized propaganda campaign directed at the hilltribes convincing them that the CPT offers a better way of life. The communists accomplished this by taking advantage of the difference in culture, customs, and social and economic conditions between the tribes and lowland people, together with the friction that developed between them and some RTG administrative officials. In many cases this support can be attributed to the CPT Civic Action Programs; and allowing the hilltribes to do things which the RTG forbid, such as grow and sell opium, slash and burn timber areas; aimed at winning the confidence of the people. If this method of winning support fails, the insurgents resort to intimidation and terrorist measures to coerce support from the villagers and hilltribes.

b. The CPT in the North are externally strongest in the areas contiguous to the Laotian border and the Luang Phra Bang Mountains, particularly in Nan and the Tri-Province areas. In these areas the CPT enjoy considerable support from the local hilltribe villagers and from a CT logistics base in Phu Miang in Chaiyaburi, Laos. Indicative of the CPT's success in developing a solid base of support in the North is the fact that they have established six area command headquarters which provide overall guidance to the insurgents organization and military activities in their respective areas. (See Figure 4 & 5). Each area command has organized a portion of the hilltribe population in their respective areas into communist controlled villages and tomhous. Village and Tambon committees have been formed which control the population, establish food production quota's, and run the village and Tambon commune stores for these committees. The Northern Regional Headquarters, which is located in Chaiyaburi Province, Laos has also organized and deployed seven Thai Peoples Liberation Armed Forces Main Force Groups, throughout the Northern area. These groups, although structured as standard battalions (200 to 300 men) continue to be dispersed and operate in squad, platoon and company size units.

c. Even though the CPT in the northern areas (Chiang Kham and Nan Provinces) have established a firm support base their success has not been as dramatic as they would like. The insurgents have managed to form a strong military force, but have encountered problems in the political aspect of communist indoctrination. This was brought to light in September 1972 when large numbers of hilltribe people begun to defect

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to the RTG. The communist commune system conflicted drastically with hilltribe traditions and caused much dissatisfaction among the hilltribe people. The Communists also restricted their movement by employing belts of booby traps around the villages, reducing the tribes personal right to go and come as they wished. Severe punishment, torture and even threat of death was dealt out to those who criticized communism. The communist governed the hilltribes with a co-center democracy system. The communist would obtain the community opinion with pretension, in order to deceive the villagers, but actually the CT would force the villagers to act as they desired by backing the village committee in the CT organized villages. If the villager disagreed he would be secretly threatened or assassinated.

d. Insurgents are presently trying to strengthen their position in the North. Early in September 1972, the North Central Committee, exchanged experts in guerilla warfare with the Northeast Central Committee for experts in political indoctrination. Since that time numerous changes have been noted in the North. The CT are patrolling and guarding the hilltribes in order to prevent them from defecting to the RTG and the communist are removing children (ages 14-16 yrs) from the villages and moving them to other villages in an effort to break down the family cohesiveness. Also insurgents are placing emphasis on recruiting and food supplies in an effort to expand their support bases. In many villages in the Chiang Rai, Nan and Tak Provinces support is coerced and contingent upon the RTG's ability to provide adequate security. Other villagers have been termed insurgent villages, and willingly support the CPT. Additional villagers have become CT supporters for greed of profit for their goods and because they are blood kin of the CT.

e. Eventhough the CPT has encountered some difficulty in political indoctrination of the hilltribes it has achieved significant success in recruiting villagers for its main force battalions, and organizing village militia units. CPT in the North is moving toward consolidation of its gains by indoctrinating local villagers in communist political theory. To broaden its political base, the CPT has already initiated plans structuring its political organization to parallel the RTG administration overall, conservative estimates indicate that the CPTs influence today reaches a hilltribe population of some 200,000 people.

f. Despite the present lack of wide spread acceptance or support for the Thai insurgents in the North, the hilltribe populace is receptive to the communist message. Providing further impetus is the contrast between RTG indifference for the hilltribe culture, customs, and social economic conditions and the insurgent display of concern for the hilltribe welfare. The present RTG policy in the North appears to be one of containment of CT to the mountains. The RTG also believes that the hilltribes are already on the CT side and further action to liberate them from the communists is fruitless at this time.

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g. There is little evidence of wide-spread support for the CPT in the North, except in the traditional stronghold areas previously mentioned. However, the RTG's complacency has enabled the CPT to affect steady progress in the development of mass support bases among the hill-tribe populace. This factor poses the most important threat to the RTG in the North.

6. (C) POLITICAL ORGANIZATION:

a. Adhering to the classical pattern, the CPT has established a political hierarchy which, in many ways, parallels the existing RTG administration. The North Central Committee is responsible for directing all insurgent activities in the North. Under orders from the CPT, village committees have been formed where covert cell structure existed. Cadre have organized Tamboon, District, Provincial and Regional committees, applying the Trotsky tread principle. This principle applies as follows:

A village committee is formed from village militia units, a tamboon committee is formed from village militia units, a tamboon committee is formed from three village committees, and so on up to regional level.

b. To date, six major area Headquarters and operational areas have been identified from captured documents and from information obtained from former insurgents. According to the information, a political organization has been established in each of the CPT operational areas. The areas are as follows:

(1) Area 52: Chieng Khang, Chieng Saen, Meuang Chiengrai, Maejun and Therng.

(2) Area 24: Chieng Khang, Therng, Chiang Kham and some parts of A. Pong.

(3) Area 13: Pong, Sub A. Chiengmuan and some parts of A. Meuang in Nan Province.

(4) Area 14: Thoong Chang, Chieng Klang and Pua Districts.

(5) Area 45: Muang, Mae Jarim Sub-District/Sa District.

(6) Area 23: Tri-Province (Phitsanuloke, Phetchabun, and Loei Provinces) and Uttaradit.

The operational areas are divided based on geographic characteristics and do not necessarily correlate with established Changwat boundaries. Area 52 uses I g and Koh rivers as the division lines with the main operations base on Doi Loung range between A. Chieng Khong and Chieng Saen. Indications

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are that this area will expand to Chiang Mai and Mae Hong Son Province and later link with Tak by using the Muser hilltribes as the cadres. Area 24 uses Doi Yao/Doi Phamon ranges and Ing river as the division lines, with the main operation bases on Doi Phamou/Doi Yao and Doi Namsa. In this area the CTs main objective is to establish local state power and expand their organization into the lowland villages. Area 13 uses Doi Phachognoi and Doi Phaji mountain ranges as the dividing line with operation bases on Doi Phachanguoi and Doi Pha Ki. Area 13 main objective is to isolate Nan Province in accordance with Mao's tactic of "Jungle Circle Village and Village Circle the town". Area 14 and area 45 operating in B. Huainu, B. Namchang and B. Phuwae. The areas use B. Pongkohnueu as division lines. These areas have the objective of intercepting road construction and establish shadow governments in the villages. Area 23 used the traditional Provincial boundaries in Phitsanuloke, Phetchabun and Loei. (See Figure 5 Area Organizational Chart of CT in North Thailand).

7. (C) TACTICS:

a. The tactics employed by the CPT in the conduct of its armed struggle are influenced by the Chinese Communist Party and Principles of Mao Tse Tung. At present the CPTs jungle forces are relatively small in number and generally lack sophisticated weapons and communications equipment. However, more and better weapons and equipment are being acquired from out-country suppliers. The jungle forces' cardinal principal of fighting is to engage RTG forces only when they have local superiority and surprise. At this stage of insurgent development, before they elect to fight they try to ensure a high probability of success. The CPT is generally dedicated to the strategy of gradual destruction of RTG forces by demoralizing them and reducing their will to fight by denying them resupply, by constant harassment, by dispersing their units and by capturing or destroying their weapons and equipment. Although over the past year little growth in the insurgents controlled area has occurred, there has been a considerable increase in the insurgents ability to fight because of the receipt of a sino-soviet bloc weapons system. Consequently it is anticipated that future insurgent-initiated operations will be more aggressive and violent in nature. These operations will concentrate on the lowlander and will fluctuate in accordance with the CPTs interest and policy and the operational activities of RTG forces.

b. The terrain in the North is well suited for maintaining a large guerilla army because the predominately high lofty mountains are heavily forested and afford excellent security for large base camps. As a result, the communist insurgents in the North have developed a sophisticated command and control organization and have displayed a higher degree of coordination than the CPT in other regions of the country. In the Northern area, the insurgents continue to consolidate their gains and strengthen their control over the population living in, and adjacent to their mountainous strongholds.

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In the insurgent controlled area of Thung Chang and Pua District of Nan, Pang District of Chiang Rai, Mai Sot District in Tak and in the Tri-Province area, insurgent cadre have structured the hilltribe population into communist controlled villages, and tambon Committees were formed and operate independently from the RTG political structure. The hilltribe population in these areas has been forced to farm collectively and to buy clothing, food and other supplies from the cooperative store operated by the Tambon Committee. The insurgents have also formed their own police force which patrols around these communities to keep RTG intelligence agents out of the area and to prevent the hilltribe population from leaving. The establishment of the village and Tambon committees in these areas demonstrates the communists capability of developing their own political organization within North Thailand, although presently it is restricted to the hilltribe population. Militarily, it is the hilltribe villager, between the age of 15-45 years who make up the majority of the guerilla army in the North. The number of full-time soldiers operating from jungle redoubts in the mountains has shown an increase over the past year from an estimated 2670-3050 in 1972 to an estimated 3390-4000 in 1973. Although the estimated fighting strength has increased, the armed village militia has decreased from an estimated 1000 to 800.

The Communist insurgents in the North are classified into two separate categories: The regular force soldier of the Thai People's Liberation Armed Forces (TPLAF), and the Village Militia. The insurgent force in the North is composed primarily of hilltribesmen with ethnic Thai and Sino-Thai providing the majority of the trained cadre and leadership. However, over the past year an increased number of hilltribe leaders have emerged among the older insurgent groups. In the North the insurgents have organized and deployed regular force groups. These groups, although structured as standard battalions of 200 to 300 men each, continue to be dispersed and operate in squad, platoon and company size units. Village militia units, normally ranging in size from five to ten men each, remain in the village to control the population and protect the village. In addition to the regular force group and village militia the insurgents have organized, trained and deployed nine special commando units throughout the Northern area. Each 30 man special commando unit is a highly trained, well equipped military force with a special mission of offensive combat. These special commando units are mobile and deployed in such a manner that they are capable of conducting sapper attacks against an RTG military installation or public utility facility in North Thailand.

c. The objective of the CPT is primarily directed toward the establishment of a large base of support among the local populace. The military arm of the CPT has the mission of screening the activities of the propagandist, the proselyte and the political leader. The military arm also trains VMUs, protects base camps, and carries out assassinations, sabotage and attacks

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on RTG forces when conditions are favorable. During the past year there was no dramatic increase in overall number of CT initiated overt actions over the previous year. However, there has been a definite rise in the intensity and sophistication of military operations carried out by the CT. Examples of this rise are: In December 1972, the CT in Nan Province used rifle grenades for the first time when CDF units made contact with them in the Doi Pha Ki area and maintained contact for five days before breaking off. In the same area several incidents have been noted where the CT have employed 60mm mortars. In December 1972 in the Tri-Province area, CT employed 12.7/50 cal. anti-aircraft weapons against aircraft. In March 1973, in Chiang Rai Province a force of approximately 50 CT, attacked a government outpost using 60mm mortars, RPG M-79's and M-16 rifles. The CT employed the tactics of two maneuver units and one fire support unit. The CT have also shown a willingness on several occasions to engage the RTG forces and stand and fight. In keeping with their present level of development, the CT generally have avoided engagements that could prove costly or disruptive to their clandestine arrangements. Overt acts are primarily conducted for propaganda purposes. Attacks against police or paramilitary outposts are conducted either for intimidation or propaganda purposes. Armed propaganda meetings, are carried out by the CT merely to demonstrate their power to local support personnel.

8. (C) LEADERSHIP IN THE CPT:

a. The inability of the CPT to recruit a significant following outside of the traditional areas of influence has been a key obstacle to expansion. Reports indicate that the CT have partly solved this problem by importing political organizers into the North from the Northeast and by training selected individuals out-country, to give a higher quality to cadre personnel. This coupled with the return of CT cadre from previous years of training in China, North Vietnam and Laos, is serving to ease the need for critical skills.

b. Within the past year numerous high-ranking CPT cadre have been replaced in Tak and Chiang Rai Provinces. As a result, there are already signs of increased overt activity. CT have initiated numerous ambushes on RTG convoys and road construction crews, attacked fire support bases and on occasion elected to stand and fight rather than retreat.

9. INTELLIGENCE:

a. Insurgent intelligence capabilities are adequate and very responsive to the CPTs needs. The insurgents tactical intelligence system is primarily centered around its village level organizations and uses the village core members, VMUs and sympathizers for gathering information. With captured signal equipment and equipment brought in from out of country the insurgents are capable of monitoring RTG radio transmissions and jamming and taping

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telephone conversations. The generally poor observance of communication security by many RTG civil and police organizations probably facilitates CPT activities in this area.

b. At the present level of insurgency in the North, the information most vital to the insurgent is that information relative to RTG movement, strength and disposition. This information is vitally necessary to provide early warning of RTG CI activities and the basis on which to conduct military operations. In areas where the CT have strong support, it has been able to obtain information, with relative ease, about troop movement, planned operations and activities of Government officials. This facilitates ambushes or attacks against the RTG. The insurgents have an effective intelligence network, which is functional and able to provide the CPT essential information.

10. (C) TRAINING SCHOOLS:

a. Reflecting the growing strength and sophistication of the CPT is the establishment of training schools in the Tri-Province area at Khao Ya mountain and Phu Hin Long Kla mountain. In Nan Province it is suspected that the CT have training schools at Doi Pha Chi mountain, but at present no firm information has been obtained. In Chiang Rai Province, no known locations exist. However, across the border in Laos two training schools are known to exist. The Anti-American Imperialist Peoples School 32 at Meaung Sui, and AAIPS 31 at Meuang Sing. Training is usually conducted in semi-permanent camps constructed within platoon safe areas. Training lasts 11 hours a day on a strict schedule beginning at 0530 in the morning and ending at 2100 hours with half-hour meal breaks. Subjects emphasized are political and ideological indoctrination in accordance with Mao Tse Tung's doctrines of revolutionary warfare. Mao's writings are available as texts. Time is set aside for Voice of the People of Thailand radio broadcasts. The insurgents are also trained in guerilla tactics and the use of weapons. Physical fitness is stressed throughout the training.

b. The CPTs inability to train the recruits inside Thailand has long been a major factor in restricting the CPTs growth. In 1970 the CPT established in-country basic political and military indoctrination and training for varied groups of recruited hilltribes personnel. With this capability the CT can train more people than ever in the North. This strengthens the CT, not only in training their jungle fighters, but also in training their supporters in the villages. With the establishment of training camps, renewed emphasis has been placed on recruitment of Meo hilltribesmen for the TPLAF in accordance with a three-phase program in which 30 men will be recruited during the first phase, 200 men during the second phase and young girls during the third phase, the latter to be used only as nurses. However to date the CPT are still having problems

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filling their ranks from in-country resources. The recruitment program described previously caused resentment by the Mao villagers, who consider this program a form of draft into the TPLAF.

c. Out-of-country training continues, with selected CPT cadre spending upwards of five years in China and North Vietnam studying medicine, political theory, radio communications and guerilla warfare. Cadre trained in the specialties are now infiltrating back into the North. The impact of their highly trained personnel is yet to be determined.

11. (C) COMMUNICATIONS: Within the remote jungle areas and the surrounding regions, the insurgents communications system is primarily based on the use of carriers. This system in the North appears to be highly functional. According to intelligence sources, it is well adjusted to the needs of the CT organization, providing the ability to communicate between units rapidly and effectively. The CPT possesses only limited signal equipment at present of which most has been captured from downed RTA aircraft or captured from RTA operations. The CT are presently receiving more communications equipment from out-country resources and over the last year their ability to communicate has increased three fold. Increased ability to monitor RTA transmissions, and intercept and jam RTG transmissions have been observed throughout the Northern area.

12. (C) LOGISTIC SUPPORT SYSTEM:

a. The insurgents in the North have only a rudimentary support system that is commensurate with their level of organization. Nevertheless, the system has shown improvements in the last few years, providing adequate sustenance to the insurgents in their jungle environment. The insurgents logistic support system is largely dependent upon the local village support structure for food, personal items and the majority of medical supplies. However, they are requiring more and more out of country support to maintain their more modern Sino-Soviet bloc weapons systems. The insurgents have established major logistical supply depots in Sayabong Province, Laos which supply their forces in North Thailand. Additionally, each area command headquarters has established and maintains minor supply depots within Thailand near the Thai/Laos border. All material infiltrated into Northern Thailand is brought in by either porters or pack animals from their supply depots. Based on an analysis of defectors interrogated, POWs and captured documents, indications are that during calendar year 1972, the amount of Sino-Soviet bloc material infiltrated into North Thailand exceeded 300 tons. Captured documents also indicate that most of the CPT's operational funds for North Thailand, approximately two million dollars per year, is provided by Communist China and is brought into Thailand via the infiltration network. The infiltration of material is usually provided along major lines of communications, which have been identified as follows (See Figure 6).

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(1) From Laos, B. Khoka (PC 8804) - B. Huai-Sa Ngeuk (B. Lamphaen) PC 6508 - B. Huai-Hin-Khao PC 6109.

(2) From Laos, B. Khoka (PC 8804) - B. Hadsa PC 6503 - Doi Phamon PC 5902.

(3) From Laos, B. Khoka (PC 8804) - B. Konteun PB 6693 - B. Huai-Lao PB 5885 - B. Laojen PB 5192, B. Lao-U PB 4988 and B. Huaichang Kong PB 5270.

(4) From Laos, Phu Phin PB 7780 - Phu Chang PB 7582 - Phu Lan PB 7475 - B. Tin Tok PB 7167 - (Doi Namsa) PB 5462, E. Kiewkaw PB 6862 - B. Meo Moh PB 5242 B. Phachangnoi PB 5825 - Doi Phachang PB 5912 - Doi Phaji PB 6103.

b. Insurgents who have defected or been captured appeared to be well clothed and well fed despite reports of food shortages in some areas. Therefore it can only be concluded that food and clothing are no problem. There is also no shortage of weapons or ammunition. Besides external sources of supply, improved military combat posture of the insurgents ensures acquisition of additional arms and communications equipment from the usually outclassed, outmanned and outgunned paramilitary forces. Medical supplies also appear to be adequate. There are also qualified physicians, who have been trained in Peking, assigned to each area Headquarters. In addition to qualified physicians at area headquarters, there are nurses at platoon/group level who were trained in China and North Vietnam. In summation, though rudimentary, the CPT logistic support system is adequately meeting insurgent demands for vitally essential material; food, clothing, weapons, ammunition, medical treatment and supplies.

13. (C) ARMAMENT:

a. Jungle Fighter Armament: For the level of insurgent now in progress in the North they are adequately armed. Nearly all the communists main and rural force soldiers are presently armed with modern sino-soviet bloc weapons. Insurgent armament includes AK-47 assault rifles, SKS semi-automatic carbines, type 53 carbine, pistols, RPG, light machineguns, M-79 grenade launchers, RPG-2 anti-tank grenade launchers, 60mm and 82mm mortars, 57mm recoilless rifles, chicom hand grenades, and mines to include the soviet model PMN non-metallic anti-personnel mine. Captured documents also revealed that the insurgent main force units have been issued a limited number of heavy machine guns and flame throwers. The heavy machine gun 12.7 mm/50 cal has been verified when it was used in the Tri-Province area, as yet the flame thrower have not been verified.

b. Village Militia Armament: Although information regarding the degree of armament of VMUs is limited, it is believed that the VMUs throughout the North are armed with locally procured shot guns and World War II vintage U.S. manufactured weapons such as the M-1 rifle, M1 and M2 carbines, M3 submachineguns and the newer M-79 grenade launcher. Recently some village militia units have armed themselves with captured M-16's.

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VEGETATION of THAILAND




Figure 1

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
AREAS OF CT ACTIVITY IN NORTH THAILAND



The Most Sensitive Changwats

1. Chiang Rai
2. Nan
3. Uttaradit
4. Phitsanulok
5. Loei
6. Phetchabun
7. Tak

 Areas of CT political subversion

 Areas of armed CT activity

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CT STRENGTH AND LOCATIONS IN THE NORTHERN AREA

1. CHIENG RAI

A. A. CHIENGSAEN

CT STRENGTH

- Doi Loung PC 262401	20
-Pakha PC 292465	5-10
-B. Muser Huai-Kwan PC 279372	5-10
-Khun-nam-yab PC 349390	Unknown
-Doi Rang-ton-khamn	20-30

TOTAL: 40-60

B. A. CHIENGKHONG

-Doi Pa-ma-kham PC 5117	40-50
-Khun Namsom PC 3640	40-60
-Doi Huai-san PC 5119	40-60
-Huai-khu PC 5302	40-50
-Doi Phamon PC 588018	40-60
-B. Panghat PC 5110	10-15
-B. Thakham PC 4926	10-15
-B. Meo Khun-Nam-kaeng PC 432089	40-60
-Doi Huai-phak-khom PC 5117	Unknown
-Huai-harn PC 4603	40-60
-Doi Phalae PC 5003	40-60
-Doi Huai-moung PC 5499	30-60
-B. Pha-jao PB 5397	Unknown

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-Khun-huai-pa-daeng PC 435025	Unknown
-Doi Yao PC 4610	100
-B. Khun-huai-ja-yin PC 413988	Unknown
TOTAL:	300-400

C. A. THERNG

-B. Kiew-khaw-ma PB 4496	15
-Doi Khun-tan PB 352905	20-30
-B. Lao-u PB 488885	40-50
-Din-khao-neu and Din-khao-tai PB 4397	40-60
-Doi Khun-ta PB 365905	50-60
-Doi Mieng-ja-prong PB 425928	20-30
-Doi Mon-liab PC 4104	30-60
-Doi Khun-huai-sak PB 352955	20-30
-Khun Huai-khok PB 352955	Unknown
-B. Kiew-huai-khrai PB 464817	10-20
-Doi Daen-meuang PC 472020	20-30
-Doi Hang-bong PE 3494	Unknown
-Doi Pong PB 312832	Unknown
-B. Pa-tao PB 400945	30
TOTAL:	250-350

D. A. CHIENGKHAM

-Doi Namsa PB 5663	20-30
-Doi Phaki PB 6103	Unknown
-Doi Phaji PB 5310	Unknown
-Dan Meo Moh PB 536445	Unknown

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-Doi Phulangka PB 5540	30-50
-Doi Khun-nanyad PB 5104	20-30
-Khun-mae-yad-loung PB 502047	20-30
-Doi San-klang PB 5218	Unknown
TOTAL:	150-200

2. NAN PROVINCE:

A A. MEUANG

-Phaki PB6003	Unknown
-B. Meo Khun-nam-mao QA 240785	20-30
-B. Juaichangyai QA 301707	30-40
-B. Huai-deu QA 218857	Unknown
-B. Phatang PA 5380	5-10
-B. Nampun QA 2560	5-10
-Doi Phukheng PA 605755	10-20
-B. Huai-nam-phrang QA 0695	5-10
TOTAL:	100-200

B. A. PUA

-B. Huai-pun QB 379663	20-30
-B. Namchang QB 321601	80-100
-B. Pangkobneu QB 331550	15-20
-B. Sobkan QB 249520	20-30
-B. Na-oi QB 278480	10-20
-B. Tham-khun-nam-phun QB 170194	10-20
-Tham Khun-kwang QB 151178	10-20
-B. Pu-kon QB 116186	10-15
-Khun-nam-oun QB 0306	Unknown

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-Lam-nam-yao QB 0801	Unknown
-Doi Pha-ngam QB 1404	30
-Doi Deuai-kai QB 107012	50
-B. Jantong QB 211259	30-40
-Khun-nam-yao QB 155132	Unknown
-B. Nabong QB 342106	10-15
-Phu-liem QA 361959	Unknown
-B. Wang-phaen QB 435075	30-60
-Doi Phu Wae QB 270359	400
-B. Kok QB 2700	20
-B. Rai QB 0803	20
-B. Sapan QB 212301	30-50
-Khun-nam-pong QB 3326	30
-Tham Khun-thao QB 151178	10-20
-B. Khun-kha QB 109155	30-40
-B. Sobmao QB 333012	20-30
-B. Nawng-jaew QB 322212	40-60

TOTAL: 600-1,000

C. A. THUNGCHANG/KIENG-AMPHOE CHIENGKLANG:

-B. Pangkae QB 079459	20-30
-B. Khun-nam-lad QB 156518	20-30
-B. Chongphrai QB 188508	10-20
-B. Kiew-kaw(related to B. Nanyao)PB 697614	30-50
-B. Phadaeng QB 154512	Unknown

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-B. Huairai QB 1463	80
-Doi Pha-hu PB 8851	30
-Tham Wiengkae PB 841359	20-30
-B. Khun-nam-prik PB 700527	Unknown

TOTAL: 200-300

D. A. SA - A. NANOI

-Namphangnoi QA 2254	40-60
-Phulan QA 069280	20-30
-Huaichangyai QA 312698	Unknown
-Makhintaek QA 4071	40-60
-Hua-meing QA 3677	Unknown

TOTAL: 100-150

3. UTTARADIT

A. A. FAKTHA

-Doi Sansao QA 175242	10-20
-Bai Phapaen QA 180290	20-30

TOTAL: 30-50

B. A. NAMPAD

-B. Pong-kum QV 056700	10-20
-B. Khok-faek QV 1167	30-40
-Phu Soi-dao QV 0551	Unknown
-Phu Mieng QV 0755	Unknown

TOTAL: 40-60

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4. TRI-PROVINCE

A. Northern Sector

-Phu Khad QV 050280	Unknown
-Khao Kheum QV 051084	40-50
-Khao Nam Pim QV 0801	20-30
-Pha Tok Toy QV 096017	30
-Ang Si-eiad QV 120055	Unknown
-Huai-lao-laeng QU 166968	30-40
-Phu-hin-the-nang QU 187933	Unknown
-Phu Ka-raw QU 170927	Unknown
-Tham Sao QU 170927	Unknown
-Thao Jia QU 202872	Unknown
-Tham Huai-loung QU 227855	30-40
-B. Omsingneu QU 142926	20-30
-B. Hinlong-kla QU 138795	Unknown
-B. Tham-berk QU 100780	Unknown
-B. Tub-kob Q" 092683	40-60
-B. Wang-hin-lom QU 110690	40-60
-Huai-phai QU 156702	Unknown
-Khaw-po QU 152692	Unknown
-Tham Huai-jieng-nam QU 171666	Unknown
-B. Huai-fai-mai QU 165656	Unknown
TOTAL:	400-600

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B. Southern Sector

-B. Huai-salieng-haeng QU0934	10-14
-B. Huchang QU 1227	Unknown
-B. Laona QU 1224	20-30
-B. Laoieu QU 0825	Unknown
-B. Khao Khaw QU 1336	30
-Phu Pha Khao (Paphai QU 0816)	30-40
-Khao Tang-bart PU 850465	20-30
-Khao Sung PU 873385	Unknown
-Khao Sab-phang PU 904202	Unknown
-Khao Pha-hin-lad QU 1718	5-10
-Khao Kon-huad QU 1310	15-20
-Khao Pha-khao QU 1605	Unknown
-Khao Sanamkla QU 2007	15-20
-Khao Sab-sai QU 1715	10-20
-Khao Baw-phra PU 9108	7-10
-Khao Huai-rai PU 7639	8-10
-Nern-prang PU 7432	10-15

TOTAL: 150-250

5. TAK PROVINCE

A. A. MAESOD

- Thi Pu Lu MU 798207	10-20
- B. Pakha MU 828288	10-20
- B. Pakhaem MU 759302	50-60
- B. Pawai MU 805314	Unknown

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-Doi Khun-meead MU 6948	20-25
-Doi Rephade MU 7131	30
-B. Huai-kharun MU 9941	90-100
-B. Lao-yang	30-60
-B. Nuki MU 897323	Unknown
-B. Thongchai MU 944365	Unknown
-B. Umpleng MU 959227	Unknown
-B. Ladtabeung MU 980030	Unknown
-B. Nawngkhiew MU 664424	30-50
-B. Paklauri MU 824375	30-50
-Doi Loung Camp MU 902273	Unknown
-B. Mao Mai MU 986478	Unknown
-B. Phao-pha MU 677125	50

TOTAL: 300-400

B. A. UMPHANG

- B. Ya Mo Khi MT 905735	Unknown
-B. Mong Kua MT 665352	60
- B. Re Tong Khu	Unknown
- Wa Seu Khi MT 780533	Unknown
- B. Phaw Ta Ka Tha MT 689373	10-15
- B. Pa La Tha MT 835522	Unknown
- Se Pa La (Ba-le) MT 846509	40-50
-B. Kho Tha MT 806472	6-10
- B. Be Khi MT 019425	40-50

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-B. Kerng-baw MT 752199	Unknown
-B. Kui Ler Taw MT 621488	40-50
-B. Perng-klerng-mai MT 564469	Unknown
-B. Keung Ma Khi Khi MT 603400	Unknown
-B. Mong Kha MT 603664	30
-B. Kui-kler MT 642431	60-80
-B. Maw Tala MT 6172	Unknown
-B. Yang MT 7571	5-10
-B. Ta Kho Bi MT 8074	Unknown
-B. Merng-klerng MT 5670	Unknown
-B. Thi Jaw Si MT 607646	80
TOTAL:	500-600

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GT OPERATIONAL AREAS



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Figure 4

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OT INFILTRATION & SUPPLY ROUTES




Figure 6

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ANNEX C

T R A I N I N G

1. GENERAL: Within Northern Thailand there is a unit that has primarily a training mission. This unit is the 4th Infantry Division composed of the 4th and 7th RCT. The training conducted includes basic combat training and unit training. There is also a Counterinsurgency Training Camp Advised by a USASF "A" Team which has the responsibility of training units stationed in Northern Thailand in Counterinsurgency Operations. During the early part of this reporting period training within the RTA units of Northern Thailand proved to be deficient in many areas. These deficiencies were mainly due to a lack of command interest in unit training on the part of senior commanders. However, in the time frame 1 January to 1 June a definite up-swing in command interest was noted and this resulted in better performance on the part of units committed in active CI operations. An example of the increase in command interest in training was the appointment of an Assistant Division Commander of the 4th Division who was given the primary responsibility for training. Following this implementation, unit Army Training Tests became outstanding training vehicles with key members of the Division planning and administering well written and executed company training tests. More emphasis was devoted to counterinsurgency type operations without a decrease in conventional warfare testing. After intensive training and testing the units of the 4th Division that were committed to active counterinsurgency operations displayed a marked improvement over past performance which substantiated the worth of a good unit training program. The Royal Thai Army units in Northern Thailand have a growing awareness of past training deficiencies and the success possible when training is improved. Therefore, a continued increase in command emphasis on training and improved unit training can be anticipated.

2. BASIC COMBAT TRAINING (BCT):

New recruits are inducted into the Royal Thai Army two times per year on 1 May and 1 November. The recruits are then assigned to parent units where they receive 12 weeks of BCT. Significant changes were experienced during the past training cycle which have improved BCT in Northern Thailand. In the past, new recruits received only 10 weeks of BCT. Because the average Thai recruit is lacking in education, a disproportionate amount of BCT time must be devoted to dismounted drill and troop information. Also, much time is devoted to physical conditioning. Although these subjects are necessary and should be included in BCT, the proportion of time devoted left little time for

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teaching other important subjects under the old 10 week time frame. Therefore the expansion of BCT to 12 weeks has increased the time available for training in these other important subjects. Also, in the past recruits who failed the BCT Proficiency Test at the end of a training cycle were not retrained to eliminate deficiencies. Rather, they were assigned to units along with the recruit who was judged to be proficient by the BCT Proficiency Test. During the past training cycle this procedure was changed and recruits who failed to pass the test were formed into a composite unit and retrained. These changes, which have long been recommended by the U.S. advisory personnel of Detachment III, have improved BCT in this area of responsibility although other deficiencies still exist. These deficiencies have been identified by the advisory personnel and brought to the attention of appropriate counterparts. They are:

a. New recruits continue to receive all of their BCT under a decentralized training system conducted at battalion level. This leads to an inordinate number of cadre being utilized as instructors and standardization of BCT is lacking.

b. Because company and battalion ATTs are held in January, February and March of each year, recruits inducted in November receive little squad and platoon training prior to being integrated into a unit preparing for company and battalion ATTs. This, in many cases, had led to poor execution on the part of units being tested because of a lack of field experience on the part of many unit members.

c. There is a noticeable lack of individual small arms firing and very little qualification firing. An amplification of this lack of weapons training is a lack of fire control and accurate firing by engaged RTA units as cited in captured CT documents and the interrogation of CT prisoners. Units frequently cite non-availability of training ammunition as the reason for a lack of weapons training but frequent checks by advisor personnel show the training ammunition is available but either not requisitioned in time or not in sufficient quantities. This problem is basically one of units not properly programming training ammunition requirements. Also, in the case of the 7th RCT, range facilities are limited.

3. UNIT TRAINING:

Small unit training continues to be a problem in Northern Thailand because it is not conducted on a regular and systematic basis and lacks realism. Squad and platoon size units seldom train under field conditions. Company and battalion training, however, has shown a marked improvement. This was particularly true during the company ATTs. The 4th Division staff prepared a training and testing program which, for the first time,

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required all the Division and Regimental Combat Team staffs and support troops to move to the field and support troops in the field.

This proved to be an excellent training exercise for the entire 4th Division. During this reporting period advisory personnel of Detachment III have noted a definite improvement in the following aspects of unit training:

a. More emphasis is placed on training units for counterinsurgency type operations. During company ATTs a large portion of the test was devoted to testing the units counterinsurgency capability. Each company was required to search and clear an AO and perform civic action projects within their AO. The members of the unit were also required to operate for five days in difficult terrain without benefit of resupply.

b. More emphasis is being placed on combined arms training. Tank and infantry units are being trained to operate as a team and all leaders down to the squad level are learning to call for and adjust artillery and airstrikes. Units are also receiving training in the proper utilization of helicopter and spotter plane support.

c. More emphasis is being placed on training in civic action. Civic action is included in all field training exercises for units of the 4th Division. Engineer units, for example, are learning to operate equipment and accomplish construction projects by actually building needed bridges, improving roads and repairing schools. Tank and infantry unit commanders are required to contact local officials while in a training area in the field to determine needed civic action projects within their capabilities.

d. The 4th RCT is now requiring its subordinate units to move to training areas outside the billet area. This has led to more realistic unit training over better terrain.

4. COUNTERINSURGENCY TRAINING:

Northern Thailand has one Counterinsurgency Training Camp dedicated to training company size units stationed in Northern Thailand in CI operations. The objective of the training is to provide the individual soldier with a sound background in general military subjects, weapons, and counterinsurgency oriented tactics, thus enabling him to function effectively as a member of a rifle company conducting counterinsurgency operations. The training is provided to selected infantry and cavalry companies and lasts for 5 weeks. A counterinsurgency field training exercise is the culmination of the company CI training program. This PTX, which is eight days in duration, is designed to provide realistic counterinsurgency situations in which both the individual soldier and

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the unit leaders are given the opportunity to apply all previous training. The FTI also provides a means by which a participating unit's combat effectiveness can be assessed and its training evaluated. The program could be an excellent vehicle for preparing units for active CI operations if classroom hours were reduced and field training time increased. Another problem area that lessens the program's effectiveness drastically is when parent units are levied to provide a company to the training camp they will frequently form a composite company manned by individuals from various companies and staff offices. Often filler personnel consist of clerks and other personnel who do not need the training while infantry soldiers are retained at the home station to perform such tasks as guard duty and participate in honor guards. Thus, a good training program in counterinsurgency operations exists but is not being utilized to its fullest.

Commanders of RTA units would prefer that the training be given at the squad level rather than the company level. This would relieve them of the administrative burden of sending a complete company and squad level CI training would be more in keeping with tactical considerations during active CI operations. Section does a Thai TO&E company become engaged in classic CI type tactics. This type operation is usually conducted at the squad or platoon level and includes ambushes and patrolling.

A problem also exists concerning the advisory effort for the CI Training Camp. As previously noted, the camp is advised by a USASF "A" Team which reports directly to USASF Headquarters. Although units advised by Detachment III personnel provide most of the trainees for the camp, the Commander of Detachment III does not have control over the advisors for the camp, and therefore the detachment does not receive reports on the performance of the units it advises when they attend CI training. It is highly recommended that the advisory personnel of the CI Training Camp be placed under the operational control of Detachment III.

5. EVALUATION OF TRAINING:

a. Based on observation by Detachment III advisors of training and training tests, and an analysis of combat actions the following weaknesses have been identified within the 3rd RTA and brought to the attention of commanders and staff officers:

(1) More emphasis must be placed on getting the small units into the field for more realistic training.

(2) Although preparation and planning for training is excellent, execution of tactics is frequently poor.

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(3) Junior leaders frequently lack proficiency in basic combat skills and often are too old to keep up with their own units during field exercises.

(4) The average Thai soldier has the capability of being an excellent combat soldier but does not have sufficient proficiency in basic combat skills to instill the necessary aggressiveness, confidence and competence.

b. The 3rd Royal Thai Army is becoming increasingly aware of these training problems. Commanders are taking an active interest in training, particularly in CI operations. These same commanders have displayed a new sense of urgency because of high battle losses during Operation Phu Krong in 1972. They have come to the realization that good training is the key-stone to successful operations against the CT and this realization and the corresponding increase in command emphasis should lead to better trained and more effective soldiers and units within the 3rd RTA.

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ANNEX D

PIANNING AND OPERATIONS

1. (C) GENERAL: The Third Royal Thai Army (3rd RTA) is the major military command in the North, and has the responsibility for conducting CI operations in this area. This annex discusses the planning and operations undertaken by 3rd RTA units during the time frame January 1972 to present.

2. (C) PLANNING:

a. Staff Planning: Generally, the staff members and the staff sections of 3rd RTA are competent in their various areas of interest. At both the Army and the Division level, all principal staff officers and the majority of their assistants are staff college graduates and most have had considerable staff experience. In most cases, plans prepared by the staff sections are very good though frequently these plans are written in great detail and allow the subordinate commander very little flexibility. Also, it is felt that in many instances the subordinate commanders do not understand the terminology used in the plans and often do not know what is required of them in the execution phase.

b. Supervision: Command and staff supervision of units conducting CI operations in North Thailand is generally poor. Although the Commanding General of the 3rd RTA/CSOR III, LTG Samran, has authority for the planning and conduct of CI operations in the North, he has not actively supervised CI operations. He spends little time at 3rd RTA FWD Headquarters and often there is no one who will take the responsibility to make an operational decision. In addition, until recently, neither the Commanding General or the Deputy Commanding General would visit the subordinate units conducting CI operations. This trend was reversed during Operation Sam-Chai when the Deputy CG, G-2 and other key staff personnel visited operational bases of units participating in CI operations. As a general rule, field commanders receive little or no direction after an initial operations order is issued. This was most apparent during Operation Sam-Chai. This lack of command and staff supervision has often resulted in poor execution of operational plans at the unit level.

c. Limitations: The major limitation to planning for CI operations hinges on budgetary matters. Budgeting limitations established by CSOC in Bangkok seriously affect 3rd RTA FWD/CSOR III planning for operations. Troop strength authorized for CI operations is limited by CSOC allocated per diem funds and as a result, the 3rd RTA CG has little freedom of action in initiating or extending operations without prior approval from CSOC.

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3. (C) Operations:

a. General: The nature of combat operations conducted by units of 3rd RTA FWD/CSOR III has varied during the past year. From January to April of 1972, one of the largest CI operations ever attempted in Thailand was conducted in the Tri-Province area. A total of approximately 12,000 troops participated in this operation (Operation Phu Kwang). Also during the past year a number of small scale operations were conducted in Chiang Rai and Nan Provinces with the objective of preventing the reinforcement of the CT in the Tri-Province area. After the termination of Operation Phu Kwang, numerous small scale operations were conducted in the Tri-Province area. This was followed by Operation Sam Chai, once again in the Tri-Province area. Upon the termination of Operation Sam-Chai on 31 January 1973, Operation Rama Suun was initiated which encompassed all the major insurgent areas in Northern Thailand and is continuing as this report is being prepared.

b. Tri-Province TAOR:

(1) Operation Phu Kwang:

(a) Operation Phu Kwang was based on the 1972 Communist Suppression Policy which called for units from the Central Region (1st RTA) to conduct CI operations in border areas and to test their ability to reinforce outlying regions in accordance with existing contingency plans. Preparation began in the summer of 1971 with a plan prepared by the RTA. Security measures were believed to be stringent, however it was later determined that the CT had compromised the plan early enough to take counter measures. Overall planning and preparation for the operation was adequate and included several new innovations never before attempted in a RTA operation. Bangkok based forces, including a major portion of the RTA 1st Division, which is considered the "countercoup force" in the capital, were involved. The RTA PSYOP Battalion prepared a unit task organized to support the specific requirements of the operation and the RTAF was brought into the planning sufficiently early to prepare for its support role. A noteworthy omission, however, was the lack of an official dialogue with the other two arms of the Civil-Police-Military (CMP) team. Especially with those elements of civil administration and the Thai National Police Department which are concerned with counterinsurgency. Operation Phu Kwang was conceived as an encirclement of the Hin Long K1a CT base with five battalions of the 1st Division while a reinforced battalion screened to the south and a battalion task force from the Special Warfare Center screened to the north. The mission of the screening forces to the north and south was to intercept the CT moving to or from the 1st Division AO. The initial concept of the 1st Division operation was to surround Hin Long K1a with five infantry battalions occupying a segment of the roughly circular division AO. All five battalions were to conduct search and clear operations focusing on Hin Long K1a while the battalion in the northwest sector was to attack into the Hin Long K1a base. Following occupation of Hin Long K1a all five battalions were to conduct search and clear operations in their respective

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sectors. At the same time, a force of two companies was given the mission of patrolling the Phitsanuloke-Lomsak Highway and other roads in the immediate area. All the units involved were supported by appropriate combat support and combat service support units.

(b) Phase I: Initial Operations: The combat units moved into the area and occupied assigned sectors in the last three days before D-Day. Phase I began on 20 January with the establishment of a fire support base in each sector of the 1st Division AO and the initiation of search operations. Although a sizeable force was fielded, combat operations were primarily of platoon or smaller size designed to engage small groups of CT and to take maximum advantage of the precipitous and overgrown terrain. Occasionally, however, forces as large as company size were committed in a single action. This pattern prevailed throughout the operation.

(c) Phase II: The remaining units, the three battalions of the 2nd RTA, the 4th RCT, and the Special Warfare Task Force, were directed to continue operations in Phase II. After retiring to base areas for a stand-down lasting from 28 March until 15 April, these units re-initiated movement toward the Hin Long K1a base. The CT continued their resistance and, due to this, plus the difficulty of resupply, the wearing down of the troops, and excessive costs, the decision was made to terminate the operation. On 21 April the units began their withdrawal.

(d) Follow-up: The 4th RCT reinforced by the 2/13th RCT, along with necessary support elements, was assigned responsibility for follow-up activity in the AO. This consisted of patrols around six fire support bases that were established during Phase I of the operation.

(e) Summary of Operation Phu Kwang: When considering the effect on the CT, the results of Operation Phu Kwang are marginal. The CT were displaced temporarily, suffered an undertermined number of casualties, and lost some supplies, but because the RTG forces did not penetrate and hold the Hin-Long K1a base, the CT were afforded the opportunity to capitalize on the propaganda theme of conducting a successful defense. The Thai labeled Operation Phu Kwang a training exercise because training funds were used and also because there was a need for training in many aspects of CI operations on the part of the RTA units that participated. As a training exercise the operation was a success. In addition, further insight was gained into CT tactics. Other items noted were that while procedures at division level were good, leadership at lower levels, particularly at company and below, was weak. Also, because provisions had not been made for follow-up activities by police and civil elements, RTA forces maintained a presence in the area but not in sufficient strength to apply pressure on the CT.

(2) From the end of April through the end of August 1972, units in the Tri-Province conducted only routine patrolling operations, which resulted in some light contact with the CT. No significant large scale operations were conducted.

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(3) During the month of September a stand down was conducted and units of the 4th RCT prepared to be relieved in place by the 11th RCT, 1st Division. On the 1st of October the Bangkok based 11th RCT moved two battalions plus supporting forces into Lom Sak replacing the previously committed units of the 4th RCT. The 4th RCT units returned to Nakon Sawan and reverted to a training status.

(4) Operation Sam Chai: The plan for Operation Sam-Chai called for the Tri-Province AO to be divided into two sectors. Operational area 1 was once again to be the Hin Long Kla mountain complex. The RTA would commit three battalions from three directions; the 2nd Infantry Battalion, 11th RCT was to move against the western face of the Hin Long Kla, the Airborne Battalion was to move against the northeast face, and the Marine Battalion was to move against the southeast face of the mountain complex. To the north, in Operational Area 2, the 9th Division was to operate in an assigned AO and employ patrols to identify CT base areas and secure roads and fire support bases. During Phase I units were to search and destroy CT concentrations in Operational Areas 1 and 2. During Phase II, the units were to expand out of the original AO's and to search and destroy additional CT forces, base camps, supply caches and crops, and mop up remnants left over from Phase I. The operation began as scheduled on 1 December but was halted after 5 days because intelligence information indicated the CT were moving out of Hin Long Kla. Based on this intelligence information, the maneuver units were assigned new AO's to the north of Hin Long Kla. The remainder of the operation was characterized by numerous small unit contacts. The operation was terminated on 31 January 1973 with a count of 26 RTA WIA, 91 RTG WIA and an estimated 21 CT KIA, 12 WIA and 2 captured in action.

(5) Operation Rama Suun: Upon termination of Operation Sam-Chai the deployed units in the TAOR under went a brief stand down and then entered into Operation Rama Suun which was to last from 1 February to 7 May 1973. During the stand down period the 1st Marine Battalion returned to its home base and was replaced by the 2nd Battalion, 4th RCT. The 11th RCT Headquarters was designated the control headquarters for the new operation. During the later part of January the 11th RCT issued operation order RS 1/16 assigning unit AO's and missions to search out and destroy CT armed forces, operation bases, supplies, arms caches and all CT crops in the assigned AO's. The operation had five phases: Phase I consisted of moving and rotating the units into operating areas, Phase II consisted of search and destroy operations, Phase III consisted of repositioning units in new AO's, Phase IV consisted of search and destroy operations in the new AO's, and Phase V consisted of moving the units back to their home stations. Phase II began on scheduled on 17 February and for the first three weeks the units involved made very little contact. On 5 March the 2/4th RCT entered the Khaw Ya mountain complex and became heavily engaged. Attempts were made to reinforce the 2/4th with the 1/11th RCT and the Airborne Battalion but no link-up was accomplished. As of this writing total casualties for Operation Rama Suun are 14 RTA KIA and 46 WIA with an estimated 10

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CT KIA and an unknown number of CT WIA. Presently this operation is continuing and is scheduled to terminate sometime in May 1973.

c. Chiang Rai TAOR:

(1) During the first part of 1972, the 7th RCT conducted operations in support of Operation Phu Kwang. These small scale operations were designed to prevent possible CT reinforcements from moving out of the Chiang Rai TAOR and into the Tri-Province area. Upon completion of Operation Phu Kwang, the 7th RCT (FWD) concentrated on conducting psychological warfare operations, civic action and intelligence collection until October 1972. At that time, the 7th RCT was replaced by the 31st RCT, a subordinate unit of the RTA 1st Division, which moved two battalions and supporting units to Chiang Kham and assumed responsibility for the Chiang Rai TAOR. The 7th RCT returned to Chiang Mai and Lampang and reverted to a training status. The 31st RCT devoted the months of October through January conducting small scale operations designed to acquaint the subordinate units with the new area of operations. On 1 February 1973, Operation Rama Suun began and the 31st RCT employed a three battalion task force with the mission of searching and clearing assigned AO's. This operation is scheduled to terminate in May of 1973. To date only light contact has been made with the CT.

(2) CIF (Chinese Irregular Forces): From 27 March to 14 April 1972, the CIF conducted a joint operation with the BFP and RTA. This operation took place in the southern portion of the Doi Yao and Doi Pha Non ridgelines in Chiang Rai Province. The CIF searched for suspected CT bases along the ridges while the 7th RCT, assisted by VDC teams, attempted to suppress the supply system established by the CT along the Thoeng-Chiang Kham road. Friendly casualties during this operation were nine KIA and 52 WIA while CT losses were two confirmed KIA, 50 estimated KIA and 95 estimated WIA. Thirty tons of rice were burned and a large number of livestock were killed after attempted evacuation failed. Other CIF operations in the same area and in Doi Luang have produced no further noteworthy results.

(3) In addition to normal combat operations a significant defection of CT controlled hilltribes people took place during the months of July, August, September and October in the Chiang Rai TAOR. A total of approximately 250 refugees, mostly women and children, defected to RTG control during this period.

d. Nan TAOR:

(1) As in the case of the Chiang Rai TAOR, the Cavalry Division Forward (CDF) devoted the early part of 1972 to conducting small scale operations designed to prevent possible CT reinforcements from moving into the Tri-Province area during Operation Phu Kwang. Upon completion of Operation Phu Kwang, the CDF instituted a policy of conducting at least two company size operations per month within the Nan TAOR. This policy

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coupled with aggressive patrolling techniques has resulted in numerous clashes with the CT and over a period of one year the culmative results of this police has been quite favorable.

(2) The Doi Pha Ki mountain complex, located to the Northwest of Nan City, has long been a CT stronghold and the CDF has launched two major operations against the CT located in that area. In December 1972, CDF forces moved into the Doi Pha Ki area and clashed with an estimated 50 CT. The results of this contact and several other smaller contacts was 5 RTA KIA and 19 WIA. CT casualties were estimated to be at least 10 KIA and 15 to 20 WIA. During this operation it was reported that the CT used rifle grenades. This was the first such report received. During Operation Rama Suun, in February 1973, the CDF again inserted units into the Doi Pha Ki area but only light contact was made.

e. Tak TAOR: The Thai Police have the primary responsibility for CT suppression in the Tak TAOR. Police operations in this area have been primarily defensive in nature and included providing protection to road construction crews. Following personnel changes in the leadership positions, the police began training local inhabitants in security procedures. This program was designed to improve local security and has been relatively successful.

4. (C) SUMMARY: During my tour of duty the RTG has continued to display an increased appreciation of the seriousness of the insurgent threat in the North. In Thai Fiscal Year (TFY) 73, the RTA doubled the number of units committed to CI operations. Based on lessons learned during Operation Phu Kwang the RTA increased small unit CI training, took steps to improve leadership in CI deployed units, increased manning levels in CI deployed units, improved integrated planning and operational concepts for RTA and RTAF units, and for the first time, deployed a RTMC unit in a CI role. National Police-Military cooperation has improved and psychological operations are being conducted more aggressively. The absence of a strong civil development program, however, still handicaps the ability of the RTG to achieve long-term benefits from military successes. In December 1972, the RTG initiated a plan to train and deploy a CI force of forty 12 man special teams made up of two regular RTA members and ten volunteer personnel recruited from SGU returnees. These teams are to conduct small unit clandestine operations in major CT base areas located in the North. With this plan came a change of technique in the deployment of RTARF in CT areas. The RTARF and TNPD assets would only be deployed around the periphery of the CT controlled areas in attempt to contain the CT and prevent their expansion into other, as yet largely untouched, areas. As part of this revised policy, plans for Operation Sam-Chai and Rama Suun were changed from offensive operations, to operations designed to contain the insurgents through small unit actions. These actions were designed to cut off the support and isolate insurgent forces. Only time will verify the effectiveness of the newly adopted approach to CT suppression. At present many problem areas do exist which must be solved if the new concept is to be successful.

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ANNEX E

LOGISTICS

1. INTRODUCTION: This annex provides information on the primary logistic support organization for the 3rd Royal Thai Army (3rd RTA) - The 3d Army Support Command (3d ASCOM), problem areas in logistic support which should receive continuing advisory attention, and unit capability analyses for the functional units of the 3d ASCOM. Since this is the first report of this kind to be written about the 3d ASCOM, it is also intended to provide a basis from which future progress can be gauged.

2. THE 3D ARMY SUPPORT COMMAND (3d ASCOM):

a. BACKGROUND: Prior to the organization of the 3d ASCOM, all direct support elements of the 3rd RTA was provided by 4th Division support companies, and the 4th and 7th Military Circles. General support effort was handled by the technical service depots in Bangkok or in the case of Engineer work orders by the Engineer Depot in Ratburi. The existence of the Tech Services and the considerable power each has gained and maintains has and will constitute an obstacle to providing true functionalized logistic support. The Chiefs of the technical service departments have the authority to assign missions, personnel, and material assets at will to units under their responsibility. Although the technical service chiefs are not in the direct chain of command of the 3d RTA, they have the power to influence logistic support provided to the 3rd RTA. Command and staff officer personnel also greatly influence the logistics system and often increased command interest can result in spectacular improvements. It is sad to note that all too often, that command interest is missing.

b. ORGANIZATION:

(1) The 3d ASCOM is organized along technical service lines with individual technical service companies providing the support afforded by their respective branches of service. It can be seen then, that the "one stop" support intended by the organization of the 3d ASCOM is handicapped and not now a reality. Further complications arise from the dispersion of units. For instance, all ammunition supply support for 3d RTA is provided by the 3d Ammunition Company at Bang Prap, a distance of some 160 miles from Phitsanuloke.

(2) An organization chart for the 3d ASCOM is shown at Inclosure 1. During 1973 and 1974 the following units are planned for expansion of the 3d ASCOM.

- Ordnance GS Maintenance Co
- Engineer Field Supply Co

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- Light Truck Company
- General Supply Unit
- Medical Supply Depot

This expansion when completed will afford the 3d ASCOM with sorely needed maintenance, transportation and medical supply capability. Until the time these units are operational which will probably be not less than two years from now, the 3d ASCOM must receive augmentation to support field operations.

c. PHYSICAL PLANT:

(1) An ambitious construction program was initiated in September 1969. Initial priority was given to construction of housing but administrative buildings and limited storage and maintenance areas have now been completed. An additional 24 x 120 meter storage warehouse is under construction now and should be completed by June 1973. Facilities that have been completed are as follows:

<u>TYPE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
Field Grade Quarters (Single Family)	22	
Company Grade Quarters(Multi-Family)	60	
NCO Quarters (Multi-Family)	330	
Troop Barracks	6	1 ea 10x75 meters 5 ea 10x42 meters
Administrative Buildings	2	1 ea HQs Bldg. 14x42 meters 1 Guard House 10x35 meters
Storage Buildings	1	Open Storage 15x45 meters
	1	Closed Storage 15x45 meters
	2	Wood Construction 9½x37 meters

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Maintenance Buildings	2	1 ea Sig. Maint. 10x30 meters
		1 ea Engr. Maint. 6x24 meters

(2) A total of 19,719,001 Baht has been programmed for construction of facilities to house the units planned for 3d ASCOM expansion in 1973 and 1974. A breakout by unit follows:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PROGRAMMED FUNDS</u>
Ordnance GS Maint Co.	8,455,854 Baht
Engineer Field Supply Co.	3,969,459 "
Light Truck Company	2,235,278 "
General Supply Unit	1,475,796 "
Medical Supply Depot	3,582,614 "

TOTAL 19,719,001 Baht

Invitation for bids for construction of these facilities will be issued in June 1973 and construction is expected to take six to ten months after a bid is accepted.

d. OPERATIONS: The 3d ASCOM first participated as a support organization in Operation Phu Kwang during the period 20 January through 30 April 1972. Considering that the 3d ASCOM had only been organized since April 1971, their performance was judged to be satisfactory throughout the operation. Personnel were eager to learn and performance was improved as the operation progressed. The next participation by the 3d ASCOM as a support organization was during Operation Sam Chai (JFTX-16) conducted from 1 December 1972 until 31 January 1973. The unit performed in an excellent fashion and it is to 3rd ASCOM's credit that the deficiencies noted during Operation Phu Kwang had all been corrected. As in the previous operations, maintenance, medical supply, and transportation capabilities were augmented with both personnel and equipment from Bangkok Depots. In support of Operation Ramasuan, the follow-up operation to Sam Chai, 3rd ASCOM has deployed the following assets at Lomsak:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>PERSONNEL STRENGTH</u>
3rd Field Hospital	96
Signal Supply & Maint Team	5
QM Corpse Collecting Team	10
Ammunition Handling Team	18

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62

TOTAL

129

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3. PROBLEM AREAS: The following problem areas are prevalent throughout the 3rd RTA and warrant continuing advisory attention to realize maximum improvement.

a. Poor Maintenance Practices:

(1) Discussion: While this is a broad problem area, it can properly be blamed on two primary faults; (a) Lack of command emphasis on equipment maintenance and (b) Failure of units to follow existing regulations. Few units practice preventive maintenance procedures. After equipment becomes inoperable, no sense of urgency is demonstrated to get it back on line, even though existing regulations specify time limits for submission of requisitions, work orders and follow-up procedures. In many cases, personnel have no knowledge of these regulations. Lack of publications and use of outdated publications impact adversely on the maintenance capability of the 3rd RTA also. The equipment deadline report, which could be an effective maintenance management tool has been changed from a monthly report to a quarterly report. Evenso, the report triggers no visible action as it passes from the submitting unit through channels to the respective technical department in Bangkok. In many instances maintenance personnel are not familiar with the equipment or publications for the equipment they are maintaining and cause some share of maintenance difficulty.

(2) Action Taken: After being made aware of the RTA regulation requiring daily equipment maintenance many units are scheduling equipment maintenance and inspecting to insure it is being done. Just prior to ATT's, interest in unit maintenance peaks and equipment taken to the field is usually in good shape. Units have submitted requisitions for necessary manuals and publications and have indicated a desire to follow-up to receive them. Continuous advisory action has been brought to bear during unit visits and frequent meetings are held by logistics personnel to keep interest high. It is fair to say that over the previous year, maintenance has improved and can continue to do so with continued advisory effort and necessary improvements being made in the logistic system.

b. Lack of Supply Responsiveness:

(1) Discussion: For the most part the regulation and existing supply system provide the necessary where-with all, for a responsive supply effort. There are many deficient areas which now prevent this. They are:

(a) Lack of school trained personnel: Supply personnel are not usually adequately familiar with the supply system to enable them to utilize the system as it should be. Most supply personnel receive OJT only. Supervisory personnel are inadequately prepared to effectively train assigned personnel and usually don't have the requisite publications and training material to do so anyway.

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(b) **Storage Facilities:** The range of storage facilities runs from poor condition to excellent condition with the majority of units having only fair condition storage facilities. In the case of the 3d ASCOM, funding restrictions on new construction beyond planned expansion has been the major culprit. Bins for parts storage are also scarce and usually are home-made when they are used. The problem is only compounded by the refusal of the Thai to see this as a problem.

(c) **Refusal to Comply with Suspense Requirements:** It is in the manner of Thai graciousness to react to any situation with outward calm and patience. While this attitude is admirable for social purposes, it contributes measurably to the delay in processing requisitions, initiating follow-up action and accomplishing normal supply procedures.

(d) **Shortage of Technical Manuals and Supply Publications:**

Publication shortages are continually experienced for two primary reasons, (1) failure of the Thai to requisition the required publications or (2) shortage of fund allocations to buy publications even when properly requisitioned. Included in this problem is the shortage experienced in supply of pre-printed forms. Often units will buy blank forms from unit funds rather than undergo the difficulties of ordering and doing without. Of course, this only continues the problem.

(2) **Action Taken:** Advisors continue to stress the importance of following supply regulations to insure responsive supply support. The 3rd ASCOM has conducted two 28 hours blocks of instruction in an admirable effort to cross train their stock control personnel. Prior to the initiation of Operation Sam Chai (JPTX-16) a two hour course on supply procedures was presented to representatives of participating units. One Officer from the 3rd ASCOM stock control section has been programmed to attend a 3 month supply course starting in April 1973. Units have been advised to requisition all required publications. Slow, but sure improvement has been noted in many units.

c. **3d ASCOM Physical Plant Construction:**

(1) **Discussion:** Since construction was initiated in September 1969, troop and family housing, administrative buildings and very limited storage and maintenance space have been completed. A large storage warehouse which will provide 2880 square meters of floor space will be completed within two months. The only two maintenance buildings now completed house the Engineer and Signal Supply and Maintenance Units. The engineer maintenance building is inadequate for the mission. A new engineer building has been planned but funds are not yet allocated to build it.

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(2) Action Taken: Advisors have repeatedly pointed out the need for adequate maintenance work areas. During conferences with the 3d ASCOM commander and staff mention has been made of the need for a large engineer maintenance shop. The current priority however is to build facilities for new units to be activated during 1973 and 1974. Advisors will continue to encourage the Thais to provide adequate engineer equipment maintenance facilities.

d. Command and Control of Logistic support units attached to RCT's:

(1) Discussion: It has been an RTA practice to attach logistic support units to deployed RCT's away from the parent logistic unit. When these logistic support units are placed OPCON to RCT's or Division Staff Officers as is the case of the 1st Fwd Support Platoon of the 4th Ordnance Co., there is a natural reluctance for the parent unit commander to supervise the attached unit as it should be supervised. More often than not, the parent unit commander disassociates himself with his subordinate unit after it has moved.

(2) Action Taken: Advisors have encouraged parent unit commanders to pay frequent visits to their detachments, platoons, and sections. Frequent visits are made to the detached units and communications between parent and detached units are encouraged. Some improvement has been noted but continued advisory effort is necessary to insure that visits or communications do not cease.

e. Insufficient Travel Funds:

(1) Discussion: Using unit support by contact teams, inspection teams and staff officer technical liaison visits is severely hampered by insufficient travel funds being allocated by the RTA. Since the lack of maintenance work areas makes contact team support essential, the lack of travel funds severely hampers mission accomplishment.

(2) Action Taken: Advisors encourage counterparts to make tech liaison visits. The need for contact team support is stressed in frequent discussions with support unit commanders. It is remarkable to note that when contact team support is directed by higher headquarters, the TDY funds are usually available and no problems are encountered in getting the support required.

f. Personnel Shortages:

(1) Discussion: Many units are short personnel who have been transferred without replacement, placed on extended temporary duty, or are in a training status. Since these assignment practices are RTA policy, the problem is a continuing one.

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(2) Action Taken: Cross-training and effective utilization of assigned personnel have been stressed by advisors. Implementation has been noted such as the instruction provided 3d ASCOM stock control personnel for cross-training.

g. Slow Response to Transportation Requirements:

(1) Discussion: The 6th Transportation Company is assigned to the 3rd ASCOM and has the capability to move cargo and personnel throughout the 3rd RTA area of responsibility. Its assets are controlled by the 3d RTA FWD G-4. When cargo is available for shipment, especially Ordnance repair parts, the decision is often made to utilize rail or Express Transportation Organization (ETO) to move the cargo. These methods can take up to 10 days or longer to complete shipments. This has caused delays in bringing equipment off deadline due to non-receipt of critical repair parts.

(2) Action Taken: This problem has been brought to the attention of the 3rd ASCOM commander and the OIC of the 3d ASCOM Stock Control Section. A request has been initiated to establish supply runs to Chiang Kham and Nan every 10 days using 6th Transportation Co. assets. If the request is favorably considered, supply problems for the units at those two locations will be diminished.

h. Advisor Coverage of Logistic Units:

(1) Discussion: At this time there are 13 separate companies in the 3rd ASCOM and 6 divisional support battalion/companies. These units are spread throughout the 3d RTA area. Combat and combat support units also require logistics advisory attention periodically. The Detachment III advisory staff responsible for advisory coverage of these units includes a Senior Log Advisor, an Ordnance Advisor, an Ordnance Maintenance Advisor, and an Engineer Maintenance Advisor. The Joint Table of Distribution dated 3 Oct 72 submitted for approval by CHARAG adds an Engineer Advisor, a Signal Advisor, a Quartermaster Advisor, and a Supply NCO Advisor to the Det III Logistic Advisory Staff. In addition it would change the Ordnance Advisor MOS 4803 to a Maintenance Advisor MOS 4800. Implementing these proposed changes would benefit the advisory effort materially, in that adequate logistic advisory coverage could be provided to all units in the 3d Royal Thai Army.

(2) Action Taken: The logistic advisory staff schedule periodic trips to dispersed logistic units and makes frequent liaison visits to logistic staff and unit offices located in the Phitsanuloke area. Reporting and paper preparation demands are satisfied during evening hours and weekends.

i. Misappropriation of Assets within RTA Units:

(1) Discussion: There have been indications that attempts have been made to misappropriate material assets intended for support of field operations. For instance, shipments of repair parts have been made to the

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31st RCT, at Chieng Kham on a monthly basis, yet officers in that unit continually complained to advisors that a shortage of repair parts existed. It is believed that some of the parts were misappropriated during shipment. The same complaint was voiced with regard to supply of petroleum products. Funding had been authorized to local purchase the POL from the "Three Soldiers" Oil Company at Chieng Kham on a credit basis. This is a departure from the cash payment reimbursement method previously in use and is not as vulnerable to misappropriation attempts.

(2) Action Taken:

(a) The Ordnance Field Supply Company was advised to require supported units to furnish a list of requisitions filled subsequent to each large shipment of repair parts. This was done for the first time on a shipment of repair parts to the 31st RCT on 26 Feb 73. On 9 Mar 73 the Ordnance Co. received a listing of all lll requisitions filled which tallied with the requisitions shipped.

(b) Remote supported units POL requirements will continue to be satisfied by providing credits for local purchase. Additionally the 3d ASCOM imposes strict control over quantities of POL allocated to each unit on a monthly basis.

(c) Advisors will continue to be alert for indicators of misappropriation attempts and will encourage immediate corrective action.

4. ACCOMPLISHMENTS: During the past year the 3d ASCOM has gained valuable experience in the requirements of providing responsive logistic support to the 3rd RTA. The 3rd ASCOM's participation in both Operation Phu Kwang and Operation Sam Chai as the responsible logistic support organization proved their capability for supporting limited size communist suppression operations. The planning that was done prior to initiating the operation was comparable to U.S. standards of excellence. The execution of the plan on successive operations showed considerable improvement. The 3d ASCOM continues to grow and make steady progress toward becoming a viable support organization. Improvement has been indicated in the following areas:

a. Facilities: Steady progress has been made on building a physical plant capable of supporting most of the ASCOM mission. Funding prerequisites for planned expansion of facilities have been accomplished and barring unforeseen difficulties construction should proceed on schedule.

b. Transportation: The 3rd ASCOM has given favorable consideration to advisory recommendations to request the use of 6th Transportation Company assets to support outlying areas on a scheduled basis. When this service is implemented it will help in the effort to provide rapid re-supply service.

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c. **Logistics Training:** The conduct of two 28 hour blocks of instruction in consolidated stock control operations has helped to provide some cross-training to stock control personnel. Conferences held to disseminate supply information prior to Operation Sam Chai also represent an advance in the logistics training area.

d. **Evacuation of Unserviceable Material:** There has been some improvement in the evacuation of unserviceable major assemblies to repair facilities in Bangkok. On many occasions during the past year, prior coordination resulted in the same vehicles delivering unserviceable material to Bangkok being able to pick-up released supplies, resulting in considerable savings of transportation assets.

e. **Responsiveness:** While a truly aggressive and positive attitude comparable to US Army requirements has not been evidenced, a more responsive attitude toward advisory recommendations has been noted. This is viewed by advisory personnel as a major improvement and will be expanded upon as rapidly as will be permitted.


5. ASSESSMENT AND SUMMARY:

a. The 3d ASCOM has shown its capability to support communist suppression operations of limited size. Even to do this, augmentation by personnel and equipment to provide Ordnance maintenance, medical supply, and additional transportation was necessary. The 3d ASCOM could not support combat operations larger in scope than those already conducted without a major input of resources.

b. The advisory staff necessary to provide full coverage of all logistic units and logistic functions in the 3rd RTA is inadequately small. The sheer number of units and their dispersion dictate the need for the Engineer Advisor, Signal Advisor, QM Advisor, and Supply NCO Advisor slots to be authorized and filled. Addition of those personnel to the Detachment III staff would enable much closer attention being paid to more units, would assist the total advisory effort, and would result, in the long run, in a better Thai logistic support system.

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
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**8d ASCOM
HEADQUARTERS COMPANY
Phitsanulok**

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1. UNIT: Headquarters Company - 3rd Army Support Command

2. MISSION: The mission of Headquarters Company is to provide inter-unit communications, services, limited supply support, and limited maintenance support for headquarters vehicles. Included in the services provided are administrative services, mess facilities for Headquarters personnel and the guard force to secure the 3d Army Support Command garrison area.

3. PERSONNEL SITUATION:

a. The unit has 87% of authorized personnel assigned and present for duty. The following chart lists personnel status by job title, MOS, grade, authorized strength and assigned strength:

<u>JOB TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Commanding Officer	2900	CPT	1	1
Executive Officer	2900	LT	1	0
1st SGT	001	MSG	1	1
Company Clerk	710	SGT	1	1
	710	PFC	2	2
Dugler	111	SGT	1	1
	111	PFC	1	1
Co Supply NCO	768	SGT	1	1
	768	PFC	1	1
Armorer	421	SGT	1	1
Carpenter	511	MSG	1	1
	511	SGT	2	1
Motor Sergeant	631	MSG	1	1
Wnl Veh Mech	631	MSG	1	1
	631	SGT	5	3
Asst Wnl Veh Mech	631	PFC	5	5
Lt Truck Driver	640	SGT	22	19
Orderly	009	PVT	57	47
Lt Truck Driver	640	PFC	26	26
Commo Plt Ldr	0200	LT	1	0
Commo Plt Sgt	311	MSG	3	3
Radio Rprman	296	SGT	2	1
Radio Tp Op	051	SGT	2	0
	051	PFC	2	0
	050	PFC	4	0
Switchboard Opr	724	SGT	1	1
	724	PFC	4	4
		PVT	4	4
Wireman	320	SGT	1	1
	320	PVT	4	4
Msg Ctr Chief	721	MSG	1	1
Msg Ctr Asst Chief	721	SGT	1	1
Code Specialist	722	SGT	2	2
Msg Ctr Clerk	730	SGT	2	1
	730	PFC	2	0
Messenger	310	SGT	4	4
	310	PVT	6	6

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CONTINUATION OF PERSONNEL SITUATION:

Guard Plt Ldr	9125	LT	1	0
Plt Sgt	950	MSG	1	1
Squad Ldr	950	SGT	3	3
Asst Squad Ldr	950	SGT	3	3
	950	PFC	3	3
Guards	950	PVT	30	30
Messenger	310	PVT	3	3
Mess Plt Ldr	4110	LT	1	0
Plt Sgt	941	MSG	1	1
Mess Steward	941	SGT	3	3
Cooks	941	PVT	20	20
		TOTAL	246	214

4. EQUIPMENT: The unit has 67% of authorized Map-supported equipment on hand. The following charts lists by technical service the items required to bring the TOE-MAP equipment assets to 100%:

TECH SERVICE	ITEM	AUTHORIZED	ON-HAND	SHORT
ORDNANCE	Binocular 6X30	2	0	2
	Binocular 7X50	4	0	4
	Pistol, Pyrotechnic	5	2	3
	Tool Kit, Gen Mech No 1	4	2	2
	Tool Kit, Gen Mech No 2	4	3	1
	Tool Kit, Auto Main 2d Echelon	5	3	2
	No 1 Common			
	Tool Kit, Auto Maint 2nd Echelon	5	0	5
	No 1 Common (Aug)			
	Test Set, Battery TS 183	1	0	1
	Carbine Cal.30 M-2	214	116	98
	Pistol Cal.45	5	0	5
	Launcher, Rocket 3.5 in.	3	0	3
	Chain Assy 5/8 in x 16 ft	2	0	2
	Chain Assy 3/8 in x 12 ft	2	0	2
	Trailer Cargo 1/4 Ton	10	0	10
	Trailer Cargo 1 Ton	5	0	5
	Trailer, Water Tank 250 gal	4	0	4
	Truck, Cargo 2 1/2 Ton 6 x 6	6	4	2
	Truck, Fire 750 gal	2	0	2
SIGINT	Amplifier, AM 4306/PRC 25	2	0	2
	Receiver AM/GRR 5	1	0	1
	Remote Control, AM/GRW 2	3	0	3
	I/U AM/GRR 5	1	0	1
	Test Set, Radio AM/VRM 1	1	0	1
	Test Set, AM/GRM 55	1	0	1
	Splicing kit, Cable TX 356 G	4	0	4
	Telephone set TA 312/PT	100	0	100
	Tool Kit TE 33	10	0	10

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QM	Can Gasoline 5 Gal	21	0	21
	Spout, Can flexible	21	0	21
	Officer Mess outfit	4	0	4
	Table, folding leg	45	0	45
	Chest, field document	8	0	8
ENGINEER	Generator 3 KW	2	0	2

5. PUBLICATIONS: The unit has most of the publications required for mission performance except the following:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY REQUIRED</u>
TM 9-2300-218-34P	10
TM J9-603-20P	6
TM 9-2320-214-24P	3

The unit has been advised to requisition the above documents. Additionally, the above manual requirements were included in the publications requirements list forwarded to HQ JUSMAGTHAI in March 1973.

6. ASSESSMENT: This unit is capable of performing its stated mission and has shown improvement in accomplishing its daily activities. For instance, a shortage of maintenance buildings for accomplishing vehicle maintenance proved no hinderance to the unit; they fabricated temporary structures from local native materials which are still in use almost a year later. The unit has been experiencing difficulty in receiving repair parts for M-series vehicles which were issued to the unit in poor condition. Their motor pool personnel have however kept most of the M-151 vehicles in operable condition, sometimes having to resort to cannabilization to do so.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS:


- TCE equipment shortages should be issued as soon as available. The 3rd ASCOM has been advised to request issue through Thai channels.
- Funding for repair parts procurement for M-series vehicles should be of sufficient quantity to allow responsive supply support through-out the supply system.
- Advisory personnel will continue to encourage construction of permanent or semi-permanent garaging and maintenance facilities for 3rd ASCOM Headquarters vehicles.

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ORDNANCE FIELD SUPPLY COMPANY- 8d ASCOM
Phitsanulok

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UNIT CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

1. UNIT: Ordnance Field Supply Company 8d ASCOM

2. MISSION: The Ordnance Field Supply Company, 8d ASCOM, is responsible for receiving, storing, and issuing Ordnance material spare parts in support of all units operating in the 8d Royal Thai Army area of operations.

3. PERSONNEL STATUS: The unit has 85% of authorized personnel assigned. ECO's and Officers have all received school training and are technically qualified. The unit conducts OJT for newly assigned recruits. Overall, the personnel situation for the unit is satisfactory. The following chart provides detailed information concerning personnel assigned:

JOB TITLE	GRADE	MOS	AUTHORIZED	ASSIGNED
Commanding Off	Maj	4512	1	1
Exec Officer	Cpt	4512	1	0
Platoon Ldr	Cpl	4512	2	2
Asst Plt Ldr	1st	4512	2	2
		Sub-total	6	5
First Sergeant	MSG	001	1	1
Mess Sergeant	MSG	941	1	1
Motor Sergeant	MSG	631	1	1
Whl Veh Mech	SGT	631	1	2
Supply Sgt	SGT	768	1	1
Supply Clerk	SGT	768	2	2
Wrecker Op	SGT	633	1	1
Admin Clerk	SGT	710	1	1
Supply Clerk	SGT	716	1	0
Armorer	SGT	421	1	1
Section Chief	MSG	783	2	2
Stk Cont Clerk	SGT	763	1	1
Supply Clerk	SGT	760	7	6
Ord Parts Spec	MSG	773	2	2
Parts Clerk	SGT	773	19	11
Section Chief	MSG	773	1	1
Packaging Spec	SGT	551	1	0
		Sub-total	44	34
Cook	PVT	940	4	4
Messenger	PVT	310	1	1
Duty Soldier	PVT	009	20	20
		Sub-total	25	25
		TOTAL	75	64

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4. **EQUIPMENT:** The unit has the bulk of its authorized MAP-TOE equipment but has some shortages which should be issued.

a. The percentage of authorized TOE-MAP equipment on hand is as follows:

TECH SERVICE	% EQUIPMENT ON HAND
Ordnance	83
Engineer	0
Quartermaster	7
Signal	87

b. Equipment shortages by tech service are as follows:

TECH SERVICE	ITEM	AUTHORIZED	ON HAND	SHORT
Ordnance	Mount, M3, Truck M 36	2	0	2
	Truck, 1 Ton 4 X 4 w/wm	1	0	1
	Truck, 2½ Ton, Shop Van	3	1	2
	Trailer, Cargo, 1½ Ton	5	0	5
	Trailer, Water, 400 gal	1	0	1
	Trailer, Lowbed, 12 Ton	1	0	1
	Tool kit, Gen Mech	1	0	1
	Tool kit, Ognl Maint No 1 (aug)	1	0	1
	Tool kit, Armorers	1	0	1
Engineer	Compass, wrist, magnetic	3	0	3
	Light Set, illum 4.5 KW	1	0	1
Quartermaster	Can, gasoline, 5 gal	10	0	10
	Spout, can flexible	3	0	3
	Forklift, pneumatic tires 4000 lbs	2	0	2
Signal	Tool kit, TE 83	1	0	1

5. **PUBLICATIONS:** The unit is short many parts manuals especially for the M-series vehicles received through MAP support. The unit has requisitioned all publications they are short. These publication shortages were also consolidated into the Publications Requirements List furnished Headquarters, JUSMAG in March 1973.

6. **ASSESSMENT:** The Ordnance Field Supply Company is capable of performing its mission. The unit is presently fortunate to have a strong company commander who willingly implements changes for improvement of his unit. The unit does have some equipment shortages, but the unit personnel are trained and sincerely apply themselves to do their job. The unit performed satisfactorily during the JFTX-16 (Operation Sam-Chai) at Lomsak. Participation in that exercise

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de. Noted the ASL parts on hand, to about 50% of required and the unit is now in the process of building the ASL density to a satisfactory level. In the meantime, 3d echelon deadline parts support is being provided by the Ordnance Depot in Bangkok. The unit provides the bulk of the staff for the Consolidated Stock Control Section and the unit commander also acts as the Stock Control Officer. In this capacity some much needed changes are slowly being implemented which will improve the Ordnance repair parts supply to supported units. For instance, depot requisitions are now being reconciled monthly in conjunction with repair parts pick-up. The request to order supported units to reconcile their requisitions monthly has been forwarded to 3d ASCOM and is under consideration.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Recommend that the RTA be encouraged to expeditiously issue TCZ equipment shortages to the Ordnance Field Supply Company, 3d ASCOM.

b. Advisory personnel will continue to encourage and assist this unit to provide responsive Ordnance repair parts support to all units in the 3d Royal Thai Army Area.

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
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218th ENGINEER FIELD MAINTENANCE CO.

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UNIT CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

1. UNIT: 216th Engineer Field Maintenance Company

2. MISSION AND CAPABILITIES:

a. The mission of the 216th Engineer Field Maintenance Company is to provide direct support maintenance and repair parts supply for engineer equipment located in the 3rd Royal Thai Army area.

b. Capabilities are as follows:

(1) Can perform field maintenance on up to 1500 items of engineer equipment.

(2) Has limited capability for evacuation of deadlined engineer equipment.

(3) Can store and distribute limited quantities of engineer repair parts.

(4) Collects basis data pertaining to types and quantities of engineer equipment supported.

3. PERSONNEL SITUATION: 65% of authorized personnel slots have been filled. Officers and NCO's have been provided school training or have extensive OJT backgrounds. The unit also conducts a daily OJT program for lower ranking personnel who do not have an assigned MOS. The Commanding Officer feels that this OJT program is a good one and that other than shortages, no problems exist with personnel. The following chart lists information on assigned personnel:

JOB TITLE	GRADE	MOS	AUTH	ASSIGNED
Commanding Officer	MAJ	4880	1	1
Maint Plt Ldr	CPT	4880	4	1
Supply Officer	LT	4470	1	1
Maint Officer	LT	4480	4	3
Svc Plt Ldr	LT	4480	1	1
Spec Equip Rep Plt Ldr	LT	4480	1	0
Sub Total			12	7

JOB TITLE	MOS	AUTHORIZED		ASSIGNED	
		MSG	SGT	MSG	SGT
Machinist	443	5	4	2	1
Welder	442	5	9	3	5
Engr Equip Rprman	622	12	36	8	16
Automotive Rprman	635	4	12	3	6
Fuel and Elec Rprman	634	4	4	2	3
Diesel Equip Rprman	623	4	12	2	5
Whl Veh Mech	631	0	8	0	2
Pwr Gen Rprman	352	1	2	1	1
Instrument Rprman	295	1	1	1	1
Pwr Gen Operator	356	1	1	1	1
Blacksmith	83 442	C	15	0	1

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UNIT CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

1. UNIT: 2d Quartermaster Direct Support Company

2. MISSION: The mission of the 2nd QM DS Company is to provide Quartermaster Supply and services support and to maintain QM equipment for the 3rd Royal Thai Army throughout its area of operations. Capabilities include:

- a. Receipt, storage and issue of Class II and IV QM Supplies.
- b. Support of a division size force with Class I field rations.
- c. Receipt, storage and issue of Class III products for 3rd ASCOM units.
- d. 3d Echelon maintenance for QM material.
- e. Backup DS for Division QM Company.
- f. Corpses collecting facilities for field operations.

3. PERSONNEL STATUS: The unit has 84% of authorized personnel assigned, however, several key slots are either unfilled or the personnel are TDY to Laos, which is the case of the unit commander. Only two officers, both lieutenants, are present for duty. The status of MOS positions is shown in the following chart:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
C.O.	MAJ	4015	1	0
X.O.	CPT	4015	1	1
Plt Ldr	CPT	4139	1	0
Plt Ldr	LT	4130	2	0
Plt Ldr	LT	4606	1	1
1st SGT	MSG	001	1	1
Mtr SGT	MSG	631	1	1
Sup SGT	MSG	768	1	0
Plt SGT	MSG	764	4	1
Sup Supervisor	MSG	553	1	1
Warehouse Supv	MSG	551	1	0
Section Chief	MSG	552	2	1
Plt Sgt	MSG	467	1	0
Section Chief	MSG	461	1	1
Section Chief	MSG	465	1	1
Section Chief	MSG	546	2	0
Section Chief	MSG	547	3	1
Mess SGT	SGT	941	2	1
Wheel Vehicle Mech	SGT	631	4	4
Armorer	SGT	768	1	1
Records Clerk	SGT	710	3	3
Clerk Typist	SGT	710	1	1

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Metal Body Rprman	441	0	5	0	1
Stgck Cont Spec	772	4	0	3	0
Engr Parts Clerk	772	4	4	3	2
Records Clerk	760	0	4	0	2
Parts Clerk	770	0	4	0	2
First Sgt	001	1	0	1	0
Personnel Clerk	716	0	1	0	1
Admin Clerk	710	0	1	0	1
Mess Steward	941	0	5	0	2
Supply Sgt	968	0	1	0	1
Armorer	421	0	1	0	1
Motor Sgt	631	1	0	1	0
Const Mach Spvr	622	1	0	0	0
Shop Clerk	760	0	5	0	5
Plt Sgt	444	1	0	1	0
Powerman	351	0	2	0	1
Carpenter	511	0	1	0	1
Wrecker Operator	631	0	1	0	1
Hvy Truck Driver	642	0	1	0	1
Lt Truck Driver	640	0	21	0	20
Plt Sgt	772	1	0	1	0
Rpr Control Spvr	622	4	4	2	0
Tool Keeper	551	0	4	0	3
Clerk Typist	711	0	4	0	1
Admin Clerk	710	4	0	4	0
Cooks	940	0	1	0	0
Plt Sgt	622	1	0	0	0
Sub Total		59	160	39	88
		PFC	PVT	PFC	PVT
Cooks		1	16	1	16
Switchboard Operator		1	0	1	0
Assistant Driver		2	0	2	0
Orderly		0	5	0	5
Asst Wrecker Driver		1	0	1	0
Asst Hvy Truck Driver		1	0	1	0
Asst Driver		15	0	15	0
Supply Room Orderly		0	4	0	4
Maint Orderly		0	8	0	8
Sub Total		21	33	21	33
TOTAL ASSIGNED PERSONNEL:		AUTH	ASSIGNED		
Officers		13	7		
NCOs		230	148		
Privates		33	33		
TOTAL		286	188		

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4. EQUIPMENT: The unit is hampered in its daily operations by equipment shortages. The scope of the unit mission cannot be broadened until additional equipment is issued. At present the unit has 45% of authorized MAP-TOE equipment on-hand.

a. The following chart lists percentage of MAP-TOE equipment on-hand by tech service: TECH SERVICE % AUTH EQUIP ON-HAND

Quartermaster	49
Ordnance	32
Signal	82
Engineer	60

b. Equipment shortages are listed on the following chart:

<u>TECH SERVICE</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ON HAND</u>	<u>SHORT</u>
QM	Can Gasoline 5 gal.	99	40	59
	Can Water 5 gal	22	20	2
	Compressor, piston ring 5 in	4	0	4
	Compressor, piston ring 7 in	4	0	4
	Jack, 100 ton, hydraulic	8	5	3
	Jack, screw, 15 ton	4	2	2
	Mask, face, RL	10	0	10
	Lifter and compressor valves	4	2	2
	Puller, PRG Attachment	4	0	4
	Puller, internal/external	4	2	2
	Puller, multipurpose	4	0	4
	Rigging Equip Set No 1	1	0	1
	Reamer, cylinder Ridge	4	2	2
	Tool Equip TR 33	1	0	1
	Tool Kit, Armorers	1	0	1
	Tool Kit, Carpenters	1	0	1
	Tool Kit, Gen Mech	80	0	80
	Tool Kit, Engr Rpr	1	0	1
	Tool Kit, Set No 5 outboard	1	0	1
	motor repair			
	Tool Kit, Set No 6, Instr.	2	1	1
	Tool Kit, Set No 7, Fld Maint	4	0	4
	Tool Kit, Set No 9, Fld Maint	4	0	4
ORDNANCE	Carbine, Cal.30 M-2	286	111	175
	Dispenser, Grease Ptbl	1	0	1
	Gauge, cyl compression	4	0	4
	Grinder, valve reface	4	2	2
	Indicator compression, Diesel	4	0	4
	Launcher, rocket 3.5 in	5	3	2
	Press 100 ton hydraulic	4	1	3
	Tester, HI-tension	4	0	4
	Test Set, Generator and volt	4	1	3
	Tool Kit, auto fuel and elec	4	0	4
	Tool Kit, Gen Mech (aug)	28	0	28
	Tool Kit, Cgnl Maint No 1 com	6	4	2
	Tool Kit, Cgnl Maint No 1 com	6	86	5
	(aug)			

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SIGNAL ENGINEER	Tool Kit, Ognl Maint No 2	1	0	1
	Com (Aug)			
	Tool Kit, Ognl Special	1	0	1
	Set B			
	Tool Kit, Set No 8 Welding	1	0	1
	Tool Kit, Radiator Test	4	0	4
	Trailor, Cargo $\frac{1}{2}$ ton	3	0	3
	Trailor, Cargo 1 Ton	26	0	26
	Trailor, Generator 2Ton	2	0	2
	4 Whl			
	Trailor, Water Tank, 1 Ton	1	0	1
	Truck, Cargo $\frac{3}{4}$ Ton	4	0	4
	Truck, Cargo 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton	29	0	29
	Welding Equip Set 300 A.	4	0	4
	Guage TL 144	5	0	5
	Counter, Rotating	4	0	4
	Crane, ptbl 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton	4	2	2
	Flashlight	49	25	24
	Gen Set 1.5 KW 60 HZ	5	3	2
	Gen Set 15 KW Ptbl	2	1	1
	Library Reference Set no 4	1	0	1
	Shop equip, hvy machine	1	0	1
	Shop equip, small tool rpr	1	0	1
	Shop equip, tool and bench	1	0	1
	Shop equip, lt truck rpr	4	3	1
Press, track pin bushing	1	0	1	

5. PUBLICATIONS:

a. The unit is short many technical publications on supported equipment. In addition to these publications shortages, much of the supported equipment is not US Standard A or B and therefore, publications for the equipment are no longer listed in DA Pam 310-4.

b. The unit commander has provided a list of publications required to Army Field Force, Bangkok and has requested that they be issued.

c. Unit publications requirements were also consolidated into the Publications Requirements List furnished Headquarters, JUSMAG in March 1973.

6. ASSESSMENT: The mission capability of the 218th Engineer Field Maintenance Company is limited by shop size, personnel and equipment shortages and the lack of adequate publications. They also have no communications capability for contact team and operational communications requirements. In spite of these limitations, the unit has performed successfully in 3 successive Communist suppression operations in the Tri-Province and Chiang Kham areas of the 3rd Royal Thai Army area of operations. Much improvement was evidenced in succeeding operations. Any increase in the scope of this units mission at this time, however, is out of the question. With only 65% of authorized personnel assigned, 45% of authorized MAP-TOE equipment on hand and too small shop facilities to work in, the unit capability is marginal.

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7. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. It is recommended that the RTA be encouraged to fill all personnel and equipment shortages expeditiously. Continued advisory effort has been directed toward this goal.

b. The 3d Army Support Command has been advised to initiate a TCE change request to incorporate PRC-25 radios into the unit TCE. When this is initiated, a Unit Authorization List change request will be submitted to JUCMAG.

c. Continued advisory effort will be exerted toward informing the 3d ASCOM of the great need of adequate shop facilities for this unit. At this time, the 3d ASCOM will not consider building the required building until the 1974 time frame.

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
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2nd QUARTERMASTER DIRECT SUPPORT COMPANY-PHITSANULOKI

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



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SIGNAL SGT	SGT	316	1	1
Drivers	SGT	640	22	19
Wireman	SGT	320	1	1
Switchboard Opr	SGT	310	1	1
Supply Clerk	SGT	764	6	6
Warehouseman	SGT	551	6	4
Supply Clerk	SGT	760	3	2
W.R. Supply Spec	SGT	552	6	6
QC Insp	SGT	903	1	1
Clerk Typist	SGT	711	3	1
QM Parts Spec	SGT	774	1	1
Shoe Repairman	SGT	462	4	3
Canvas/Leather Repairman	SGT	460	2	2
Office Machine Repairman	SGT	465	2	1
QM Light Equip Repairman	SGT	466	1	1
Bath Processor	SGT	546	3	0
Bath Processor	SGT	540	9	3
Laundry Equip Rpr	SGT	467	1	0
Corpse Processor	SGT	547	4	3
Laborers	PVT	-	28	40

TOTAL 138 117

4. EQUIPMENT: There is a severe shortage of MAP provided TOE equipment.

a. Percentages of MAP TOE equipment by tech services is as follows:

<u>TECH SERVICE</u>	<u>% MAP TOE EQUIP ON-HAND</u>
Engineer	10%
Medical	100%
Ordnance	57%
Quartermaster	64%
Signal	40%
Transportation	67%

b. The following chart lists MAP TOE equipment shortages by tech services:

<u>TECH SERVICE</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>SHORT</u>
ENGINEER	Water Sterilizing Bag	2	0	2
	Compass, Lensatic	10	0	10
	Flood light set, Portable 5KW	1	0	1
	Generator, Gas Eng. - 1.5 KW	1	0	1
	Hose, Assy, SGL JKT, 1 1/2"x11 1/2"x 25 ft.	2	0	2
	Hose Assy, Rubber Wrap, 1"x11 1/2"x 15 ft.	1	0	1

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<u>TECH SERVICE</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/M</u>	<u>SIXT</u>
	Light, Extensio 50 ft.	1	0	1
	Light Set, Gen. Illum 25 outlet	1	0	1
	Respirator, Air filtering,			
	Paint Spray	4	0	4
	Spray Outfit, Paint - 2 guns			
	w/compressor	1	0	1
	Tool Kit, Carpenters	4	0	4
	Tool Kit, Gen. Pipefitters	1	0	1
 <u>ORDNANCE</u>				
	Bayonet w/scabbard for M2 Carbine	142	85	57
	Machine Gun, Cal.30	4	1	3
	Ignition Timing Light	1	0	1
	Mount Tripod for M.G. Cal.30	4	1	3
	Pistol, Cal.45	7	4	3
	Carbine cal.30 M-2	135	98	37
	Shop Set Fld Maint Spare	1	0	1
	Parts Storage Set No. 1			
	Compression Tester w/adaptor	1	0	1
	Tester, I.C. Engine	1	0	1
	Toolkit, Canvas & Leather Rpr	2	0	2
	Toolkit, Electricians No 2	1	0	1
	Toolkit, Gen. Mechanics	6	0	6
	Toolkit, Orgn Maint No 1	1	0	1
	Toolkit, Orgn Maint No 1 Sup	1	0	1
	Trailer $\frac{1}{2}$ ton 2 wheel	4	0	4
	Trailer Cargo, $\frac{3}{4}$ ton	3	0	3
	Trailer Cargo, $1\frac{1}{2}$ ton	2	0	2
	Trailer, Water 250 gal.	1	0	1
	Truck Cargo, $\frac{3}{4}$ ton	3	0	3
	Truck Cargo $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton	15	8	16
	Truck Tank Fuel Servicing	6	3	3
	Truck, Shop van $2\frac{1}{2}$ ton	1	0	1
 <u>QUARTERMASTER</u>				
	Wrecking Bar $\frac{3}{4}$ " x 30"	1	0	1
	Bath unit, Ptbl & showerhead	3	0	3
	Cabinet, spare parts, 11 drawers	2	0	2
	Canvas Repair Kit	1	0	1
	Collapsible Drum 500 gal.	2	0	12
	Dispensing Pump Hand 1 qt/ stroke	3	0	3
	Dispensing Pump, Rotary	5	3	2
	Conveyor, Gravity 45° curved	2	0	2
	Conveyor, Gravity 10 ft section	6	0	6
	Drum Handling Attachment	1	0	1
	Hose & Fitting Kit for Gas Pump	6	0	6

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<u>TCH SERVICE</u>	<u>EQUIPMENT</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/M</u>	<u>SHORTAGE</u>
QUARTERMASTER	Key set, Socket Head, L type	1	0	1
	Goggles M-1944	27	0	27
	Laundry Unit Tractor	1	0	1
	Extractor-Washer			
	Laundry Unit, Tractor	1	0	1
	Generator & Tumbler			
	Numbering Machine	1	0	1
	Panel Marker, Ground Signal to A/C	6	0	6
	Petroleum Testing Kit	1	0	1
	Pin Set, Laundry Marking	1	0	1
	Sewing Machine, Individual	1	0	1
	Steel Strapping Kit $\frac{1}{4}$ " strap	4	0	4
	Tool Kit Office Machine % compartments	2	0	2
	Tractor, Warehouse, 4,000 lbs	1	0	1
	Truck, Hand, 2 whl, Gen Utility	1	0	1
	Truck LP 4000 lbs	1	0	1
	Truck LP 6000 lbs	1	0	1
	Towing & Lifting Yoke for 500 gal drum	3	0	3
	Turntable, typewriter repair	2	0	2
	Wrench Set Socket $\frac{1}{2}$ " drive	1	0	1
	Can, Gas, Mil 5 gal.	637	450	187
	Can, water, Mil, 5 gal	44	36	8
	Spout, Can, Flex	33	14	19
SIGNAL	Telephone set TA 312	6	1	5
	Tool Equip TE 33	2	0	2
	Wire WD-1/PT	2	1	1
TRANSPORTATION	Block & Tackle 5,000 lb cap.	2	0	2
	Chain Assy $\frac{5}{8}$ " x 16 ft	13	11	2
	Sling, Endless $\frac{3}{8}$ " x 12 ft	3	1	2
	DBC Hook 1 ring			

5. PUBLICATIONS: The unit has on-hand the necessary Quartermaster type publications but lacks vehicle and weapon TM's. Manual shortages have been requisitioned from RTA and were also consolidated in the lists furnished JUSMAG in March 1973. The following are the manuals required:

<u>MANUAL</u>	<u>QUANTITY REQUIRED</u>
TM 9-1005-210-12	1
TM 9-1005-212-33	1
TM 9-1055-840-1842	1
TM 9-1005-211-35	1
TM 9-2320-218-20P	2
TM 9-2320-218-20	2
TM 9-2320-214-20	2
TM 9-2320-214-20P	2
TM 9-2320-215-24P	2
TM 9-2320-215-20	1

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6. ASSESSMENT: This unit is capable of performing only a fraction of its mission. It is beset with both personnel shortages in key positions and severe TOZ equipment shortages. On the positive side, the unit performed satisfactorily the Class I field ration, Class III, and Corpse Collecting portions of its mission during Operation Sam Chai. The unit has requested issue of TOZ equipment and required publications. The acting unit commander says he has also requested fill of vacant personnel slots. A shortage of shop space also inhibits the units capability for mission accomplishment. For instance, textile repair equipment is now set up in a tent outside the unit barracks.

The unit is providing a 10 man team to Operation Ramasuen to perform the Corpse Collecting mission for field operations at Lonsak.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Advisory personnel will continue to encourage aggressive action to speed procurement, release, and delivery of TOZ MAP equipment shortages.

b. Advisory personnel will continue to recommend assignment of warehouse space, when available, to the 2nd QM DS Company.


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**SIGNAL FORWARD
SUPPLY AND MAINTENANCE COMPANY
PHITSANULOK**

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



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UNIT CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

1. UNIT: Signal Forward Supply and Maintenance Company.

2. MISSION:

a. The Signal Forward Supply and Maintenance Company is responsible for providing supply support including dry batteries and maintenance for signal equipment belonging to units supported by the 3rd ASCOM. The unit also provides backup DS support to the 4th Division Signal Company.

b. Capabilities include:

(1) Receipt, storage and issue of all supported signal equipment and dry batteries and signal spare parts.

(2) Maintenance and repair of radios, telephones, teletypes and frequently generators.

3. PERSONNEL STATUS: The unit is presently staffed with 82% of authorized personnel assigned. Most key officer and senior NCO slots are filled so the unit has only a minor personnel shortage problem. The following chart shows the personnel status of the Signal Fwd Supply and Maint Co.:

<u>JOB TITLE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Company Commander	MAJ	4415	1	1
Executive Officer	CPT	4415	1	0
Platoon Leader	CPT	4400	1	1
Log Coord Off	LT	4400	1	1
Plt Ldr	CPT	4415	2	1
Sig Maint Off	LT	4415	2	1
First SGT	MSG	001	1	1
Motor SGT	MSG	631	1	1
Supply SGT	MSG	765	1	1
Mess SGT	SGT	941	2	2
Whl Veh Mech	SGT	631	3	3
Armorer	SGT	421	1	1
Co. Clerk	SGT	719	2	2
Drivers	SGT	760	13	11
Sig Sup NCO's	MSG	765	4	4
Sig Sup Parts Spec	SGT	765	10	10
Sig Sup Clerk	PFC	765	3	3
Sr Radio Repairman	MSG	296	11	9
Radio Repairman	SGT	296	4	4

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<u>JOB TITLE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Sr Pwr Gen Spec	MSG	351	2	2
Pwr Gen Spec	SGT	351	1	1
Sr RTT Repairman	MSG	293	1	1
Sr Carr Repairman	MSG	294	3	3
KTT Repairman	SGT	293	2	1
Carr Repairman	SGT	294	1	1
Sr Man Cent Off Rprman	MSG	327	2	1
Man Cent Off Rprman	SGT	327	1	0
Section Chief	MSG	351	1	1
Mct Equip Rprman	MSG	295	1	0
Laborers	PVT	-	18	18
		TOTALS	97	86

4. EQUIPMENT: This unit has not been issued much of its authorized TOE MAP supported equipment. This lack of equipment limits the mission capability of the unit to the point that they cannot perform their backup DS mission for the 4th Div Signal Company.

a. Percentage of TOE MAP Supported equipment on-hand by tech service is as follows:

<u>TECH SERVICE</u>	<u>% EQUIP O/H</u>
Signal	42%
Engineer	42%
Ordnance	72%
Quartermaster	60%

b. A listing of TOE MAP supported equipment shortages follows:

<u>TECH SERVICE</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>SHORT</u>
SIGNAL	MK 288/URM	7	0	7
	BC-5	1	0	1
	CY-64-U Parts Cabinet	84	5	79
	AN/GSM-44	3	2	1
	AN/TSM-16	4	2	2
	PU 618/U	7	0	7
	AN/URM 103	8	0	8
	AN/URM 55	7	1	6
	AN/URM 120	7	6	1
	ME 71/PCC	5	4	1
	FR 40/GSM	1	0	1
	TS 352/U	17	12	5
	AN/VRC 53	1	0	1
	AN/VRC 34	1	0	1
	AN/VRC 12	1	0	1
	MK 153/GR	5	3	2
	TS 563/PT	5	0	5
		98		

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<u>TECH SERVICE</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>SHORT</u>
Signal	TS 716/U	5	3	2
	AN URM-1	2	0	2
	TU7	12	2	10
	AN GRM-55	7	0	7
	AN VRM-1	7	4	3
	TS 268/U	3	1	2
	TE 111	3	2	1
	TE 50B	4	3	1
	TK 105	7	2	5
	TK 100	7	3	4
	MK-1258	7	4	3
	I/U AN VRC-53	3	0	3
	PP 4763	8	0	8
	AN/URM 207	7	3	4
	AN/URM-127	8	4	4
	AN/URM-155	5	0	5
	AT 892	4	0	4
	AT 912	4	0	4
	PP 2953/U	5	0	5
	TS 723/U	2	0	2
	AN/USM-181	1	0	1
	ME 57/U	11	1	10
Engineer	Ammeter Pthl AC 25-125 HZ	2	0	2
	Conveyor Roller Gravity 500 lb/ft	2	0	2
	Detector, Mine Polysmith	1	0	1
	Light set, Illum 25 Outlet	6	2	4
	Steel Rail, 4 rolls single row 2 1/2"	18	0	18
Ordnance	Carbine, Cal.30 M-2	101	93	8
	Pistol Automatic Cal.45	8	5	3
	Shop Van 2 1/2 ton	5	0	5
	Tool set, Gen Mech	1	0	1
	Trailer Cargo 1/2 ton	4	0	4
	Trailer Cargo 1 ton	8	0	8
	Trailer Pwe Equip PU 618/0	3	0	3
	Trailer, Water 250 gal	1	0	1
	Truck, Cargo 1/2 ton	6	0	6
	Truck, Cargo 2 1/2 ton	1	0	1
Quartermaster	Can, Gasoline 5 gal	30	20	10
	Panel Marker Signal	4	0	4
	Tool Set, Electrician	5	1	4
	Tool Set, Wire Repair	5	1	4
	Tool kit, Armorer	1	0	1
	Tool Set, Automotive	5	0	5
	Tool Kit, Electrical PPL863	5	0	5
	Tool Kit, Electrical PPL 927	7	0	7

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5. PUBLICATIONS: The unit has requisitioned 119 technical publications which are required for operations. While the unit file set of publications is fairly complete, the additional technical manuals will allow contact team usage at the same time garrison shop activities are taking place.

6. ASSESSMENT: The Signal Forward Supply and Maintenance Company is capable of limited mission performance. Their supply capability for dry battery issue and limited maintenance capability were tested during Operation Sam Chai and found to be satisfactory. They cannot perform their backup DS mission for the 4th Division Signal Company due to lack of equipment and full ASL. This work is now being handled by the Signal Depot Bangkok. Their contact team support has been improving however, and the unit also has a signal equipment repair team of 5 personnel providing support to the tri-province AO of Operation Ramasuen. The assigned technical personnel have all received signal training. An on-going OJT program is being provided newly assigned privates.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Advisory personnel have recommended release and issue of authorized TOE-MAP supported equipment especially signal equipment and parts storage cabinets.

b. Advisors will continue to recommend that vacant TOE personnel slots be filled.

c. Advisors will continue to encourage counterparts to expend effort directed toward raising the RTA priority of support units.

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
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**6TH TRANSPORTATION COMPANY
(LIGHT TRUCK)**

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



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UNIT CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

1. UNIT: 6th Transportation Company (Lt. Truck)
2. MISSION: This unit provides transportation capability for cargo and personnel movement throughout the 3rd RTA area in Northern Thailand.
3. CAPABILITIES: Based upon driver utilization for 20 hours per day and 100% availability of equipment, the unit has the following capabilities:
 - a. Can move 576 tons per day within a 50 kilometer radius of Phitsanuloke.
 - b. Can provide lift for 14,400 ton miles per day for distances in excess of 50 kilometers from Phitsanuloke.
 - c. Can move 648 personnel per trip.
4. PERSONNEL: The unit is in better shape than most with 79% of authorized personnel assigned and present for duty. The following chart provides information on assigned versus authorized strength by job title, mos and grade.

<u>JOB TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>SHORT</u>
Company CO	0660	CPT	1	0	1
Plt Ldrs	0660	LT	3	4	
Maint Plt Ldr	0605	LT	1	1	
1st SGT	001	MSG	1	1	
Houseboys	009	PFC	5	5	
Radio Operator	050	SGT	1	1	
Messenger	310	PFC	1	0	1
Asst Radio Opr	320	Cpl	1	0	1
Armorer	421	SGT	1	1	
Wheel Veh Mech	631	SGT	8	5	3
Lt Truck Driver	640	SGT	78	54	24
Truck Master	643	MSG	1	1	
Clerk	710	SGT	1	1	
Supply SGT	760	SGT	1	1	
Parts Clerk	770	SGT	1	1	
Asst Med SGT	910	PFC	2	2	
Med SGT	911	SGT	1	0	1
Mess Asst	940	PFC	10	8	2
Mess Sgt	941	SGT	1	1	
Privates			<u>27</u>	<u>27</u>	<u> </u>
		TOTALS	145	114	31

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5. EQUIPMENT: The unit has 84% of TOE Equipment authorized on-hand. The only shortages noteworthy of mention are Ordnance supplied and are listed below:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>O/H</u>	<u>SHORT</u>
Machine Gun Cal .30	13	4	9
Tripod, MG Cal.30	13	4	9
Tool Kits General, Mechanics	7	5	2
Tool Kit, Orgn Maintenance	7	5	2
Truck, Cargo, 2 1/2 ton M602	51	34	17
Truck, Cargo, 2 1/2 ton OSPJ	0	6	+6
Trailer 1/2 ton	6	4	2

6. TECHNICAL MANUALS: The unit has all required TM's on-hand.

7. COMMENTS: This is one of the best units in the 3rd RTA. It was brought under 3rd ASCOM control on 24 August 1972 and has performed its mission effectively since then. Its transportation assets are controlled by the 3rd Army (FWD) G-4 and operate in support of units throughout the 3rd RTA area which encompasses Northern Thailand.

The unit consistently maintains a low deadline rate. On 2 March 73 it was 10% with only 4 of 40 mission vehicles deadline. This is a result of the unit commander emphasizing preventive maintenance procedures and the fact that the unit maintenance platoon is conscientious in their duties.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS: As MAP Ordnance assets become available, it is recommended they be issued to the 6th Transportation Co. to fill its authorized TOE levels of equipment.


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3RD FIELD HOSPITAL

NAKON SAWAN

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1. UNIT: 3d Field Hospital- Nakhon Sawan

2. MISSION: The mission of the 3d Field Hospital is to provide a 100 bed hospital for treatment of sick and wounded in the 3d Royal Thai Army area of operations.

3. PERSONNEL SITUATION: At the present time only 60% of authorized personnel are assigned. This severe personnel shortage is compensated for by attaching personnel from the 4th Medical Battalion and the 4th RCT medical company for field operations. The following chart provided information on personnel status:

JOB TITLE	GRADE	MOS	AUTHORIZED	ASSIGNED
Director	LTC	3500	1	1
Deputy Director	MAJ	3500	1	0
Hq Chief	CPT	2900	1	1
Mass Officer	CPT	4419	1	1
Finance Officer	CPT	6100	1	1
Medical Officer	CPT	3506	1	1
Dentist	CPT	3170	1	0
Medical Doctor	MAJ	3159	1	0
Nurse	LT	3449	2	2
Surgeon	MAJ	3150	1	0
Radiologist	CPT	3506	1	0
1st Sgt	MSO	001	1	1
Supply Sergeant	MSO	767	1	1
Mass Sgt	MSO	941	1	1
Supply Clerk	MSO	760	2	1
Admin NCO	SOT	715	1	1
Finance NCO	MSO	730	1	1
	SOT	730	1	1
Asst Supply Sgt	SOT	767	2	1
Admin Clerk	SOT	711	3	1
Cooks	SGT	9941	6	3
Admin Clerk	SOT	716	1	1
Maintenance NCO	SOT	208	1	0
General Supply NCO	SOT	315	2	1
Motor Sgt	SOT	631	4	1
Tailor	SGT	461	1	1
Driver	SGT	640	9	7
Signal NCO's	SOT	353	4	2
Corpsmen	MSO	912	1	1
	SOT	912	10	4
Corpsmen	MSO	913	1	1
	SOT	913	3	2
Class II-IV NCO	SOT	932	3	0
Radiology NCO	SGT	935	1	1
Clerk	SGT	710	2	2
Dental Assistant	SOT	917	1	0
Operating Room Asst	SOT	520	3	0
Laborers	PVT	-	40	26
		TOTAL	117	69

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4. **EQUIPMENT:** The unit supply documents indicate that 95% of authorized TOE-MAP supported equipment is on hand. Medical equipment on hand is listed in SC-6546-8-CL-H19 - MEDICAL EQUIPMENT SET- FIELD HOSPITAL - HOSPITALIZATION UNIT. Many items of both TOE and Medical equipment are old and may need to be replaced as they wear out. Unit shortages of authorized equipment include:

EQUIPMENT	AUTH	ON HAND	SHORTAGE
LATRINE, Box, Portable M-2	6	5	1
Inhalator, Multiple	3	2	1
Field Bed, Hospital	100	97	3
Folding Basin Stand	4	3	1
Telephone, Field TP-9	2	0	2

5. **PUBLICATIONS:** The unit professes no lack of either technical or administrative publications.

6. **ASSESSMENT:** This unit was organized in January 1956 and was made a subordinate unit to the 3rd Army Support Command in November 1971. The unit has deployed and performed successfully in two major field training exercises during 1972 and the bulk of the unit is now supporting Operation Rama Suun at Lomsak. While the unit is capable of performing its mission for a limited time, personnel shortages make augmentation from outside sources necessary for supporting sustained field operations. For instance, 71% of the units assigned personnel are TDY to Lomsak Nakhon Sawan, yet constitute only 50% of the hospital personnel on duty at that location. Shortages of professional personnel are satisfied by assigning doctors, nurses, and other professionals from Bangkok area military hospitals. Even with the personnel turnover, the unit experiences, the service they provide continues to improve. One of the most striking improvements noted during Operation Sam Chai was the availability of an air-conditioned, adequately lighted, and clean field operating building. This helped keep the mortality rate, even for severely wounded patients, low during Operation Sam Chai.

Much of the equipment on hand is old, some of it having been issued in 1956. Replacement of this equipment as it wears out is mandatory to enable the unit to continue its fine record of providing responsive medical support and services to the field.

7. **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

a. Recommend that the MACTHAI Surgeon, who is responsible for advising this and other medical units, encourage and assist the unit to replace aged and defective equipment prior to failure.

b. Advisors will continue to encourage fill of vacant personnel slots.

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
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3RD ORD AMMO DEPOT

NAKHON SAWAN

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UNIT CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

1. UNIT: 3rd Ordnance Ammunition Depot

2. MISSION: To receive, store, renovate, and issue conventional Class V materiel in general support of 3rd IMA units; to provide medical services to Bang Prap Camp.

3. PERSONNEL:

a. Strength -

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>NCS</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Commanding Officer	LTC	4512	1	1
Executive Officer	MAJ	4512	1	1
Stock Control Off	MAJ	4514	1	1
Admin Officer	CPT	4514	1	1
Supply Services Off	CPT	4514	1	0
Medical Officer	1LT	3506	1	1
Finance Officer	1LT	6101	1	1
		SUB-TOTAL:	7	6
Admin NCO	MSG	710	1	1
Admin NCO	SGT	710	2	2
Supply NCO	MSG	763	1	1
Supply NCO	SGT	763	1	1
Inspector	MSG	411	5	5
Inspector	SGT	411	2	2
Medic	MSG	910	4	2
Medic	SGT	910	3	3
Finance Clerk	MSG	730	1	1
Finance Clerk	SGT	730	1	1
Typist	SGT	711	3	3
Messenger	SGT	310	1	1
Motor NCO	SGT	643	1	1
Driver	SGT	640	3	3
Carpenter	MSG	511	1	1
		SUB-TOTAL:	30	28
Laborer	Civilian		150	127
		TOTAL:	187	161

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b. Training -

All military personnel have received school training at the RTA Ordnance Depot, Bangkok.

4. EQUIPMENT:

a. This unit currently has only 45% of its authorized equipment on hand. The status of equipment by tech service is as follows:

<u>TECH SERVICE</u>	<u>TOE ITEMS AUTH</u>	<u>TOE ITEMS O/H</u>
ENG	11	5
MED	15	0
ORD	119	87
QM	154	28
SIG	47	36
TRANS	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL:	348	156

b. Authorized equipment that is not on hand, by tech service, is as follows:

<u>TECH SERVICE</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QTY AUTH</u>	<u>QTY SHORT</u>
ENG	Floodlight Set, Elec, Ptbl, 5KW	1	1
	Pump, Sump, 210 GPM	1	1
	Spray Outfit, 1 Gun, 5 Gal, w/o Case	1	1
	Tractor, FT, Low Speed Driven, Med, w/Bul- dozer	1	1
	Welder, Elec Arc	1	1
MED	First Aid Kit	15	15
ORD	Hand Tool Set, 60 & 81mm Mortar Ammo	5	5
	Jack, Hydraulic, Floor, 10 Ton Cap	3	3
	Lift, Transfer/Trans- mission	1	1
	Linking-Delinking Mach, Cal .30 (Hand)	3	3
	Linking-Delinking Mach, Cal .50 (Hand)	2	2
	Machine, Hand Oper, Assy & Dis-assy, 37 - 105mm Ctg	5	5

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<u>TECH SERVICE</u>		<u>QTY AUTH</u>	<u>QTY SHORT</u>
ORD	Machine, Defusing, ED- PD Fuse, NF30D- 1002	1	1
	Pistol, Auto, Cal .45	2	1
	Tester, Socket Circuit	1	1
	Tool Set, Org Maint, No 2, Common	1	1
	Tool Set, Welding, No 5	1	1
	Tool Set, Anso Renovat- ion, Flt Maint (FSN 3470-754-0710)	1	1
	Torch, Oxy-Acet, Hvy Duty	1	1
	Trailer, Cargo, $\frac{1}{2}$ Ton	1	1
	Trailer, Water Tank, $1\frac{1}{2}$ Ton	2	2
	Vise, Pneumatic, NF30D- 2065	3	3
QM	Conveyer, Gravity, Rol- ler Type, 90 Deg Curve, 7' Outside Radius	5	5
	Conveyer, Gravity, Rol- ler Type, 10x21" Wide, 4" High	30	30
	Crowbar, 60"	4	4
	Cutter, Bolt, 36", 7/16"	1	1
	Capacity		
	Dispensing Pump, Hand Dri- ven, Piston Type, 1 Qt per Stroke	1	1
	Gen Mech Tool Set	5	5
	Marking Outfit, Rubber, Solid Gothic Type	3	3
	Press, Drill, Elec Bench Type, 1/3 HP	2	2
	Sign Painting Set	1	1
	Stencil Cutting Mach, Hand Oper, $\frac{1}{2}$ "	1	1
	Stencil Cutting Mach, Hand Oper, $\frac{3}{4}$ "	1	1
	Stencil Cutting Mach, Hand Oper, 1"	1	1
	Stencil Cutting Mach, Hand Oper, 1-3/4"	1	1
	Stencil Cutting Mach, Hand Oper, 1 $\frac{1}{2}$ "	1	1

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<u>TECH SERVICE</u>	<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QTY AUTH</u>	<u>QTY SHORT</u>
QM	Support, Gravity Conveyor	35	35
	Tim Snips, 8"	4	4
	Tool Kit, Eng'r Carpenters	2	2
	Tool Kit, Pioneer	2	2
	Tool Kit, Armorer	1	1
	Tool Equip, T3-33	4	4
	Tow Bar	2	2
	Trimmer, Tree, Pole Mtd	3	3
	Truck, Hand, 2 Whl, GP	10	10
	Truck, Lift, Fcrk, Gas, 4000 Lbs Cap	2	2
	Wrench, Impact (Air)	1	1
	Wrench Set, Socket, Sq, 3/4"	2	2
SIG	Reeling Mach, Cable, RL-27	2	1
	Reel, RL-39	8	4
	Wire, Telephone, WD-1/TT on RL-159 (Hilco)	10	6
TRANS	Tow Chain	2	2

5. PUBLICATIONS: All required publications within this unit are on hand, both up-to-date and in sufficient quantity. The unit commander states that the publications supply support he receives is excellent.

6. ASSESSMENT: This unit is capable of performing its assigned mission; however, severe equipment shortages require that much of its renovation activity be accomplished using improvised methods. A higher production rate could be achieved if machine-aid renovation devices were available. The lack of a bulldozer requires that manual labor be used to build and maintain berms around ammunition storage pads. Depot personnel are knowledgeable in ammunition storage, issue, and accounting procedures and are performing satisfactorily.

7. RECOMMENDATION:

a. Recommend that RTA be encouraged to issue all MAP TOE shortages to the unit expeditiously.

b. Advisory personnel will continue to assist the unit in improvising methods to overcome handicaps imposed by equipment shortages.


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3RD ORDNANCE AMMUNITION COMPANY

NAKHON SAWAN

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UNIT CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

1. UNIT: 3rd Ordnance Ammunition Company

2. MISSION: To receive, store, and issue conventional Class V materiel in direct support of all 3rd RTA units; to operate an ammunition supply point for supported using units.

3. PERSONNEL: This unit has 76% of its authorized personnel assigned. The following chart provides detailed personnel status information:

a. Strength -

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Commanding Officer	MAJ	4514	1	1
Stock Control Off	CPT	4514	1	1
Asst Stock Con Off	1LT	4515	1	0
Mag Plt Ldr	1LT	4515	2	2
Motor Trans Off	1LT	0660	1	0
		SUB-TOTAL:	6	4
First Sergeant	MSG	001	1	1
Mag Plt Sergeant	MSG	411	2	1
Inspector	MSG	411	1	0
Inspector	SGT	411	1	0
Armo Clerk	MSG	411	1	1
Armo Clerk	SGT	411	1	0
Sec NCO	SGT	411	1	1
Sec Chief	SGT	411	4	1
Asst Sec Chief	SGT	411	4	1
Storage Supervisor	SGT	411	2	0
Toxic Gas Spec	SGT	413	1	0
Mess NCO	SGT	941	1	1
Typist	SGT	711	2	0
Company Clerk	SGT	710	1	1
Armorer	SGT	421	1	0
Supply NCO	SGT	768	1	1
Supply Clerk	SGT	760	1	1
Records Clerk	SGT	760	4	0
Motor NCO	MSG	631	1	1
Wrecker Operator	MSG	631	1	0
Wrecker Crewman	SGT	631	1	0
Wheel Veh Mech	SGT	631	2	1
Forklift Operator	MSG	611	2	0
Tractor Operator	MSG	612	1	0
Tractor Crewman	SGT	612	1	0
Lt Truck Operator	SGT	640	12	3

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<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Radio Operator	SGT	050	2	2
Switchboard Oper	SGT	324	<u>2</u>	<u>1</u>
		SUB-TOTAL:	55	18
Orderly	PVT	009	6	6
Wireman	PVT	320	1	1
Ammo Handler	PVT	410	36	15
Cook	PVT	940	8	8
Recruit	PVT		—	<u>34</u>
		SUB-TOTAL:	51	64
TOTAL:			112	86

b. Training -

All officers and NCO's have received school training at the RTA Ordnance Depot, Bangkok.

4. EQUIPMENT: This unit has 79% of its authorized equipment on hand; of 490 items authorized, the unit is short 104 items as follows:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QTY AUTH</u>	<u>QTY SHORT</u>
Trailer, Cargo, 1½ Ton	10	10
Trailer, Cargo, ¾ Ton	1	1
Trailer, Water Tank, 1½ Ton, 400 Gal	1	1
Truck, Cargo, 2½ Ton	10	3
Truck, Cargo, 2½ Ton, w/w	10	9
Truck, Water Tank, 2½ Ton	1	1
Fork Lift, Gas, 10,000 Lb	2	1
Tractor	1	1
Axe, Chopping	31	2
Support, Gravity Conveyor, Floor	14	14
Spout, Can, Flexible	22	1
Add-Sub Machine, Hand, 8-Digit	2	2
Case, Dispatch, Canvas	5	5
Chair, Folding	14	14
Desk, Field	2	2
Kit, Box Strapping, 5/8" Steel Strap	2	2
Kit, Box Strapping, ¾" Steel Strap	2	2
Lantern, Gasoline Leaded Fuel	5	5
Machine, Numbering	1	1

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<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QTY AUTH</u>	<u>QTY SHORT</u>
Fuller, Nail, 18"	1	1
Range, Field Set No 90	7	7
Stencil Outfit, $\frac{1}{2}$ " & 1"	2	2
Screen, Latrine	1	1
Table, Camp, Folding	8	8
Typewriter, NP, 19", Thai-English	2	2
Boots, Rubber	1	1
Gloves, Rubber	1	1
Tongs, Rubber	1	1
Mask, Face	1	1
Radio Set, AN/GRC-87	2	1
Tool Kit, TE-33	3	1

5. PUBLICATIONS: The unit professes to have no publications shortages. Samples of publications on hand were screened and found to be current and available in sufficient quantity to allow mission accomplishment.

6. ASSESSMENT: This unit is capable of performing its assigned mission. The unit provided outstanding ammunition support for the tri-province area of operations during Operation Sam Chai and currently has ammunition teams deployed to Chiang Kham and Lom Sak supporting Operation Ramastum. Noticeable improvement was noted in ammunition storage and issue procedures during Operation Sam Chai as compared to the preceding Operation Phu Kwang. The shortage of some equipment, such as 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ ton trucks, requires that unit transportation capability be augmented for operations.

7. RECOMMENDATION:

a. Recommend that current MAP TOE equipment shortages be expeditiously filled.

b. Advisory personnel will continue to encourage fill of vacant TOE personnel slots..

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
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**POL STORAGE FACILITIES
PHITSANULOK AND
LAMPANG**

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ORGANIZATION CHART

POL STORAGE FACILITY-3- PHITSANULOK
AND LAMPANG

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UNIT CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

1. POL Storage Facility - Phitsanuloke

2. **MISSION:** To receive, store, and issue regular gasoline (MOCAS) in support of all 3d RTA units in Phitsanuloke Province. The unit has a storage capability for 4000 barrels of gasoline and is currently handling approximately 1000 barrels per month. The unit receives bulk gasoline via rail tank car and transfers it via pipeline from the railway POL siding to the storage tanks. Issue is accomplished by transferring bulk gasoline to 55 gallon drums which are issued. Future capabilities of this unit are supposed to encompass all Class III products.

3. a. **PERSONNEL SITUATION:** The following chart lists personnel strength by grade, MOS, authorized strength and assigned strength.

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Commanding Officer	MAJ	4960	1	1
Executive Officer	CPT	4960	1	0
Chief Storage NCO	MSG	552	1	1
Asst Storage NCO	SGT	552	2	1
Supply NCO	MSG	764	1	1
Clerk	SGT	768	1	1
Transfer NCO	MSG	552	1	1
Asst Transfer NCO	SGT	552	2	2
Drivers	SGT	640	4	4
Supply Handlers	PVT	550	18	18
Engineer NCO	MSG	635	1	1
TOTAL			33	31

b. All personnel have been provided OJT at the POL Depot at Korat for periods ranging from two to six weeks. The Commanding Officer of the unit expresses confidence in the abilities of the personnel assigned to accomplish his units mission.

4. **EQUIPMENT:** This unit is not presently MAP supported. Efforts have been allegedly initiated through Thai channels to request MAP support for this unit but no documentary evidence to support that allegation has been found. The unit is hampered in it's daily operations by equipment shortages and the scope of their mission cannot be broadened without issue of additional equipment. The following items are required.

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>NOMENCLATURE</u>	<u>QUANTITY REQUIRED</u>
1	Piston Type Dispensing Pump	1
2	Pump Assembly 225 GPM	1
3	Tank Truck 1500 gal capacity	1

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4	Tape Gauge Stainless	2
5	Forklift 2000 lbs	1
6	Empty Drum rack	100 ft.
7	Sleeve EPO	12 pr.
8	Fire Extinguishing Unit	1
	Tempus Type 300 litre	
9	Small Electric tool kit	1
10	Gasoline Paste	20 cans
11	Water Finding Paste	20 cans
12	Petroleum Tester kit	1
13	Voltmeter 500V AC-DC	1
14	Ammeter 20 amp	1
15	Platform scale 300 KG	1
16	Calculator, Electric	1
17	Lawnmower, gasoline powered	1
18	Tool kit General, Mechanics	1
19	Over Coupling 6"	1 Set
20	Split Leak Clamp 6"	1 Set
21	Pit Leak Clamp 2"	1 Set
22	Filter Pack, 10"	12
23	Rising Stem Valve 6"	1
24	Non-Rising Stem Valve 6"	1
25	Adopter Elbow 90° 2"	2
26	Standard Elbow 60° 6"	2

5. PUBLICATIONS: All necessary publications are on-hand but are old and in some cases maybe outdated. For instance AR 725-50 on-hand is dated Feb 65, TM 10-1110 (Petroleum Handling Equipment and Operations) is dated July 1965; TM 11-1105 (Inspection and Testing Petroleum Products) is dated Jan 63. Unit has taken no action to receive updated publications.

6. This unit is capable of performing its very limited mission of dispensing 55 gallon drums of gasoline. Adequate personnel are on-hand but any increase in the scope of their mission is out of the question unless additional equipment is provided.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. 3D ASCOM has been advised to request MAP Support for this unit.

b. When MAP Support is provided recommend UAL's be submitted to request the additional equipment.

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POL STORAGE FACILITY

LAMPANG

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UNIT CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

1. **UNIT:** POL Storage Facility - Lampang

2. **MISSION:** To receive, store, and issue regular gasoline (MOGAS) in support of all 3rd RTA units in Lampang, Chiang Mai, and Chiang Rai Provinces.

3. **CAPABILITIES:** This unit has a storage capacity for 3,000 gallons of gasoline. Bulk gasoline is received via rail tank car and transferred via pipeline from the POL rail siding to the storage tanks. Issue is accomplished by transferring bulk gasoline to 55 gallon drums for issue. Future capabilities of this unit are supposed to encompass all Class III products.

4. **PERSONNEL:**

a. Strength -

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>NO3</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Commanding Officer	MAJ	4960	1	1
Executive Officer	CPT	4960	1	0
Storage NCO	MSG	552	1	1
Asst Storage NCO	SGT	552	2	2
Transfer NCO	MSG	552	1	1
Asst Transfer NCO	SGT	552	2	2
Engineer NCO	MSG	635	1	1
Supply NCO	MSG	764	1	1
Asst Supply NCO	SGT	768	1	1
Driver	SGT	640	4	4
Supply Handlers	PVT	550	20	20
		TOTAL:	35	34

b. Training -

All personnel have attended a thirty-day course of OJT instruction in POL storage conducted by the 9th US Log Command in Korat, Thailand. Based upon this training, the Commanding Officer expresses confidence in the abilities of assigned personnel to accomplish the unit's mission.

5. **EQUIPMENT:**

a. This unit currently has approximately 70% of its authorized equipment on hand. Major shortages are as follows:

(1) Engineer Items -

Electric Fan, 60"	1 each
Fire Extinguisher	12 "

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Lawn Mower	1	each
Paint Sprayer	1	"
Tool Kit, Electrician	1	"
Tool Kit, Fire-Fighting, # 2	1	"
Tool Kit, Garden	1	"

(2) Ordinance Items -

Pistol, Cal .45	2	each
Rifle, M-16	33	"

(3) Transportation Items -

Tool Kit, Automotive	1	each
----------------------	---	------

b. This unit is not presently MAP supported. Efforts have been allegedly initiated through RTA channels to request MAP support for this unit, but no documentary evidence to support this allegation has been found. In addition to authorized equipment shortages, this unit is hampered in its daily operations by shortages of additionally required equipment, and their mission cannot be broadened without the issue of this equipment. Specifically, the following additional items of equipment are required:

Forklift, 6000 Lb	1	each
Truck, Tank, 4800 Gal	3	"

6. **PUBLICATIONS:** The Commanding Officer states that none of the publications required within his unit are on hand, particularly FM's and TM's. He also states that no publications are presently on order to eliminate these shortages. (The proper procedure for requesting publications through RTA channels has subsequently been explained to the unit commander for his action.)

7. This unit is capable of performing its mission; adequate and adequately trained personnel are on hand and equipment shortages, although they hamper the unit in its daily operations, do not prohibit the unit from accomplishing its mission. Equipment shortages and additionally required equipment must be provided, however, before any increase in the scope of the unit's mission can be effected.

8. **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

a. The unit continues efforts to eliminate publications and equipment shortages.

b. 3rd ASCOM request MAP support for this unit.

c. UAL be submitted to request additionally required equipment upon receipt of MAP support.

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
VETERINARY HOSPITAL

UTTARADIT

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART



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UNIT CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

1. UNIT IDENTIFICATION: Veterinary Hospital, Uttaradit.

2. MISSION: This unit supports the 3rd Royal Thai Army area in all matters concerning veterinary medicine. Included in this mission is treatment of animals for disease, conducting animal sanitary checks, and keeping records and statistics on animals treated. The hospital also develops plans for protection/control and cure of outbreaks of infectious animal diseases, and provides a mobile animal team to conduct civic action projects as directed by CG 3rd RTA.

3. PERSONNEL:

a. The unit is short several key personnel. The current personnel situation is as follows:

<u>TITLE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTH</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>
Hospital Director	MAJ	3200	1	1
Deputy Director	CPT	3200	1	0
Pharmacist	CPT	3318	1	0
Detachment Commander	LT	3200	1	0
Chief Clerk	MSG	710	1	1
Clerk	SGT	710	2	1
Animal Medical Spec	SGT	084	7	2
Blacksmith	SGT	084	2	0
Laborer	PVT	-	44	31
			—	—
	TOTALS		60	36

b. Personnel assigned have received required MOS schooling and are qualified in their respective fields. The fact that only 60% of authorized personnel are assigned restricts the unit in accomplishing any field operations. Especially important are the animal medical specialists and only 2 of 7 authorized are assigned.

4. EQUIPMENT: This unit is not MAP supported. TD equipment on-hand is sufficient in quantity but is old. The unit is authorized 16 horses and 6 pack horses but is short 8 horses and has no pack animals. The unit has stated a need for the following equipment in addition to TD equipment now on-hand:

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>QUANTITY REQUIRED</u>
Handbook on care and cure of dogs and birds	1
Medical Refrigerator	1
Trallor, Horse	1
Truck $\frac{1}{4}$ ton	1
	129

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5. The unit now occupies facilities controlled by UTTARADIT Military Circle. The 3rd ASCOM Veterinarian has estimated the following physical facilities would be required for independent operation:

<u>FACILITY</u>	<u>QUANTITY REQUIRED</u>
Blacksmith shop & Animal Treatment Area	1
Troop Barracks - 60 man	1
Animal Food Storage Shed	1
Mess Hall & Kitchen 60 man	1

6. PUBLICATIONS: The unit has not stated a requirement for FM or TM type documents but does require medical library type books on the care and cure of small animal diseases. The need has been stated for a book on "Care and Cure of Dogs and Bird diseases.

7. ASSESSMENT: The unit is capable of performing its stated mission. It is presently limited, however, by severe personnel shortages and limited equipment shortages. If called upon to perform field operations in support of anti-communist suppression operations, it is doubtful that such support could be rendered on other than a very limited basis. The dependence upon Uttaradit Military Circle for facilities is undesirable. A separate area would promote more responsive support to 3rd Royal Thai Army Requirements.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. 3rd ASCOM has been advised to request MAP support for this unit after reviewing the mission requirements with 3rd RTA.

b. When TOE's are prepared and MAP support initiated, UAL's should follow to insure that the unit has all equipment on-hand necessary for full mission performance.

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EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE DISPOSAL DETACHMENT 3
Phitsanuloke

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UNIT CAPABILITY ASSESSMENT

1. UNIT: Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment 8-Phitsanulok

2. MISSION: To search for, identify, render safe, remove from location and destroy explosive items of both Thai and foreign manufacture that have not exploded. Included are items such as bombs, projectiles, mines, rockets, pyrotechnics, and other explosive material that has been fired, dropped or laid that is considered dangerous to personnel and equipment. This unit supports the entire 84 Royal Thai Army area of operations.

3. PERSONNEL SITUATION:

a. Authorized, assigned, and present for duty strengths are as follows:

<u>GRADE</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>MOS</u>	<u>AUTHORIZED</u>	<u>ASSIGNED</u>	<u>PRESENT FOR DUTY</u>
CPT	EOD OFFICER	9224	1	1	1
LT	ASST EOD OFFICER	9224	1	0	0
MSG	EOD SUPERVISOR	413	1	1	1
MSG	SR EOD SPEC	413	2	2	2
MSG	ASST EOD SUPR	413	1	0	0
SOT	EOD SPEC	413	2	1	1
SOT	EOD ASSISTANT	413	6	0	0
SOT	CLERK TYPIST	711	<u>1</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTALS			15	5	5

b. All assigned personnel have been to the 8 week EOD Course at the Ordnance School in Bangkok. The minimum any one of the assigned personnel has been involved in EOD work is 2 years; the maximum 8 years. Training of all personnel is considered to be adequate.

4. EQUIPMENT:

a. Percentage of authorized equipment on hand is 67 %. The breakout by technical service is as follows:

TECH SERVICE	TOE(MAP) ITEMS AUTH	TOE(MAP) ITEMS O/H
Quartermaster	53	49
Ordnance	28	16
Engineer	24	20
Transportation	8	0
Signal	15	8
Chemical	12	0
Medical	<u>2</u>	<u>0</u>
TOTAL	137	93

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b. The following chart lists tech service equipment authorized but not on hand:

TECH SERVICE	ITEM	QUANTITY AUTHORIZED	QUANTITY SHORT
QM	Tool kit, Carpenters	1	1
	Cooking outfit 1 burner M1950	2	2
	Paulin, 20ft X 40ft	1	1
Ordnance	Binocular 7 X 50	1	1
	Pistol, Automatic Cal 45	2	2
	Tool kit FM Expl Ord Squad	1	1
	Tool kit, Special Expl Ord Disp Sqd	1	1
	Trailer, Cargo 1/2 Ton	1	1
	Trailer, Cargo 3/4 Ton	2	2
	Truck, Cargo 3/4 Ton	2	2
	Truck, Shop Van 2 1/2 Ton	1	1
Engineer	Compass, magnetic lensatic	3	3
	Auger, post hole	1	1
Transp	Block tackle, 8 in shell	1	1
	dbl slide hook 2450 lbs		
	Block tackle, dbl shackle 2450 lbs	1	1
	Block tackle, snatch 5000 lbs	2	1
Signal	Headset microphone H 144 KD	1	1
	I/U for VRC 9 (1/2 Ton)	1	1
	I/U for VRC 9 (3/4 Ton)	1	1
	Radio Set VRC 9	3	3
Chemical	Breathing Apparatus Oxy gen	4	4
	Decontamination Apparatus, Ptbl 1 1/2 qt.	3	3
	Detector kit, Chem agent M 18	1	1
	Respirator, air ABO M 14	2	2
Medical	First Aid Kit OP	2	2

5. PUBLICATIONS: The unit does not have adequate quantities of either technical or administrative publications. The unit has done nothing to alleviate this publications shortage problem because they were instructed to wait for publications distribution from the 1st EOD Detachment. Their publications shortages were consolidated into the list furnished Headquarters JUSMAGTHAI in March 1978.

6. ASSESSMENT: The 5d Explosive Ordnance Disposal Detachment, because of equipment, personnel, and publications shortages must be assessed as incapable of full mission performance. The lack of important EOD tool kits as well

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as not having any transportation capability render this unit incapable of performing all but the most routine and safe EOD missions. Their lack of signal gear inhibits their being utilized any appreciable distance from hard wire communications facilities. Chemical and medical equipment shortages make any work in a closed area an unacceptable safety risk. The unit has reported each quarter, since being formed on 16 March 1971, their equipment and personnel shortages to 3rd ASCOM and the ASCOM has in turn reported this information to RTA Headquarters.

Only 33% of authorized personnel are assigned. It must be said, however, that assigned personnel are trained and display a strong desire to do a credible job.

7. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. It is recommended that the highest levels of the RTA be advised to properly staff and equip the 3d EOD Detachment so that creditable EOD capability is afforded the 3d Royal Thai Army.

b. Advisory personnel will continue to encourage the unit to submit updated requests for all required material and personnel.

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ANNEX F

BASE DEFENSE

1. (C-NP) GENERAL:

a. Within the Detachment III area of responsibility are located nine U.S. troop concentrations outside of the Army Advisory Group Chain of Command. The Commanding Officer, Detachment III has been tasked to assist in coordinating the external base defense of these locations and has also been designated the Area Coordinator for alert notification. These nine U.S. troop concentrations and their locations are:

- | | |
|--|---------------------|
| (1) Takhlī RTAFB | Takhlī |
| (2) Kho Kha Air Station | Kho Kha/Lampang |
| (3) Loran CG Station | Hang Chat/Lampang |
| (4) Detachment B, 7th RRFS | Chiang Mai |
| (5) Detachment 415, HQ CMD | Chiang Mai |
| (6) OICC Thailand Detachment | Chiang Mai |
| (7) CI Training Camp | Lampang |
| (8) Detachment of the USAF
1973rd Commo Sqdn and
the Detachment of the
6th Aerial Port Sqdn | Chiang Mai Airfield |
| (9) FEC STRATCOM Site | Phitsaruloke |

b. Four types of threats have been identified and considered in the planning for and conduct of base defense. These threats, listed in order of decreasing probability are:

- (1) Raids, conducted by small sapper elements.
- (2) Stand-off attacks using rockets or mortars.
- (3) Internal sabotage.
- (4) Ground attacks by a company size or larger force.

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None of the installations have been attacked nor is there intelligence that might indicate any of them are targeted. The threat to all the installations is considered to be low for both sapper and stand-off attack with the exception of Takhli RTAF base where the threat from sapper attack is considered medium. All installations have effective security checks of Thai nationals entering the installation which has reduced the threat of internal sabotage. The threat of a large scale ground attack is minimal at this time according to the current intelligence estimates and because such large groups are readily detected. Also, most of the installations are located in lowland, highly populated areas some distance from known CT base areas.

Prior to discussing the individual installation defense systems, consideration should be given to the relationship of tenant units with the host country. The United States and Thailand reached an agreement during the early stages of the Vietnam War concerning the use and security of these installations. The Royal Thai Security Guard Regiment, RTAF, was formed to provide internal base defense for the U.S. Air Force tenant units such as Takhli RTAFB, Kho Kha Air Station, and the various communications sites. The Thai Security guards, augmented by USAF security forces, are responsible for the area within the base perimeter. External defense is the responsibility of the Royal Thai Government (RTG), and is exercised through the Royal Thai Army (RTA), assisted as necessary by police and other civil and para-military agencies. This division of responsibility concerning base defense periodically causes misunderstanding and problems. It is in this area that JUSMAG advisors have been tasked with the responsibility of effecting coordination between local U.S. tenant units and Thai officials. Advisors assist in the formulation of plans, conduct of rehearsals, and joint meetings on base defense matters. The succeeding paragraphs describe the general base defense situation at the nine installations and give an overall assessment of the defense status of U.S. installations in Northern Thailand.

2. TAKHLI RTAFB:

a. General: Takhli RTAFB is located near the city of Takhli. It is situated on flat land surrounded by hills ranging from 728 to 925 feet elevation. The areas along the northeast, east and southeast boundary is covered with vegetation and would offer insurgent forces ample concealment for close approaches to the airbase. The air base is occupied by the 4th Wing (RTAF) and the 366th Tactical Fighter Wing (USAF). Located adjacent to Takhli RTAFB, but not within the perimeter, is the Takhli Hill Signal Site, a USASTRATCOM installation manned by two U.S. Army enlisted men.

b. Intelligence: The security threat to Takhli RTAFB and Takhli Hill Signal Site is considered medium for sapper attack probability and low for stand-off attack probability. Neither installation has ever been attacked and there are no known safe houses within a 16 km radius of the

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installation at the present time. Also, none of the villages in the area are suspected of having insurgent sympathies and no infrastructure is known to exist according to both US and Thai intelligence personnel. No active insurgent forces are known to exist within striking distance of the installation, therefore a stand-off attack is highly unlikely. A sapper attack is possible by an insurgent sapper unit moving clandestinely into the area for a one shot attempt but this is not considered a serious threat.

c. **Friendly Forces:** The following friendly military forces and Thai National Police organizations are available to aid in the protection and defense of Takhli RTAFB and Takhli Hill Signal Site:

<u>REG UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>APPROX. STRENGTH</u>
4th RCT	Nakhon Sawan	1,500
4th RTAFW Infantry Force	Takhli AFB	650
Cangwat Chainat (PP)	Chainat	120
Amphur Monorom (PP)	Monorom	45
Cangwat Nakhon Sawan (PP)		
Amphur Takhli	Takhli	80
Amphur Tak-Pa (PP)	Tak-Pa	40

d. **Internal Defense:** The Commander, 366th Tactical Fighter Wing (USAF) and the commander 4th Tactical Fighter Wing (RTAF) share the responsibility for internal base defense matters. USAF tenant units have responsibility for the security of US occupied portions of the base, and the RTAF units are tasked with providing overall internal base defense. To accomplish these missions, the primary subordinate units utilized are the 366th Security Police Squadron and the Air Police Company, 4th Security Battalion. Coordination of all efforts, internal and external, rests with the Base Defense Security Center (BDSC).

e. **External Defense:** The defense plan for Takhli RTAFB tasks the 4th Tactical Fighter Wing, RTAF, augmented by the provincial police, with the mission of conducting patrols and maintaining surveillance within a 16 km radius of the air base. The 4th RCT, RTA, has the mission of supporting as requested. The initial relief force would consist of one rifle company of not less than 150 men and one full strength 107mm mortar platoon. Other forces would standby at their home station in Nakhon Sawan.

f. **Coordination:** Several coordination meetings have been held for representatives of the various units concerned and although no full rehearsal to include the 4th RCT has been conducted (funding is a problem since the

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4th RCT is located 65 km from the base), concerned Commanders of the 4th RCT have conducted a reconnaissance of the area surrounding Takhlí RTAFB. Personnel from Detachment IIIA, ARAG, stationed at Nakhon Sawan have served as coordinators between USAF and the 4th RCT, and have arranged and attended several coordination meetings.

g. Evaluation: An excellent plan for the defense of Takhlí RTAFB is in effect at present and provides for adequate defense. There are, however, some weak points that would probably come to light during a major attack by a determined insurgent force.

(1) The time-distance factor involved in moving the reaction force from Nakhon Sawan to Takhlí is excessive and experience in Vietnam shows that by the time the reaction force could be alerted, loaded and move the 65 km, the attack would probably be over and the damage done. The reaction force could however, be useful in engaging the insurgent force during their withdrawal.

(2) Takhlí Hill Signal Site is not included in the overall base defense plan of Takhlí RTAFB although a certain amount of residual protection is afforded because it is located near the base.

(3) Joint coordination meetings are not held frequently enough to insure that plans and personnel are kept current. With the constant rotation of responsible USAF personnel coordination should be conducted at least on a quarterly basis.

(4) A full scale rehearsal of the base defense plan, to include the 4th RCT reaction force is needed to test the plan.

3. KHO KHA AIR STATION:

a. General: Kho Kha Air Station is located 10 miles south of Lampang adjacent to Highway 1. It is situated on flat open terrain and is surrounded by cultivated areas which allows good visibility in all directions except to the north. North of the perimeter, the land is used to grow sugar cane and during the growing season visibility is severely restricted. The station is staffed by approximately 250 USAF personnel and civilian technicians. No RTAF units are located at the station.

b. Intelligence: The security threat to Kho Kha Air Station is considered to be low for both sapper and stand-off attack. There are no armed insurgents identified in the area of the station and it has never been attacked. None of the villages within a 16 km radius of the station have been suspected of being insurgent sympathizers; having an infrastructure; or providing food, intelligence or porter support for insurgents.

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c. Friendly Forces: In addition to the 40 American Guards and 65 Thai Guards dedicated to internal defense of the station the following friendly military forces and Thai National Police Forces are capable of rendering assistance to the station in the event of an insurgent attack:

<u>RTG UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>APPROX. STRENGTH</u>
HQ, 7th Mil Circle	Lampang	300
2nd Inf BN, 7th RCT	Lampang	387
7th Tank Co, 7th RCT	Lampang	100
4th Engr Company, 7th RCT	Lampang	141
7th APC Plt, 7th RCT	Lampang	40
Special Action Force (PP)	Lampang	50
Armored Car Reaction Force (PP)	Lampang	13
Amphoe Muang (PP)	Lampang	90
Amphoe Kho Kha (PP)	Kho Kha	38

d. Internal Defense: Internal defense procedures are well planned and could be adequately performed by the 100 plus Thai and American guards. A chain-link fence and perimeter lights add to the internal base defense capability and plans have been approved for 12 perimeter guard towers and 17 cement bunkers for fighting positions.

e. External Defense: Although there are no RTG forces with formal responsibility for the security of the Air Station and no reaction force has been designated, close informal coordination, to include reaction drills, has taken place between Ko Kho Air Station and Lampang Provincial Police.

f. Coordination: In the absence of directives from higher headquarters, the local RTG units will not coordinate or plan for the security of Kho Kha air station. While some police units have conducted reaction drills and discussed security measures freely, no real commitment is valid without formal orders. Detachment III, ARAG, Advisory personnel have requested, through channels, that Supreme Command Headquarters designate an RTG contingency force, but currently the RTG does not view the threat to this base as being significant enough to justify a commitment. The RTG forces do not have any facility which can serve as a combined operation center, and the command and control problems in Lampang are complicated because the CG, 7th Military Circle is the ranking individual, while the combat units are under the command of the 7th RCT, located in Chiang Mai.

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g. Evaluation: Internal base defense procedures are well planned and provided for at Kho Kha Air Station, however, external defense is deficient. This deficiency is due mainly to a lack of a feeling of urgency and need for defensive planning on the part of the RTG in this area. This has resulted in not having a unit assigned the responsibility for acting as a reaction force. No headquarters has been given the responsibility for establishing a combined operations center. Although the insurgency threat to Kho Kha Air Station is considered low at present, normal procedure should dictate the formulation of contingency planning and the designation of a responsible reaction force. These problems cannot be resolved at the Detachment III level because the required action must be taken at Thai Supreme Command Headquarters.

4. USCG LORAN STATION (HANG CHAT/LAMPANG):

a. General: The USCG Loran Station is situated on approximately 47 acres of cleared land about 2 km east of Amphoe Hang Chat and 18 km west of Lampang. The installation is located on relatively flat terrain with heavy brush surrounding the perimeter on all sides which severely restricts observation to about 10 meters. The USCG elements consists of two officers and 26 EM, with 15 men required to be on the station at night.

b. Intelligence: The security threat to the USCG Loran Station is considered to be low for both sapper and stand-off-attack. There are no armed insurgents identified in the area of the station and it has never been attacked. None of the villages within a 16 km radius of the station have been suspected of insurgent sympathies; of having infrastructures; or of providing food, intelligence, or porter support for insurgents.

c. Friendly Forces: In addition to 12 Thai Security Guards, supervised by one RTA NCO and the USCG personnel, the following friendly military forces and Thai National Police forces are capable of rendering assistance to the station in the event of an insurgent attack:

<u>RTG UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>APPROX STRENGTH</u>
HQ, 7th Mil Circle	Lampang	300
2nd INF BN, 7th RCT	Lampang	387
7th Tank Co, 7th RCT	Lampang	100
4th Engr Co, 7th RCT	Lampang	141
7th APC Plt, 7th RCT	Lampang	40
Special Action Force (PP)	Lampang	50

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<u>RTG UNITS</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>APPROX STRENGTH</u>
Armored Car Reaction Force (PP)	Lampang	13
Amphoe Huang (PP)	Lampang	90
Amphoe Hang Chat (PP)	Hang Chat	37

d. Internal Defense: A ten-strand barbed wire fence surrounds the station. The security force consists of 12 Thai security guard (TSG) supervised by one RTA NCO. Nine guards are on the station at night with 4 TSG on six-hour shifts and the NCO supervisor on a 12 hour shift. The sentries communicate with Motorola walkie-talkie radios. TSG are armed with M-1 carbines except for the sentries on post who carry M-16 rifles. Each sentry patrols an area roughly equivalent to a quarter of the reservation. The road from the main gate to the living quarters is lighted and security lights are positioned in the vicinity of the buildings and under the antenna. The north and eastern edges of the station are dark.

e. External Defense: There are no RTG forces with formal responsibility for the security of the Loran Station and no reaction force has been designated, but there has been informal liaison with the provincial police. The Hang Chat Police Station has four men on duty at night who have one jeep. PM radio contact between the TSG and these police is maintained. Three armored cars and additional provincial police and RTA units are stationed in Lampang, 18 km away. The nearest US installation is Kho Kha Air Station, about 35 km away. This station has no capability to provide reinforcements in the event of an attack; however, present plans call for the installation of land line communications between Kho Kha and the Loran Station which will facilitate relaying intelligence information and requests for assistance. Along with the police, the 2nd Infantry Battalion and the 7th Tank Company of the 7th Regimental Combat Team are located in Lampang and could provide reaction forces within approximately one or two hours.

f. Coordination: As is the case with Kho Kha Air Station the local RTG units will not coordinate or plan for the security of the USCG Loran Station. While the local provincial police unit at Hang Chat is friendly toward the personnel of the Loran Station and has freely discussed intelligence and security matters, no real commitment is valid without formal orders designating responsibility. Detachment III, ARAG, advisory personnel have requested, through channels, that Supreme Command Headquarters designate an RTG contingency force, but again as in the case of Kho Kha Air Station, the RTG does not view the threat to this station as being sufficient to justify a commitment at this time. The RTG forces do not have any facility which serves as a combined operations center. The command and control problems in Lampang are complicated because the CG, 7th Military Circle is the ranking individual, while the combat units are under the command of the 7th RCT located in Chiang Mai.

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g. Evaluation: The installation cannot be defended against a stand-off mortar attack in the absence of external assistance in the form of patrols or air cover. Currently, the installation is extremely vulnerable to a well-planned sapper attack. Major deficiencies include the isolation of the guard barracks, absence of bunker/fighting positions, inadequate lighting, inadequate fencing, lack of an automatic alarm system and defense plan, and the lack of formal contingency plans that would provide RTG assistance. These problems cannot be resolved at the Detachment III level because the required corrective measures must be initiated at the Thai Supreme Command level and by the US Coast Guard.

5. DETACHMENT B, 7TH RRFS, CHIANG MAI:

a. General: Detachment B, 7th RRFS is located approximately 6½ miles North of Chiang Mai on the Chiang Mai-Pang Highway (Hwy 3). The compound of the detachment is approximately 200 meters from the highway and occupies an area of about 8 acres. The site is surrounded by sparse woods and open farm land. A mountain range with foothills extends to within 1 km of the site. The site is staffed by a total of 14 EM including two NCO's. Three Federal Electric Thai civilian employees provide maintenance and 14 Thai Security Guards (TSG) provide security.

b. Intelligence: The security threat to Detachment B, 7th RRFS is considered to be low for both sapper and stand-off attack. There are no armed insurgents identified in the area of the site and it never has been attacked. None of the villages within a 16 km radius of the station are suspected of having insurgent sympathies or an infra-structure, nor of providing food, intelligence, or porter support for insurgents.

c. Friendly Forces: In addition to the 14 Thai Security Guards, which would be augmented by the 14 US personnel dedicated to internal defense of the station, the following friendly military forces and Thai National Police Forces are capable of rendering assistance to the site in the event of an insurgent attack:

<u>RTG UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>APPROX STRENGTH</u>
HQ 7th RCT (Incl HHC, Hwy Mortar Co, Serv Co, & Med Co)	Chiang Mai	500
1st Inf BN, 7th RCT	Chiang Mai	756
7th Arty BN, 7th RCT	Mae Rim	398
RTA Pack Squadron	Mae Rim	200
Military District	Chiang Mai	120

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<u>RTG UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>APPROX STRENGTH</u>
Kuang Station (PP)	Chiang Mai	171
Amphoe Mae Rim (PP)	Mae Rim	30
Mobile Reserve Plts (BPP)	Mae Rim	60
Weapons Reserve Plt (EPP)	Mae Rim	30

d. Internal Defense: Although the security force dedicated to internal defense is adequate for a limited defense, the physical security measures are inadequate. The site is surrounded by a wooden fence about five feet high that is inadequate even for its intended purpose: to prevent large animals from entering the compound. The site has three observation towers that are not constructed to withstand small arms fire and are only 5' high. There are 12 security lights around the building, but 12-14 more are needed to completely light the compound.

e. External Defense: Again there are no RTG forces with formal responsibility for the security of Detachment B, 7th RRFS, and no reaction force has been designated. The Detachment does however, enjoy excellent relations and close liaison with the commander of the adjacent RTA pack squadron. Communications have been established between the two units and the Squadron Commander has stated that the pack squadron will informally assume responsibility for guarding the area south and west of the detachment's site. It is also likely that the police of Mae Rim would keep the detachment informed of any insurgent threat developments and the Border Patrol Units would assist in a real emergency.

f. Coordination: No directive has been issued by higher headquarters and therefore local RTG units will not coordinate or plan on a formal basis. Thus, all coordination is informal and restricted to the Pack Squadron and the local police; however, no commitment is valid without formal orders designating responsibility. Detachment III, ARAG, advisory personnel have requested through channels, that Supreme Command Headquarters designate an RTG contingency force, but again the RTG does not view the threat to this site as being significant enough to justify a commitment at this time. There is no local combined operations center to provide command/control of the various RTA and TNPD forces. Joint Security Center 5, which currently functions as a joint intelligence gathering agency, could be augmented with personnel and equipment and serve as a joint or combined operations center.

g. Evaluation: The internal security measures in effect are adequate to suppress theft and prowlers but would do little to repress an armed attack. In all probability, intelligence concerning a known CT threat to the site would be relayed to Detachment B. Although informal agreements exist for limited external defense assistance, a need exists for formal commitment of RTG support.

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6. DETACHMENT 415, HQ COMD (CHIANG MAI):

a. General: The compound of Detachment 415, HQ COMD is located 5 miles West of Chiang Mai on the slopes of Doi Suthep mountain. It is approximately 3000 meters square in area, and spreads over mountainous, heavily wooded terrain. A total of 15 USAF personnel, including one officer, are assigned and security is provided by three Thai civilian guards.

b. Intelligence: The security threat to Detachment 415 is considered to be low for both sapper and stand-off attack. There are no armed insurgents identified in the area of the compound and it never has been attacked. None of the villages within a 16 km radius of the compound are suspected of insurgent sympathies, infrastructure, or providing food, intelligence or porter service for insurgents.

c. Friendly Forces: Because this unit is also located in close proximity to Chiang Mai and Detachment B, 7th RRFS, the RTG units that are capable of rendering assistance to the organizational security personnel is the same as shown in paragraph 5c.

d. Internal Defense: Little has been done concerning internal defense at the compound. The mission of the Detachment is not war-related and therefore the Detachment 415 Disaster Preparedness Plan calls for evacuation of the compound in the event of a threat of hostilities. The Thai civilian guards are not armed and only provide protection against theft. The area is surrounded by a seven-foot chain-link fence with a three foot, barbed wire overhang and has all-around security lighting.

e. External Defense: Because the disaster preparedness Operations Plan for Det 415 is designated primarily for orderly evacuation and because the threat of a surprise attack is remote, no coordination has been effected with RTG forces.

f. Evaluation: With minimal warning, this unit could effect its plan for evacuation of the site. However, if a surprise sapper or stand-off attack were directed at this installation, it would be next to helpless to defend itself or to evacuate. Also, only the Thai guards are on duty at the site at night and a surprise attack would render the equipment on the site vulnerable to compromise because the destruction or evacuation of sensitive records and equipment would be impossible.

7. OICC THAILAND DETACHMENT (CHIANG MAI): Although Detachment III has been tasked with coordinating the base security of the OICC Thailand Detachment, this activity consists of two individuals who are advisors to a road construction crew and no physical facility exists. An informal agreement does exist between the members of the OICC Thailand Detachment and the construction crew they advise. The construction crew will assist in the evacuation of detachment personnel in the event of a CT ambush.

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8. CI TRAINING CAMP (LAMPANG):

a. General: The CI Training Camp, is located approximately 70 km North of Lampang near the Lampang-Chiang Rai Highway (Highway 1). It is situated in very dense jungle terrain with a USSF "A" Team of 8 men assigned as advisors.

b. Intelligence: This base has never been attacked and no known threat exists, but because of its isolated location on the fringe of an active CT operational area, there is a possibility of a sapper or stand-off attack.

c. Friendly Forces: Located at the CI camp are approximately 70 Thai Cadre. During a training cycle a full infantry company is in residence along with an infantry platoon of support personnel. Other RTG units capable of reinforcing are located in Lampang as shown in paragraph 3c.

d. Internal Defense: The RTA cadre patrol the inside of the perimeter during darkness.

e. External Defense: The student company, when in cycle, patrols the perimeter of the camp.

f. Coordination: No formal provisions have been made for a reaction force in the event of a sapper or stand-off attack. Because of the time distance factor involved, the units located in Lampang would be of little use, even if given a reinforcing mission, in reaction to a surprise attack.

g. Evaluation: Because of the qualifications of the training cadre and the strength of the camp when a company is in a training cycle, it is believed that the camp is capable of defending itself and the USSF "A" Team.

9. DETACHMENT OF THE USAF 1973RD COMMUNICATIONS SQUADRON AND THE DETACHMENT OF THE 6TH AERIAL PORT SQUADRON-CHIANG MAI AIRPORT:

These two units are located within the Chiang Mai Airport area and together total 34 USAF personnel. There is no known insurgent threat at this location, and security is provided by a RTAF Infantry Company of 120 men. This RTAF unit has a specific mission to provide security for all RTG activities at the Chiang Mai Airfield, to include the USAF Detachments. Presently, a formal agreement does exist which requires elements of the 7th RCT to be dispatched to the Chiang Mai Airfield as a reaction force in the event the airfield is threatened.

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10. PEC STRATCOM SITE (PHITSANULOKE)

a. General: The PEC STRATCOM Site, Phitsanuloke, is located on the Phitsanuloke RTAF Base and is surrounded by land which contains an abundance of rice paddies and other farm crops. Although the area has been cleared for 100 yards, the area within this radius contains many levees which could afford concealment to insurgent forces. There are also aircraft pavements located in the area surrounding the site which would afford excellent cover for enemy forces. A total of 54 personnel (USAF, US Civilian and Thai) maintain the communications site. The ICS, MARC-98 and power plant are maintained by 14 US civilians and 14 Thai civilian employees. The communications van proper is maintained by 3 USAF personnel. Security is provided by 19 Thai guards and 4 USAF Security Police with their parent unit, the 432nd CSG, located in Udorn, Thailand.

b. Intelligence: The security threat to the PEC STRATCOM site is considered to be low for both sapper and stand-off attack. Although this site has never been attacked, there has been increased insurgent activity in the low-land sections of Phetchabun and Phitsanuloke provinces adjacent to the Phu Inm lo mountains. None of the villages within a 16km radius of the site have been suspected of insurgent sympathies, or of having an infrastructure, however there have been intelligence reports of CT personnel buying food and supplies in Phitsanuloke City.

c. Friendly Forces: In addition to the organic security force of 19 Thai and 4 US Air Force guards, dedicated to internal defense of the site, the following friendly military forces are capable of rendering assistance to the station in the event of an insurgent attack:

<u>RTG UNIT</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>APPROXIMATE STRENGTH</u>
HQ, 3RD RTA	Phitsanuloke	467
3rd ASCOM	Phitsanuloke	103
HQ, 4th Inf Div	Phitsanuloke	308
3rd BN, 4th RCT	Phitsanuloke	769
Security Det, 4th Wing, RTAF	Phitsanuloke	204

d. Internal Defense: Internal defense procedures are planned for and the organic security force of the site is integrated into the overall RTAF base defense plan. The physical preparations to defend against an attack are adequate and consists of a 8' high chain link fence topped with barbed wire, 4 sandbag bunkers and adequate illumination. The main deterrent to adequate defense of the site is a 15 foot high aircraft pavement immediately adjacent to the south side of the perimeter which

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blocks line of site observation outside of the fence.

e. External Defense: The FEC STRATCOM Site is located on a RTAF base and would of necessity be included in the base defense. Although a reaction force, other than elements of the security detachment not on duty, has not been designated formally, it is safe to assume the 3rd RTA would dispatch a force, probably from the 4th Infantry Division, to render assistance in the event of an attack on the air base.

f. Coordination: No formal coordination has taken place between RTG forces for the external defense of the base. In the event of an increase of the threat level, 3rd RTA Headquarters could act as a control element with very little difficulty. There are sufficient RTA forces available in the Phitsanuloke area to act as a reaction force. Coordination has been effected for internal security. The RTAF security element will dispatch a small reaction force if the FEC STRATCOM site is attacked and the land line communications has been established between the site and the RTAF security element.

g. Evaluation: With a minimum amount of effort, such as leveling the aircraft revetment, internal security measures could be adequate. The formal agreement between the RTAF and the RTA units in the area for a combined defense of the airfield would enhance the external defense capability but, based on the present threat, this step is unlikely. If, however, the threat level increases, it is anticipated cooperation would be affected.

11. SUMMARY:

Because of the low threat level, with the exception of Takhli RTAFB, Thai officers are often apathetic toward over-all base defense and lack of sense of urgency necessary for effective and thorough planning. They often cite this low threat level, lack of funds and direction from higher headquarters, and other excuses for not conducting base defense meetings and rehearsals. On the American side, frequently the same apathy is experienced. The commanders limit their interest in base defense to protecting against theft and only half-hearted interest is displayed in defense against CT attack. However, when interest is shown on the part of American commanders, frequently informal agreements are reached which in the absence of implementing directives from the Thai Supreme Headquarters, are the best that can be hoped for at this time.

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ANNEX G

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

1. (U) GENERAL: This Annex is designed to evaluate the psyops effort as it presently exists in Northern Thailand.

2. (C) DISCUSSION:

a. In most areas, the insurgency existing in North Thailand is in its incipient phase. In some areas, notably the Chiang Kham district of Nan province, there is evidence that the CPT is moving towards the intermediate phase of insurgency. During the incipient phase of an insurgency, the majority of the Psyop effort should be directed towards the support of military civic action, economic developmental programs, and political and social improvement programs. In those areas where the Communist Terrorist (CT) insurgency is moving into the intermediate phase, population and resources control measures should be receiving the majority of the Psyop effort. A successful Psyop program must be coordinated by all the RTG agencies involved. Each agency must have a clear understanding of the background and expectations of the population of the area, and of the insurgent's organization and motivation. Psyop programs for North Thailand must correlate the needs of the population with the needs of the Royal Thai Government. The propaganda apparatus of the CPT is highly sophisticated and extremely capable. Each psyop action employed by the RTG is swiftly countered by a CPT propaganda program designed for the CT. Although a direct appeal to the CT may not result in substantial numbers of ralliers/defector returnees, the continued use of psyop by the RTG will often lower the morale of the CT and thereby decrease his effectiveness. These direct appeals to the CT should emphasize the guile and deception practiced by the CT and the enhancement of the rallier's dignity for his recognition of the unnatural actions of the CT. The insurgents should always be targeted for psyop surrender and amnesty programs after successful RTG military operations. Psyop programs can be tailored to known or suspected CT vulnerabilities such as individual dignity, family unity, lack of food and supplies, recent defeats, and health problems. It is generally recognized that the CT live under very austere conditions and are frequently forced to move out of their base camps by the pressure of military operations. These conditions, if exploited by effective and well-planned psyop will often lead to an increased rate of defection or return to government control. There is a vast store of information already available which could be exploited by psyop to the considerable embarrassment of the CPT.

b. The ethnic minority groups of North Thailand are the prime targets of the CPT insurgency, particularly the mountain tribes people. The language and cultural differences of these groups present a problem to Psyop personnel inasmuch as most of these are members of the military elite and therefore unable to identify with the target groups. The

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average military Psyop team is rarely fluent in more than one dialect other than central Thai. It is often difficult for the RTG officials to identify with the underprivileged ethnic minorities who generally lack knowledge of the central government and who usually care less. The lack of formal education, or worldliness, of these minorities, and their poor economic conditions, make them highly susceptible to the CT propaganda. Also, since many of the CT are themselves members of these minorities, they have an initial advantage over the RTG. Psyop directed at these minority groups should concentrate on high-impact, short-range improvement programs which are readily identifiable with the government's interest in the social problems of these groups. The majority of the government programs should be civic action projects such as road building, well drilling, construction of schools and small dams for the conservation of water resources, medical assistance, and educational programs. All these civic action programs must be supported by Psyop campaigns which will inform the populace exactly what the government is trying to do and why. Since there will seldom be enough trained Psyop personnel to follow-up on all the projects, it will be necessary to enlist the aid and willing cooperation of the local civilian media in attempts to inform the majority of the members of the minority groups about the programs.

c. The G-5, 3rd RTA has primary staff responsibility for Psyop. In addition to the attached and Opcon assets, the G-5 section consists of four officers and five NCO's. It is headed by a Special Colonel who does understand and appreciate the Psyop requirements of the 3rd Army area. The G-5 Psyop and civic action activities are governed by the CSOC Psyop SOP. The Psyop officer coordinates the programs primarily in the Tri-Province Area (Loei, Phitsanuloke, and Petchabun) and monitors other programs in North Thailand. Additional guidance is provided by the Psyop officer or deputy Psyop officer of the Army staff at the RTA Tactical Operations Center (TOC) in Bangkok. The G-5 takes an active part in Psyop through staff guidance, coordination with provincial CSOP, and personal inspections of ongoing Psyop programs. The G-5 coordinates the use of the U-10 aircraft normally stationed at Lomsak for Psyop loudspeaker and leaflet drop missions through the Direct Air Support Center (DASC) located with 3rd Army Forward headquarters. Use of the U-10 is infrequent, primarily due to a lack of defectors who could be exploited by aerial Psyop messages.

d. 3rd RTA/CSOD-CSOR III currently has attached to it eight Psyop teams from the RTA Psyop Battalion. These teams have been regularly and frequently utilized since their attachment. Because they are attached by CSOC to the CSOD-CSOR, there is considerable flexibility in their use. These teams are well equipped, mobile, and generally well trained. They are ideally suited for attachment to RTA combat units committed to counter-insurgency operations or field training exercises. They can also be employed with RTA units or civilian agencies who are conducting civic action

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projects. These teams are CSOC funded, and their TDY per diem status permits their deployment for extended periods. They are also capable of providing Psyop training for the RTA units to which they are assigned. The teams are rotated through their parent unit, the RTA Psyop Battalion at Lopburi, for refresher training and updated instruction in Psyop. Problem areas include occasional inability of team members to communicate in the local dialects. The teams are normally equipped with a 3/4 ton truck, trailer, movie and slide projectors, generator, amplifier, tape recorder, radio, and a movie screen. Some of the teams are now equipped with lightweight field equipment: a lightweight amplifier, a Sanyo or Panasonic portable cassette tape recorder, two lightweight 70 watt loudspeakers, and a field type visual aids kit. The advantage of the lightweight equipment is that it breaks down into four equal man-loads of about 15 pounds each, whereas the regular team equipment, when arranged for combat Psyop, breaks down into only two equal loads of about 30 pounds, much too heavy to carry for any length of time in a hilly, jungle-covered area. These teams consist of four men, Psyop trained in Lopburi, and cross-trained in team functions. They can produce field-type leaflets and posters by means of a silk-screen printing kit which is usually issued to the military tactical Psyop teams when they are attached to combat units.

e. Each Special Operations Center (SOC) has one RTA Psyop Battalion military Psyop team attached to it for consolidation type Psyop. As a general rule, these teams have three men instead of four. These teams provide an essential asset to the SOC elements wherever they operate. Since the SOC normally operate in the remote parts of the Kingdom, there are some problems with vehicle maintenance and spare parts for the team equipment.

f. Radio Station 914, established by the National Security Command (NSC) and dedicated in February 1973, has not yet been operating long enough to permit an evaluation of its effectiveness. It is hoped that Radio 914 will be as efficient as Radio 909 in Sakon Nakhon or Radio 912 in Narathiwat. It is expected that Radio 914 will be instrumental in influencing the Hill Tribes in its listening area into returning to RTG control and into supporting the government programs.

g. The major combat element of the 3rd RTA Army is the 4th Infantry Division. The division does not have an organic Psyop capability; however, the Chief of Staff of the division is also the Army G-5. Psyop personnel and Psyop teams must be attached to the division if required for normal operations or training exercises. Other 3rd Army combat elements include the 11th and the 31st Regimental Combat Teams, and the Cavalry Division (FWD), equivalent to a Combat Command plus support units. The Cavalry Division (FWD) does have an organic Psyop capability which has been extensively engaged in propaganda appeals towards the Hilltribes people in Eastern and Northern Nan province.

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h. The Office of National Psychological Operations (ONPO) currently monitors the activities of any Psyop Mobile Information Service Teams (MIST) attached to the provincial CSOP. This organization is sometimes referred to as NIPSO (National Information and Psyop Organization). While NIPSO has been established to develop and supervise national Psyop programs, it is in fact more pro-forma than substantive, and supervised by other agencies which are taking the active role in National Information programs. Activities supervised by ONPO include those of the eight teams attached to 3rd RTA by CSOC from the RTA Psyop Battalion assets and the seven former USIS Information Service Teams (MIST) now belonging to province headquarters of the CSOC designated counterinsurgency threat provinces. NIPSO/ONPO is an arm of CSOC HQ in Bangkok, and as such is responsible for national information programs, except as already noted. Psyop activities are monitored mainly by the CSOC Psyop section in coordination with the Psyop section of the RTA TOC. The effective utilization of these teams depends upon the attitude of the province governor and upon the qualifications of his Psyop officer. The MIST teams are forbidden by CSOC directive from taking part in active military operations, and are usually employed for consolidation Psyop in liberated areas or in areas where a government presence is either required or desirable to achieve local objectives. The MIST perform minor Medcaps and other minor civic action within their own capabilities. There are no definitive prerequisites for province Psyop officers. They are usually appointed by the province governor and it is possible that some of the appointed Psyop officers lack the training and experience necessary to administer an effective Psyop program.

i. There are two Joint Security Centers (JSC) located in Northern Thailand. These function as information collection and processing centers. At present, there are two Psyop qualified personnel at JSC-6, and none in JSC-5. A coordination meeting was held at HQ, 3d Army in 1970 with membership from PRD, 3rd RTA, CSOC, and JSC-5. The meeting provided the basis for the Army to develop specifically directed Psyop programs using defectors/returnees/ralliers. Raw information and ideas are developed for broadcast by PRD station programmers in coordination with JSC-5. The final product is reviewed by JSC-5 who has been given broadcast approval authority, after which the program, if approved, is broadcast over PRD stations. The present programs appear to be a hit-or-miss proposition in that there is often considerable delay between the time a rallier is interviewed and the time his message is broadcast.

j. In addition to the Psyop assets mentioned above, there are a considerable number of Psyop audio-visual units operating in North Thailand from time to time from the RTG departments of ARD, Agriculture, Public Health, Communist Development, Education, IDIA, and the National Police.

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Because of the number of agencies involved, it is difficult to ascertain exactly how many and what types of Psyop assets from these agencies are working in North Thailand. The presence of these teams undoubtedly hinders the overall effectiveness of any Psyop programs for the North inasmuch as the activities of the teams are not coordinated either through CSOC Psyop section or the RTA TOC Psyop section. All Psyop assets in any area must work on a coordinated effort and cooperate to insure maximum effectiveness.

k. The Royal Thai Government does not have the necessary administrative machinery to handle a mass exodus of the hill tribes people from their current living areas to RTG controlled areas. The governors of provinces in which refugee camps are presently located do not have sufficient space, equipment, supplies, or funds to provide adequate living conditions for a sudden increase in numbers of returnees/ralliers/defectors. Failure to provide at least marginal facilities for these people could result in loss of effectiveness of all RTG/RTA Psyops, and loss of face for the Thai government. Any failure on the part of the Thai government to provide for the comfort and welfare of the refugees will be readily exploitable by the CPT propaganda apparatus.

3. (C-MF) SUMMARY:

a. 3rd RTA/CSOD-CSOR III has Psyop assets available to conduct effective Psyop programs in North Thailand.

b. At the present time, there is no effective coordination of the overall Psyop programs in North Thailand.

c. The most profitable targets for Psyop programs in the North are the rural and ethnic minority population groups.

d. A complete, detailed inventory of all assets in North Thailand is required as a basis for development of a unified area Psyop program.

e. The 4th Infantry Division can complement the existing Psyop assets by designating and training selected personnel in its organic units in Psyop techniques.

f. The U-10 aircraft has not been utilized effectively due to a lack of exploitable defectors.

g. RTG does not have the capability to care for a mass influx of refugees.

4. (C-MF) RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. That the G-5, 3rd RTA be tasked to coordinate, provide planning guidance, and staff supervision for all Psyop programs of all RTG agencies

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in North Thailand, and be given sufficient authority to ensure minimum interference in 3rd RTA Psyop programs and maximum cooperation of all Psyop teams or assets working in the North.

b. That the major portion of the Psyop effort in the North be targeted toward the rural and ethnic minority population groups.

c. That personnel qualified in the language dialects of the ethnic minority groups and in their social and political culture be assigned to 3rd Army for utilization in Psyop programs in North Thailand.

d. That a thorough and immediate assessment of all Psyop assets in North Thailand be made

e. That G-5, 3rd RTA be persuaded to request an MTT (Mobile Training Team) from the RTA Psyop Battalion to serve as an instructor group for Psyop techniques and consideration for the personnel of all Army units in North Thailand.

f. That message appeals be developed and broadcast via the U-10 aircraft to increase the utilization of the aircraft.

g. That Psyop programs to be developed for the North capitalize upon the deception and racial control practices of the CPT and the CT, and stress the concept of national solidarity against the interference of foreigners in Thailand.

TARAGC (21 May 73) 1st Ind
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John R. Hermann
525-46-1324) RCS CSFOR-74

Chief, Army Advisory Group, USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI, APO SF 96346 6 June 73
THRU Commander, USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI, APO San Francisco 96346

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: for OT UT,
Department of the Army, Washington D.C. 20310

1. (U) Subject report was prepared by Colonel Hermann at the end of his one year tour in Phitsanulok, Thailand as Commanding Officer of Detachment III (Northern Thailand) and Senior Advisor to Headquarters, 3rd Royal Thai Army. This excellent report documents the situation as currently being experienced in North Thailand. Colonel Hermann and Detachment III's performance during the past year has had a most favorable and significant impact on the advisory effort in Thailand as can be seen when studying this most informative report. During the past year significant improvements have been made in many areas due to the leadership and highly professional effort displayed by the CO and members of Detachment III. The outstanding rapport with Thai counterparts in the most active area of counterinsurgency operations has provided significant data by which the effectiveness of the over all advisory effort will be enhanced. Some critical or controversial statements contained in this report do not apply to units outside the Third Army area. Overall, I indorse the content of this report with the following exceptions or additions for clarification:

a. Reference Page 9 paragraph 7b(2). Strongly concur that all personnel assigned to up country advisory duties be language trained. The influence of an advisor is directly proportional to his ability to speak Thai.

b. Reference Page 9, paragraph 7b(4). Concur that all detachments should have as a minimum two personnel authorized and assigned.

c. Reference Page 9, paragraph 7c(1). In accordance with US Mission and RTA policy advisors may not accompany units, below division headquarters level, on CI operations. This policy is understandable by current doctrine however it does force a reliance on second or third hand information as to a units effectiveness and or weakness. The Thai's "Save Face" system more often than not will delete most or all deficiencies that might be reported through U.S. channels.

d. Reference Page 10, paragraph 7c(3). Concur. There is no definitive written guidance agreed to by the RTA and the US mission as to just what an advisors specific duties are or to the type/level of RTA information to which he is allowed access. Dependence on interpersonal relationships produces varied results. E.g. some advisors may be limited to the monitorship

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of only MAP logistical matters, others may have access to most information on planning, training, operations and logistics.

e. Reference Page 11, paragraph 7c (4). For the past six months TARAG has included the J2 and other staff representatives in the monthly CHARAG's commanders and staff conference. Additionally, a Detachments CO's reading file has been established which includes pertinent information on current situations, policy, trends and/or issues. In many cases secret or sensitive information precludes or limits the distribution of information to the field detachments.

f. Reference Page 11, paragraph 7d (1). USA Hospital policy is that the urgency of the medical or dental condition dictates priority of treatment and not the individuals job.

g. Reference Page 11, paragraph 7d (2). A check with the JUSMAG IG revealed no formal complaints from Detachment III personnel had been received concerning a lack of mail service. There is no mail service on holidays in Bangkok or upcountry and the problem appears to be that up country mail is delayed an additional day for sorting prior to dispatch. The mail is forwarded up country twice a week thus when a holiday is involved a delay will be experienced. There are a total of 17 scheduled holidays for 1973; two of which occur on Friday and 8 on Monday; or a total of 10 days throughout the year in which the mail could be delayed by holidays alone. Vehicular and aircraft breakdown, bad flying weather may also cause delay. This matter is receiving CHTARAG personal attention.

h. Reference Page 11, paragraph 7d (3). Concur. Attempts are being made to hire local Thai Nationals as translators. It appears however that Budget/Personnel reductions may preclude this action.

i. Reference Page 11, paragraph 7d (4). Further study of the requirement for each Detachment to have a generator for back-up electrical power is required. Some detachments currently have backup generators and the need for one in each of the 24 detachments doesn't appear feasible. The RTA is responsible for all the electrical power at the JUSMAG houses. The results are not always satisfactory. When their power fails the advisor has no power either. Back-up generators for the detachments would require a change to the JTA.

j. Reference Page 12, paragraph 8c. Non concur that the new RTA policy is one of "containment". Recent conversations with RTA headquarters personnel plus recent RTA policy papers indicate a change in strategy. The change is from Bn or larger operations to the use of small units supported by Bn or RCT headquarters plus supporting elements. The RTA insists that penetration

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and clearing of CT main base areas is and will remain a primary RTA mission. The Civil-Police-Military (CPM) through mutual reinforcing/supporting elements have the mission to restrict or interdict the CT from the village-urban areas. This mission has often been misinterpreted, particularly by US personnel, as "containment".

k. Reference Page 80 , paragraph 7a. The RTA, and advisory personnel have been informed that the majority of equipment for the 3rd ASCOM has been purchased/delivered. Apparently RTA has diverted or issued a quantity of the equipment to other units.

l. Reference Page 105 through 108 . The condition of medical equipment of all MAP supported hospitals is constantly checked by personnel from the MACTHAI Surgeons Office. The Medical Supply and Operations Advisors visit the 3rd Field Hospital quarterly. Currently the 3rd Field Hospital does not have any shortages which would impair their operational capability. During the past year the 3rd Field Hospital received new sterilizers, hospital beds plus other items. A complete operational check was made of the hospitals equipment prior to their last field training exercise (December 72).

2. (C) Reference the numerous statements made regarding publications; The RTA requirement for technical publications has increased as a result of the continued addition of newer equipment into the RTA inventory. The MAP publication fund (CT54-\$20,000 per year) administered by ARAG has not been adequate to meet RTA's demands for technical publications even though 90% of this fund has been devoted to purchasing technical manuals. The remainder has been used to purchase field manuals. Because of projected MAP funding in this area certain actions have been taken by ARAG:

a. An additional \$20,000 has been added to the 1973 fund (\$20,000) for a total of \$40,000 to be used to purchase publications this year. This additional purchase will help alleviate most of the shortages being experienced by RTA units.

b. As of 31 Dec 1973 ARAG will no longer accept requisitions from the RTA for the procurement of US Army field manuals with MAP funds. Furthermore, no technical publications will be MAP funded by ARAG beyond 30 June 1974.

c. RTA has been offered the opportunity to establish a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) case for the purchase of publications to fill present and follow on requirements. If the RTA accepts the FMS offer prior to 31 Dec 1973 for field manuals and 30 June 1974 for technical publications, there is no apparent reason why the provision of US military publications cannot continue with minimal disruption.

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d. RTA has been encouraged to greatly expand the translation and printing of technical publication in the Thai language in order to meet present and future demands.



R.W. HASSINGER
Colonel, Infantry
Chief


MACTC (21 May 73) 2d Ind
SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report (Colonel John R. Hermann
525-46-1324) RCS CSFOR-74

COMUSMACTHAI, HQ USMACTHAI/JUSMAGTHAI, APO San Francisco 96346

THRU: ~~Commander in Chief, USARPAC, APO 96558~~ WNC 20 Jun 73

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, ATTN: for OT UT,
Department of the Army, Washington D.C. 20310

1. Forwarded herewith are three copies of the subject report.
2. This is an excellent report reflecting the views and assessment of a very capable commander. I cannot, however, subscribe to the recommendation that US Advisors accompany Royal Thai Army combat units in counterinsurgency operations. The potential disadvantages to the US far outweigh any local advantages. The proper time to influence combat operations is before they begin and the place to influence them is in the training camps during field training.
3. An information copy has been furnished to CINCPAC.

2 Incl
as


THOMAS W. MELLEN
Major General, USA
Acting Commander

(This page is

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